Weekly Review of Orthodox Church News

A survey of developments in the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches worldwide.

4–10 October 2026

Contents

1. Top Stories of the Week

1.1 France — Crete ten years on: the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Chantilly conference (5–8 October)

What happened. From 5 to 8 October 2026 the Ecumenical Patriarchate held an international academic conference titled “The Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (2016–2026): Assessment and Prospects” at Chantilly (Oise), north of Paris. Bulgarian reports name the venue as the Les Fontaines conference centre in neighbouring Gouvieux. Patriarch Bartholomew flew to France on Monday 5 October and gave the inaugural address that evening. Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon chaired the organising committee. (Orthodoxie.com programme, Jivko Panev, 5–6 Oct — French; ec-patr.org programme — English; Orthodoxia News Agency, 5 Oct — Greek; Hristianstvo.bg, 10 Oct — Bulgarian)

The Council it commemorated met at the Orthodox Academy of Crete in Kolymvari on 19–26 June 2016. Ten of the fourteen generally recognised autocephalous Churches attended. The Patriarchates of Antioch, Moscow, Bulgaria and Georgia stayed away. Bartholomew named all four in his Chantilly address. The Antiochian Holy Synod, meeting at Balamand on 27 June 2016, said the Council had been “convened in the absence of four Autocephalous Churches representing more than half of the Orthodox faithful” and that its decisions were “non-binding” on Antioch. (Antiochian Synod statement, 27 June 2016, via OrthoChristian — English)

The programme. Nine working sessions followed the opening, most of them built around one of the six documents adopted at Crete:

  • Session I (5 October) covered the Council’s legacy and the Ecumenical Throne’s role.
  • Session II (6 October) took the Encyclical and the Message. Speakers included Bishop Maxim of the Serbian Patriarchate, on Metropolitan John (Zizioulas) of Pergamon, and Fr Hyacinthe Destivelle OP, who gave a Catholic reading.
  • Session III (6 October) addressed the diaspora.
  • Session IV (6 October) covered relations with the rest of the Christian world.
  • Session V (6 October) dealt with autonomy, with speakers from the Churches of Finland and Estonia and a Bulgarian canonist.
  • Session VI (7 October) took marriage and its impediments, including the Grand Ecclesiarch Aetios on “the second marriage of clergy: from the Holy and Great Council to the Holy and Sacred Synod”.
  • Session VII (7 October) was on fasting.
  • Session VIII (7 October) was on mission.
  • Session IX (7 October) covered the social document For the Life of the World.
  • Closing round table (8 October) brought together Archbishop John (Joan) of Tirana and All Albania, Metropolitan Job of Pisidia, Archdeacon John Chryssavgis, Professor Theodoros Giagkou and the Antiochian layman Carol Saba.

(Orthodoxie.com — French)

What the Patriarch said

The Patriarchate published the full Greek text of the inaugural address on the evening of 5 October. (ec-patr.org, 5 Oct — Greek) Four passages carry its argument.

  • On the four absent Churches. Their decision “caused great sorrow” (προεκάλεσε θλῖψιν πολλήν). Bartholomew said it had been “taken on the basis of extra-ecclesiastical criteria” and announced at the last moment. It “tested the functioning of synodality in Orthodoxy, but in no way touched its synodal identity”. He added that “no theological or ecclesiological reason existed for the Council not to take place”. He said that postponement “would have meant its definitive cancellation … and perhaps some wished for and pursued exactly that” (καί ἴσως αὐτό ἐπεθύμουν καί ἐπεδίωκόν τινες).
  • On reception. He quoted his own 2016 homily at Chania: receiving and implementing the decisions is “a synod after the Synod” (σύνοδον μετά τήν Σύνοδον).
  • On theology. The Council “revealed the power of theology as the iron arm of the Church” (τοῦ σιδηροῦ βραχίονος τῆς Ἐκκλησίας). He called for a “dialogical theology”. He also insisted that dialogue with culture “in no way means adapting to the spirit of the age and conforming to the world”.
  • On youth. “Care for youth belongs at the centre of the Council’s legacy.”

He also criticised “fundamentalism” and “intolerance”. He warned that the Church is threatened both by secularisation and by “barren introversion” (τήν ἄγονον ἐσωστρέφειαν), and he closed by citing Zizioulas. The address does not mention Ukraine, nor does it use the word “primacy”.

Greek church media read the address as aimed at the absent Churches. Vima Orthodoxias, in a piece signed by Giannis Papanikolaou, presented it as “the message to the four Churches”. The unsigned analysis in Ekklisia Online was headlined “Barbs from Bartholomew at those who perhaps wanted the Council of Crete cancelled”. (Vima Orthodoxias, 6 Oct — Greek; Ekklisia Online, 6–7 Oct — Greek; Orthodoxia News Agency, 6 Oct — Greek)

The assessments: what entered the life of the Churches?

Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon set the question in his welcome: the conference would ask which of the Council’s decisions “entered the life of the Churches and what, for the time being, remained on paper”. He insisted that decisions “cannot be imposed” and must be received gradually. On the absences he said: “That caused pain. It still hurts” (Αὐτὸ προεκάλεσε πόνον. Ἐξακολουθεῖ νὰ πονῇ). He called the assessment “an initial one … it will not be the last”. (Orthodox Times, 6 Oct — English; ec-patr.org — Greek)

His closing address on 8 October was built around the parable of the seed growing secretly. He named two dangers. The first is impatience, which “demands measurable fruits, decisions and numbers”. The second is forgetfulness: “synodal texts left on the shelves are remembered only on anniversaries.” His practical priority was to put the texts into the hands of priests, catechists, students and young people. To the absent Churches he said, “we do not forget their labour” (Τὸν κόπον αὐτῶν οὐ λησμονοῦμεν), and he prayed that “when the time of harvest comes, we may all be together.” No final communiqué was traced. The closing address announces neither published proceedings nor a date for any future council. (ec-patr.org, 8 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 8 Oct — English)

Metropolitan Job of Pisidia gave the most critical internal assessment. He is the Orthodox co-chair of the international Orthodox–Catholic dialogue. At Crete, he recalled, the hope had been that the Council would become “a regular institution convoked every seven or ten years”. That hope went unrealised because “the crisis through which the Orthodox Church is passing has not allowed this pious wish to be fulfilled.” He asked directly: “When will the next Holy and Great Council be convened?”

He also criticised several of the Council’s own choices:

  • the “historical name” formula used for non-Orthodox Churches in the relations document;
  • the reliance on canon 72 of the Council in Trullo for mixed marriages;
  • leaving fasting and mixed marriages to each autocephalous Church, which he warned risks contradictory decisions.

He also defended Zizioulas’s theology of the “person” against its critic Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos. (ec-patr.org, 8 Oct — French; Orthodox Times, 8 Oct — English)

Archbishop John of Albania called for “more regular pan-Orthodox synodal cooperation in the future” and supported a Council that “convenes periodically”, its timing left to “common ecclesial discernment”. He cited Bartholomew’s question: “Is it not time to curb the excesses of nationalism?” Greek agencies noted that he attended “at his own request”. (ec-patr.org, 8 Oct — English; Orthodoxia News Agency, 8 Oct — Greek)

Archdeacon John Chryssavgis spoke on conciliarity and primacy. “Synodality is not an event. It is a culture.” Conciliarity “depends upon consensus rather than imposition”, and “we need the many; but we also need the one, the first.” (ec-patr.org, 9 Oct — English)

Metropolitan Ignatios of Demetrias (Church of Greece) argued that the first hierarch “is needed not to speak in place of the others, but to make their meeting possible”. He quoted Zizioulas: “there can be no primacy without a Synod, nor a Synod without a First.” He counted 16 sessions at Crete, about 36 hours of debate and 183 bishops’ interventions. (Orthodox Times (Greek), 6 Oct — Greek)

Metropolitan Gregory of Cameroon (Patriarchate of Alexandria) used the sharpest language of the week. He spoke of “the culpable silence before the war of two Orthodox peoples”. He said some Churches “have become satellites of the untheological theory of the ‘Russian world'”. He named no Church and no country. (ec-patr.org, 6 Oct — Greek)

Live disputes behind the academic titles

  • Autonomy. The Bulgarian canonist Alexander Smotchevski traced how the Crete text on autonomy was drafted. In his reading, autonomy “is not established as an antechamber to autocephaly”. He showed that the Council itself added the words “canonical” (para. 2a) and “are judged” (para. 3d). (ec-patr.org, 7 Oct — Greek)
  • Finland. Dr Jelisei Heikkilä of the Church of Finland traced Finnish autonomy from Patriarch Tikhon (1921) and the 1923 Tomos to 1957, “when the Moscow Patriarchate withdrew its claim”. He argued that Finland is a local Church, not part of the diaspora. (ec-patr.org, 7 Oct — English)
  • Estonia. A speaker from the Orthodox Church of Estonia sat on the same autonomy panel, in a year when the Moscow-linked Estonian Christian Orthodox Church has taken Estonia’s law to Strasbourg (see §1.5). The programme alone shows the juxtaposition; no account of the Estonian paper was traced.
  • Diaspora. Fr Alexander Rentel (St Vladimir’s Seminary) spoke on “the unity of the Church, not jurisdictionalism, as the ultimate goal”.
  • Second marriage of clergy. The Grand Ecclesiarch Aetios spoke on second marriage “from the Holy and Great Council to the Holy and Sacred Synod” — the Phanar’s own synodal decisions.
  • Primacy. Jean-François Colosimo spoke on “primacy and kenosis”.

These last three papers are known from their programme titles only.

Who came from the Churches that stayed away

This is the question the anniversary invited, and the answers are more nuanced than the programme labels suggest.

  • Bulgaria. Metropolitan John of Varna took part by decision of the Bulgarian Holy Synod (protocol no. 5, 2 October). (Pirinsko, 6 Oct — Bulgarian) In an interview with Hristianstvo.bg, however, he drew a careful distinction. He came “with the blessing of the Bulgarian Patriarch and following a decision of the Holy Synod, although I appear in a personal capacity”. His text “was not coordinated with the Holy Synod”. And: “we did not sign the documents of the Council of Crete and did not attend it.” He said the invitation came by email from Metropolitan Emmanuel. (Hristianstvo.bg, 10 Oct — Bulgarian; the site publishes from a committed conservative standpoint) Novinata.bg presented his presence simply as official, citing a Patriarchate press release. (Novinata.bg, Nedyalko Tenev, 10 Oct — Bulgarian) The second Bulgarian speaker, Dr Smotchevski, is listed in the programme under “Patriarchate of Bulgaria”, but his paper’s byline gives only academic posts (Thessaloniki doctorate in canon law; Sofia University). Hristianstvo.bg links the Bulgarian participation to Bartholomew’s forthcoming visit to Bulgaria on 16–20 October (see §2.10).
  • Antioch. The programme lists Carol Saba under “Patriarchate of Antioch”. He told the conference otherwise: “I am not representing him [Patriarch John X] nor the Patriarchate of Antioch in our gathering here.” He said Antioch had been “prevented, and I repeat, prevented, at the very last moment” from attending Crete, because of its dispute with Jerusalem over Qatar. He added that “the QATAR dispute is still ongoing and still needs a resolution in accordance with the Athens 2013 Agreement.” He called for “Unity, Unity, Unity”, for new mediation mechanisms, and for the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the centre for resolving pan-Orthodox disputes. These are Saba’s own characterisations. For the record (as at 10 October 2026): Antioch severed communion with Jerusalem on 29 April 2014 and restored it on 20 October 2023. The jurisdiction over Qatar remains disputed between two Churches that are in communion. (ec-patr.org, 9 Oct — English)
  • Moscow and Georgia. Neither Church had a speaker on the programme. No reaction from the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations had been published by 10 October. The only Russian comment traced was an unsigned digest in the conservative Russkaya Liniya on 6 October. It said Bartholomew “insists on the supreme value of the decisions of the Council of Crete”. It questioned which of those decisions had affected the life of the local Churches, and noted that questions such as autocephaly had been removed from the Crete agenda. (Russkaya Liniya, 6 Oct — Russian)
  • Serbia. Serbia attended Crete in 2016 after briefly declining. Bishop Maxim’s paper on Zizioulas does not say whether he spoke for the Serbian Patriarchate.

Reading Chantilly: three questions to keep apart

  1. Is Crete being received? On this the speakers were candid rather than celebratory. Emmanuel’s “shelves”, Job’s unanswered “when”, John of Albania’s call for periodicity and Smotchevski’s account of narrowed texts all describe a Council whose documents have barely entered the life of most Churches. Above all, the institution of a regularly recurring council, which Crete was supposed to inaugurate, has not materialised.
  2. Was the 2016 absence ecclesiologically justified? Here the conference was a party, not a referee. Bartholomew’s “extra-ecclesiastical criteria” and his suggestion that “some” wanted the Council cancelled are his characterisations. Antioch’s 2016 position was that a Council without more than half the faithful could not bind it. Saba’s account is that Antioch was “prevented” by an unresolved jurisdictional dispute. Moscow’s view was not voiced at Chantilly.
  3. Is Chantilly about Moscow? Only one speaker, Gregory of Cameroon, used “Russian world” language, and even he named no one. The Patriarch’s address avoided Ukraine entirely. The Bulgarian and Antiochian participants were careful to speak in a personal capacity, which allowed their Churches to be present without being committed.

A complementary reading was published days before the conference. Krystallia Latsara (University of Helsinki), writing in the Finnish yearbook Ortodoksia, revisits the Council’s preparation and impact over ten years. According to its abstract, it warns of the outcomes if internal conflicts are left unaddressed (see §7).

The anniversary sits between two dated tests. The first is Bartholomew’s visit to Bulgaria (16–20 October), which a petition by clergy and laity opposes (see §2.10). The second is the Synaxis of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem, called for 30 November at the Phanar. No replies to that invitation had been reported by 10 October. (Orthodox Times, 5 Sept — English) Antioch, absent from Crete, is invited, and the two Churches’ restored communion since 2023 is the most recent proof that a broken relationship can be mended.

1.2 Ethiopia — Federal forces retake Mekelle; Eritrean troops reported inside Tigray; strikes near Axum

The war. The war in Tigray resumed in late September. This week it turned:

  • Mekelle. Late on Saturday 3 October the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) said it had “temporarily moved out of Mekelle” to “operate from somewhere else”. Federal forces and the pro-government Tigray Peace Forces (TPF) entered the regional capital. Sources date the entry to 3 or 4 October. (Al Jazeera, 4 Oct — English; AP via WSLS, 8 Oct — English)
  • Looting. Residents described looting in a security vacuum. A Mekelle resident told Al Jazeera: “It feels like we are back to square one.” (Al Jazeera, 5 Oct — English)
  • Eritrean troops. On 6–7 October, Reuters and AP witnesses reported Eritrean soldiers in Adigrat and Idaga Hamus. ACLED reported Ethiopian drone strikes on them. Eritrea’s information minister Yemane Gebremeskel did not deny the crossing; he said Eritrea was “not in the business of refuting wild allegations or narratives”. Eritrea had cut diplomatic ties on 1 October. Ethiopia’s foreign minister then wrote to the UN Security Council alleging invasion. (Al Jazeera, 7 Oct — English; AP via WSLS, 8 Oct — English)
  • The UN. On 9 October UN Secretary-General António Guterres said he was “gravely concerned”. (Rio Times, 10 Oct, citing RFI/ACLED — English)
  • Regional diplomacy. On 4 October, Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia met at New Alamein and called for a peaceful solution. Al Jazeera’s analyst Zecharias Zelalem says this does not amount to a formal alliance. (Al Jazeera, 9 Oct — English)
  • Axum. The holy city of the Ethiopian Orthodox tradition has been under reported federal strikes since 3 October, according to the US Critical Threats Project (American Enterprise Institute). The same source says who controls Axum is not established. (Critical Threats, 8 Oct — English)
  • Sheraro and Adwa. A drone strike on the displacement camp at Sheraro on 3 October killed at least eight people, according to the Brussels-based EEPA, which writes from a standpoint sympathetic to Tigrayan and Eritrean rights advocacy. Strikes on hotels in Adwa killed further civilians. The tolls differ by source and night: Borkena reports 11 dead at one hotel on the night of 3 October; Critical Threats reports nine killed on the night of 4–5 October; EEPA reports two killed on 7 October. They may be different strikes. (EEPA Situation Report 768, 8 Oct — English; Borkena, 7 Oct — English)
  • Amhara. The Amhara Fano National Movement claims large gains in North Shewa, within about 150 km of Addis Ababa. These are rebel claims and are unverified. (Borkena, 9 Oct — English)

The Churches. Ethiopia’s Catholic bishops issued a peace statement on 1 October. Bishop Tesfasellassie Medhin of Adigrat said on 20 September that “the sanctity of human life and human dignity must remain the non-negotiable priority.” On 30 September Pope Leo XIV said that “armed conflict never solves problems but only worsens them.” The OSV News report that gathered these appeals on 8 October contains none from the Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, from Patriarch Abune Mathias, or from the Tigrayan Orthodox hierarchy. (OSV News via Catholic Review, Fredrick Nzwili, 8 Oct — English)

A signed opinion piece in Borkena on 9 October, under the pen-name “Tazabi”, argued that ethnic polarisation among Amhara, Tigrayan and Eritrean Orthodox communities, exploited from abroad, threatens the Church with “silent relegation”. (Borkena, 9 Oct — English; Borkena writes from an Ethiopian-diaspora, Amhara-leaning standpoint)

1.3 Armenia — Parliament’s inquiry into the Church takes shape; Etchmiadzin calls it unlawful

Following the report of 3 October on the inquiry committee:

  • 6 October. The National Assembly set the committee’s membership at eleven, by 62 votes to none. The opposition factions Strong Armenia and Hayastan did not take part. Arman Yeghoyan of the ruling Civil Contract party chairs it, with a mandate of up to six months. (Armenpress, 6 Oct — Armenian; Noyan Tapan — English)
  • The brawl. The debate ended in a brawl. A Civil Contract MP referred to the Catholicos by his secular name, Ktrich Nersisyan. (Caucasian Knot, 6 Oct — English)
  • 8 October. Speaker Ruben Rubinyan approved seven named members, all from Civil Contract; the opposition seats remain unfilled. (Noyan Tapan, 9 Oct — English; 168.am, 9 Oct — Armenian, opposition-leaning)
  • Prosecutors. On 6 October the Prosecutor’s Office said it was examining the government’s 80-page report of 24 September for possible crimes. Questioned in parliament on 7 October about one of the report’s allegations, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said: “I know that our law enforcement authorities are examining the report.” He could not say whether a criminal case had been opened. (Armenpress, 7 Oct — English; PAN.am, 7 Oct — English)

The Mother See’s response. On 6 October Catholicos Karekin II met constitutional lawyers, including Gevorg Danielyan and Ara Zohrabyan. He said: “The Armenian Church has operated and operates within the law.” The participants called the committee unconstitutional. (Azatutyun, 7 Oct — Armenian)

On 9 October an assembly at Etchmiadzin chaired by the Catholicos issued a statement. Present were the bishops serving at the Mother See and the diocesan primates and locum tenens in Armenia. The statement expresses “decisive disagreement” with the committee, which it says “violates the internationally recognised fundamental principles of religious freedom and Church autonomy” and has been given powers not provided by law, including judging canonical matters. It says the National Assembly “is turning into a platform of illegality”. It asks the faithful to express their views only by lawful means and says the Mother See “will resolutely pursue all legal means to defend the rights of the Armenian Church”. The statement is presented as collective, and no individual signatories are named. (Azatutyun, 9 Oct — Armenian; Hetq — Armenian; A1+ — Armenian)

The government’s stated aim. Pashinyan said on 1 October that legislation must “end the seizure of the Church”, with transparency, binding conciliarity and social guarantees for clergy. On removing Karekin II he said: “Slowly, systematically, painfully, but we will go all the way.” No bill text had been tabled by 10 October. (Armenpress, 1 Oct — Armenian)

A US visit. On 4 October Paula White-Cain of the White House Faith Office attended the liturgy at Etchmiadzin and met the Catholicos, after the Yerevan Prayer Breakfast of 2–3 October. Whether government–Church relations were discussed was not stated publicly. (PAN.am, 5 Oct — English)

The criminal case. The case against the Catholicos and six bishops of the Supreme Spiritual Council remains with Judge Serzh Rushanyan of the Armavir Region Court, sitting at Vagharshapat. They are charged with obstructing a court ruling by defrocking a bishop. The Court of Cassation returned the case there on 7 September, after a jurisdiction dispute with a Yerevan court. The next hearing is on 30 October at 16:00, when the court is expected to rule on the defence motions. (Iravaban.net, 26 Sept — Armenian; PAN.am, 18 Sept — English)

Three questions, kept apart.

  1. Did the conduct alleged in the government’s report occur? That is for prosecutors and courts, and the report remains the government’s allegation.
  2. May a parliamentary committee examine a “crisis within the Church”, including canonical matters? The Church’s own formulation is that it may not, on grounds of religious autonomy. The majority’s is that the committee asks questions within constitutional bounds.
  3. Is the criminal case part of the same campaign? The defence says so; the prosecution says it concerns the enforcement of a court ruling.

1.4 Sinai — A two-week window before Egypt’s Court of Cassation rules on 24 October

Greek press reports describe a decisive fortnight for the autonomous Archbishopric of Sinai and the Monastery of St Catherine.

  • The court date. Egypt’s Court of Cassation is expected to rule on 24 October, after four postponements, unless a settlement is reached first. (Ekklisia Online, 9 Oct, citing Parapolitika — Greek)
  • The proposed deal. According to the same report, the arrangement under discussion would not transfer ownership. It would instead give permanent, rent-free, exclusive use of the religious sites. Talks have been suspended since August. Archbishop Symeon, recovering in Athens, is to brief the brotherhood, which is described as divided (“better no agreement than a bad agreement”).
  • Greek government sources. Ta Nea (Dimitris Th. Alexopoulos) reports Greek government sources as saying that “after October 22, there is no room for an agreement.” It describes 14–22 October as the window for a tripartite agreement among Egypt, Greece and the brotherhood. (Romfea reproducing Ta Nea, 9 Oct — Greek)
  • The prosecutors’ reported recommendation. On the Egyptian side, a leak on the website Matsada2sh, relayed by Nikos Meletis of Proto Thema, says two chief prosecutors recommend rejecting the monastery’s appeal. On that reading ten more properties could be lost and the religious status of 28 others reviewed, in a case (24/2015) concerning 71 plots. The leak is unverified. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 5 Oct — Greek)
  • Jerusalem. On 9 October Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem received Greece’s Secretary General for Religious Affairs, Georgios Kalantzis, and thanked him for helping resolve “the recent problem regarding the Holy Monastery of Saint Catherine on Mount Sinai”. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem consecrates the Archbishop of Sinai. (Jerusalem Patriarchate, 9 Oct — English)

The Egyptian government’s position is reported here only through Greek sources and an unverified leak.

1.5 Estonia — The Moscow-linked Church and Pühtitsa Convent take Estonia’s law to Strasbourg

On 8 October ERR reported that the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (EKÕK), the body linked to the Moscow Patriarchate, has filed complaints with the European Court of Human Rights. So has the Pühtitsa Dormition Convent, home to about ninety nuns. They challenge the amended Churches and Congregations Act.

  • The law. The Supreme Court upheld it on 8 June 2026, with six of seventeen judges dissenting, including the Chief Justice. It took effect on 27 June. It requires the Church to cut administrative ties with Moscow and install a new metropolitan by 28 December 2026.
  • The Church’s lawyers. Artur Knjazev said: “The Interior Ministry is offering a choice between two impossible options.” Steven-Hristo Evestus said: “The concept under which this law was rescued does not appear anywhere in the law itself.”
  • The Interior Ministry. Its adviser on religious affairs, Ringo Ringvee, said the ministry met the Church the previous week and agreed to review its statutory ties. The ministry is “in a dialogue phase” but the law must be applied. He disputed claims that the minister intends to seek the Church’s dissolution.

(ERR News, 8 Oct — English)

On 10 October the former Chancellor of Justice Allar Jõks told ERR the complaint had slim chances because it is premature: “The ECtHR does not assess laws in the abstract”, and domestic remedies have not been exhausted. (ERR News, 10 Oct — English) Russian state media relayed the filing the same day as ERR. (RIA Novosti, 8 Oct — Russian)

2. Eastern Orthodox News

2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate

A relic returns after 822 years. On Friday 9 October Patriarch Bartholomew visited the Catholic Cathedral of Our Lady at Amiens, where he was received by Bishop Gérard Le Stang. He venerated the Head of St John the Baptist in its chapel. The relic was taken from the Stoudios Monastery in Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade (1204) and reached Amiens in 1206. The bishop gave the Patriarch a fragment, which will be exposed for veneration in the Patriarchal Church of St George at the Phanar.

Accompanying the Patriarch were:

  • Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon
  • Metropolitan Dimitrios of France
  • Bishop Ambrosios of Sinope
  • the Grand Ecclesiarch Aetios

The Patriarch returned to Istanbul that evening. (ec-patr.org, 9 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 9 Oct — English; Romfea, 9 Oct — Greek)

New Jersey: how the election was decided. On 4 October Athenagoras, Metropolitan-elect of New Jersey, presided at the Sunday Liturgy at the Phanar (Orthodox Times, 5 Oct — English). The Holy Synod elected him on 1 October.

Theodore Kalmoukos of the Greek-American National Herald reported, citing unnamed sources, that the vote was not unanimous and that the Patriarch appeared hesitant. The Patriarchate’s communiqué refers to a three-name list from the Eparchial Synod and says nothing about unanimity. Kalmoukos’s account of the internal deliberations cannot be independently verified. (The National Herald, Theodore Kalmoukos, 4 Oct — English)

On 7 October the same writer reported on a Turkish opinion piece by Ahmet Almaz on the site Haberler. It names Archbishop Elpidophoros of America as a possible successor to Bartholomew, whom it describes as “nearing 86”. Unnamed Phanar sources quoted by Kalmoukos dismissed the piece as a directed effort; the newspaper says it has not verified the claims. (The National Herald, 7 Oct — English)

Bioethics and the birth rate. The Patriarchate’s 4th Scientific Conference on Bioethics met at Rethymno, Crete, on 2–4 October; its conclusions were published on 6 October. Among them:

  • Children are “an essential purpose and blessing, but not the only one” of marriage.
  • People should not become instruments of demographic or national goals.
  • Childbearing should not become a measure of spirituality.
  • On assisted reproduction, Christian bioethics should avoid both uncritical acceptance and blanket rejection.

(Romfea, 6 Oct — Greek) Set beside the Russian and Greek state-church emphasis on demography, the conclusions are notably restrained.

The relics exchange. On 4 October the Patriarchate welcomed the Greek–Bulgarian exchange of 3 October (see §2.11). It called it “the beginning of the return” and said it hoped the process “will be completed quickly”; it cited the Parthenon sculptures as a parallel. (ec-patr.org, 4 Oct — Greek)

2.2 Patriarchate of Alexandria

Synod and anniversary. The Resident Holy Synod met on 8 October, the 22nd anniversary of Patriarch Theodoros II’s election. Reports from the meeting:

  • Plans for a nine-storey hospital in Alexandria were presented.
  • Bishops Timotheos of Goma and Polykarpos of Kisangani in the Democratic Republic of Congo sent reports; they could not attend because of conditions in their regions.
  • No formal decisions were reported.

(Orthodox Times, 8 Oct — English) Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew telephoned his congratulations. (Romfea, 9 Oct — Greek)

Bukoba: “We were sixty years late.” A more striking document came from the Diocese of Bukoba in Tanzania, whose bishop, Chrysostomos, has led Alexandria’s public resistance to the Moscow Patriarchate’s African Exarchate. On 8 October its finance committee met under his chairmanship. The diocese’s own release was headlined “We were 60 years late — the mission was a mistake!” It criticised the diocese’s dependence on money from Greece, Cyprus and the diaspora: “Everyone is waiting for Greece.” The committee adopted a plan to move clergy salaries gradually onto local parishes. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 10 Oct — Greek)

A missionary diocese is publicly diagnosing its own dependency in the same week that Moscow’s Exarchate advertised new “firsts” in Ghana and baptisms in Nigeria (see §4.1). That coincidence frames the competition in Africa more precisely than either side’s polemics.

In Ghana itself, the Metropolis of Accra announced the complete renovation of the Church of the Holy Theophany at Breman. It is funded by the St Cosmas the Aetolian Missionary Association of Thessaloniki. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 9 Oct — Greek)

2.3 Patriarchate of Antioch — Syria: tension in Suqaylabiyah

On Saturday 3 October a confrontation broke out in Suqaylabiyah (Hama governorate, Syria), a predominantly Greek Orthodox town. It involved young men from the neighbouring Sunni town of Qalaat al-Madiq, about 4 km away. Accounts of what happened differ.

  • Syrian authorities. The state agency SANA spoke of an “altercation”, including an attack on a shop, and arrests in both towns. The Al-Ghab district director, Mohammad al-Attal, said the matter would be handled “through the appropriate legal procedures, without generalisations or attempts to fuel tensions”. He urged residents not to circulate “old footage or unconfirmed reports”. (SANA, 4 Oct — English)
  • The National (Abu Dhabi). It reported a brawl, security deployments to both towns, and the Hama governorate blaming “systematic incitement”, with no casualties. It called this the second such incident this year. It put the town’s population at about 16,000, down from 20,000 in December 2024. (The National, 4 Oct — English)
  • GreekReporter. It reported that gunmen fired on homes and on an Orthodox priest’s car; the priest was unhurt. It quoted the parish priest, Fr Fadi Sankari, calling for “security, justice and accountability, not vendettas”. The outlet notes the attackers’ motives are not established. (GreekReporter, Dimitrios Aristopoulos, 9 Oct — English)

Syriac advocacy bodies reported on 6 October that detainees had been transferred in a way that raised fears of unequal treatment; that report is a headline item only. An earlier incident, in March 2026, had drawn a Patriarchate statement (“Enough blood in Syria”).

2.4 Patriarchate of Jerusalem

Gaza. At dawn on 3 October an air strike on a residential building in Gaza City killed five people. Among them were Maisa (Maysa) Abu Daoud and her daughter Mary Najjar. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem called them “martyrs”, saying that “every human life is sacred”, and prayed “for an end to the war and bombardment and for the protection of civilians”. (Jerusalem Patriarchate, 3 Oct — English)

According to OSV News, the two women served at the Catholic Holy Family parish, and their funeral was held at the Greek Orthodox Church of St Porphyrios. Pope Leo XIV wrote to the parish priest, Fr Gabriel Romanelli (“How long, Lord?”). Romanelli counts 62 Christian deaths in Gaza during the war, 25 of them violent. (OSV News via Catholic Review, Junno Arocho Esteves, 5 Oct — English)

Taybeh. In Taybeh, the only 100% Christian village in the West Bank (where Latin Catholics make up the majority of the population today, with Orthodox Christians probably accounting for between 25 and 30%), residents have been unable to harvest their olives for a fourth year. Israel declared the area a closed military zone in August. A local activist, Ihab Hassan, says the restrictions “just apply to Palestinians, while the settlers continue to go wherever they want”. About 1,200 residents remain, and some 200 are considering leaving. (Vatican News, Joseph Tulloch, 5 Oct — English)

Audiences and appointments.

  • Jaffa. On 5 October Patriarch Theophilos received Chris Deek, described by the Patriarchate as Israel’s special envoy to the Christian world, together with commissioners of the Jaffa community, to discuss “the flock and the school of that community”. (Jerusalem Patriarchate, 5 Oct — English)
  • Jacob’s Well. Archimandrite Ioustinos Mamallos, hegumen of Jacob’s Well at Nablus, died on 1 October. He had restored the shrine and built the church of St Photini there. On 5 October the Patriarchate disowned fundraising appeals made in his name, saying it “has assumed in full all responsibility and expense”. His funeral was set for 10 October at Jacob’s Well. (Jerusalem Patriarchate announcements — English)
  • Sinai. The Greek official’s visit concerning Sinai is covered in §1.4.

2.5 Moscow Patriarchate (Russia)

Patriarch Kirill and the state. Within three days Patriarch Kirill honoured the two men whose wartime roles are most prominent in Russian public life.

  • Kadyrov, 5 October. On Ramzan Kadyrov’s 50th birthday, which was also his inauguration day, Kirill awarded him the Church’s Order of Glory and Honour, first class. He called Kadyrov a “strong-willed, purposeful and responsible leader”. (Novaya Gazeta Europe, 5 Oct — Russian; exile independent outlet)
  • Putin, 7 October. Kirill greeted President Putin on his 74th birthday, praising his “selfless and devoted service to the Fatherland” and the strengthening of Russia’s “sovereignty”. (RIA Novosti, 7 Oct — Russian; state agency)
  • St Sergius, 8 October. Preaching at the Trinity–St Sergius Lavra on the feast of St Sergius, he said the saint should inspire “those in power” as well as monks. (RIA Novosti, 8 Oct — Russian)
  • Kubrinsk, 6 October. He sent condolences after a fire at a fireworks factory in Kubrinsk (Yaroslavl region) killed 14 people. (RIA Novosti, 6 Oct — Russian)

Legislative agenda. On 5 October Fr Fyodor Lukyanov of the Patriarchal Commission on the Family urged the newly elected State Duma to:

  • ban the advertising of “paganism, occultism, magic”;
  • write Presidential Decree No. 809 on “traditional values” into law.

(RIA Novosti, 5 Oct — Russian) The day before, he spoke of “growing youth interest” in Orthodoxy but cited no data. (RIA Novosti, 4 Oct — Russian) For a contrary reading of Russian youth work, see Ksenia Luchenko’s article in §7.

The SOVA Center reports that LDPR deputy Boris Chernyshov was confirmed on 30 September as chairman of the Duma committee responsible for religious associations. (SOVA, 5 Oct — Russian)

Enforcement against other faiths. SOVA also relays Supreme Court Judicial Department statistics on prosecutions for “illegal missionary activity” (Art. 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences):

Earlier yearLater year
Cases431716
Persons punished—463
Fines (roubles)4.75 million (2024)6.44 million

The period covered is not stated unambiguously in the release. (SOVA, 5 Oct — Russian)

Crimea. In occupied Crimea, Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov) of Simferopol led a procession on 9 October carrying the relics of St Luke (Voino-Yasenetsky) between Simferopol’s two cathedrals. (RIA Novosti, 9 Oct — Russian) The same day RIA reported that Ukraine’s Interior Ministry database lists Tikhon as “hiding from investigation”; the SBU had charged him in absentia in September. (RIA Novosti, 9 Oct — Russian)

Russia beyond Moscow

  • Tambov (Central Russia). The diocese is raising funds to rebuild the Cathedral of the Nativity of Christ in central Tambov, built in 1865 and demolished in 1939, as a memorial to local participants in the war in Ukraine. “The names of the heroes will be carved on the walls of the church,” said Archpriest Georgy Neretin. The project is blessed by Metropolitan Feodosy and backed by Governor Pervyshov. (RIA Novosti, 6 Oct — Russian)


  • Ufa (Bashkortostan, Volga). The first Orthodox social-volunteering rally of the Ufa diocese was held on 3 October at the Ufa Expo Centre, with Deputy Prime Minister A. A. Kasyanov of the republic present.



    • Volunteer groups have already travelled twice to occupied Donbas; a third trip is planned for 8–21 November.

    • Joint Orthodox–Muslim aid was discussed.


    (Pravoslavie.ru, 9 Oct — Russian)


  • Yekaterinburg (Urals). More than 300 delegates from the 16 Urals dioceses will gather on 27–30 October for an interregional conference on church social service under Metropolitan Yevgeny. Aid to Donbas civilians and to veterans is on the agenda. (Pravoslavie.ru, 9 Oct — Russian)


  • Ulyanovsk (Volga). A court stripped two members of the fringe Orthodox group “Tsarskaya Imperiya” (Tsarist Empire) of parental rights. The parents had destroyed their children’s identity documents; fifteen children of the community were identified. (SOVA, 7 Oct — Russian)


  • Kazakhstan (Metropolitan District of the Moscow Patriarchate). Following the report of 26 September on its Russian itinerary, the right-hand relic of St Spyridon of Trimythous toured Kazakhstan from 21 September to 10 October: Baikonur on 7 October, Pavlodar on 8–9 October, Shymkent on 9–10 October. (RIA Novosti, 7 Oct — Russian)


Three of these regional items share one theme: provincial church social work increasingly includes the war — a memorial cathedral, volunteer trips to occupied territory, aid to veterans.

2.6 Ukraine

The Kyiv Metropolia case goes to the Supreme Court. The Sixth Appellate Administrative Court was due on 7 October to hear the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) claim to liquidate the “Kyiv Metropolia of the UOC”. It postponed the hearing “to an indefinite date” because “the case files will be sent to the Supreme Court” for the Church’s appeal. That is how the UOC’s lawyer, Mykyta Chekman, put it on Telegram.

On 22 September the Supreme Court’s Cassation Administrative Court opened proceedings on the UOC’s appeals in case no. 855/11/25. These concern rulings on the Kyiv Metropolia (proceeding А/990/22/26) and the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra (А/990/21/26). DESS declared the UOC affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church on 27 August 2025 and filed suit two days later. (LB.ua, Tania Matiash, 7 Oct — Ukrainian; Interfax-Ukraine, 7 Oct — Ukrainian)

The pro-UOC news site Pravlife had published an appeal on 6 October for believers to “prayerfully support” the Metropolia’s lawyers. (Pravlife — Russian; committed pro-UOC standpoint)

Other court and state actions.

  • Lebedyn bell tower. On 5 October the Commercial Court of Cherkasy region granted a prosecutor’s claim returning the 1839 bell tower of the UOC’s Lebedyn women’s monastery to state ownership. The tower is a monument of national significance. (RISU, 9 Oct — Ukrainian, headline item; Religionpravda, 9 Oct, citing Ukrinform and the regional prosecutor — Ukrainian; Religionpravda is strongly anti-UOC in tone)
  • Collaboration verdict. On 5 October the Zavodskyi District Court of Zaporizhzhia convicted Archpriest Anatolii Zyhar in absentia. He was formerly a UOC priest at Pidhirne (Berdiansk diocese). He received 11 years with confiscation for collaboration and for denying Russia’s aggression. According to the verdict as reported, he joined the Russian Church’s “Berdiansk diocese” in occupied territory and acted as “spiritual adviser” to a Russian volunteer unit. (Religionpravda, 5 Oct, citing Lokator Media — Ukrainian)
  • SBU, Sumy. The SBU’s Sumy office served notice of suspicion in absentia on an unnamed 61-year-old archpriest of the Russian Orthodox Church, rector of a cathedral in Oryol region. He is accused of supplying Russian units. (Religionpravda, 7 Oct, citing the SBU — Ukrainian)
  • Korets. The Supreme Court set the appeal in the Korets monastery case (no. 855/2/26) for 10 November. (RISU, 30 Sept — Ukrainian)

An OCU bishop convicted. On 5 October the Kalush City District Court convicted Bishop Kyrylo (Mykhailiuk) of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine’s Uzhhorod-Khust diocese. He had issued fake deacon’s certificates to 291 men to help them avoid mobilisation between June 2023 and November 2025, reportedly for US$1,000–2,000 each. Under a plea agreement he received five years, suspended, with three years’ probation. The OCU Synod had removed him from his diocese on 2 February 2026. (RISU, 8 Oct — Ukrainian)

The case shows that the mobilisation regime bears on both Orthodox jurisdictions. From the UOC side, the partisan outlets Pravlife and SPZh reported the forcible mobilisation of UOC clergy holding deferments, at Zolotonosha and elsewhere. These claims were not independently verified. (Pravlife, 9 Oct — Russian)

Parishes.

  • Kalush (Ivano-Frankivsk region). On 6 October Mayor Andriy Naida announced that the city executive had approved registration of a new OCU St Nicholas community. It will use the former UOC church on Hrushevskyi Street. The UOC parish had refused to change jurisdiction and ceased operating on 23 July. The formal transfer is pending. (RISU, 8 Oct, citing ZAXID.NET — Ukrainian)


  • Pervomaisk (Mykolaiv region). Coverage this week reported the September vote of St Michael’s parish to join the OCU: 31 for, 2 against, 1 abstention. The rector, Archpriest Roman Mykhailiuk, said: “For us it was a great tragedy… no one heard us, no one hears us.” Pravlife responds that Metropolitan Oleksii of Voznesensk had suspended him on 14 September for violating his oath and contracting a second marriage. (Religionpravda, 8 Oct — Ukrainian; Pravlife, 8 Oct — Russian)


  • Polytsi (Volyn). Two incompatible accounts surround the funeral of a fallen soldier, Oleksandr Oliferchuk.



    • Religionpravda, citing local media, says the UOC priest kept the church locked unless he himself officiated, so the service was held in the churchyard.

    • SPZh calls it an OCU “provocation” in which relatives demanded that an OCU cleric serve in the UOC church.


    (Religionpravda, 6 Oct — Ukrainian; SPZh, 6 Oct — Ukrainian; committed pro-UOC)


The primates.

  • Epifaniy and the Norwegian Council of Churches. On 6 October Metropolitan Epifaniy, as current chair of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations, met a delegation of the Norwegian Council of Churches led by its general secretary, Henrik Erhard Germansen. He said: “Ukraine sincerely seeks a just and lasting peace but does not accept capitulation or the loss of independence.” (pomisna.info, 6 Oct — Ukrainian)
  • Onuphry on St Sergius’s day. Preaching on 8 October, the feast of St Sergius of Radonezh, Metropolitan Onuphry said: “People attack one another, fight, kill and rob. God does not want this.” The sermon names no aggressor. (news.church.ua, 8 Oct — Ukrainian)
  • Metropolitan Antoniy (Pakanych) on the OCU’s founding. The UOC’s chancellor commented on a chronicle attributed to Metropolitan Gregory of Ankara alleging state involvement in the OCU’s creation in 2018: “The Church cannot be created by a decision of the authorities, just as it cannot be destroyed by a court ruling.” (Pravlife, 6 Oct — Russian)

War damage. An overnight Russian drone attack on 4 October damaged a church building in Boryspil district (Kyiv region), along with a school, a hospital and six houses; no one was hurt. (RISU, 4 Oct — Ukrainian)

A street name for Filaret. On 8 October RISU reported the result of a vote in the Kyiv city app on naming a lane after Patriarch Filaret: 54% for, 46% against. It is an open app vote, not a representative survey. (RISU, 8 Oct — Ukrainian)

2.7 Georgia — The Kurmukh church dispute with Azerbaijan

Why now. A dispute between the Georgian Patriarchate and the government of Azerbaijan over a church in north-western Azerbaijan broke out in late September. It has not been reported here before; this is a belated pick-up. It returned to attention this week through two analyses. On 7 October the Washington-based Jamestown Foundation published “Church Dispute Strains Relations Between Azerbaijan and Georgia” by Beka Chedia. (Jamestown Foundation, Beka Chedia, 7 Oct — English) The same day the independent Azerbaijani agency Turan published an analysis by Mehman Aliyev (see below).

The church. The church is known in Georgian as St George of Kurmukhi and in Azerbaijani as Kürmük. It stands in the Qakh (Gakh) district, home to Azerbaijan’s small ethnic Georgian, largely Ingiloy, community; Azerbaijan’s 2019 census counted 8,400 ethnic Georgians. According to Turan, the present building dates from 1891–94 and was restored by Azerbaijan’s culture ministry in 2004–05. Radio Tavisupleba reports that it opens only twice a year, on 6 May and on Giorgoba (23 November). Locals say they are often not allowed to bring in Georgian-language literature. (Radio Tavisupleba, Luka Pertaia, 26–27 Sept — Georgian; Turan, Mehman Aliyev, 29 Sept — Azerbaijani)

The sequence (19–30 September).

  • 18 September. Photographs of excavations at the church, cordoned off with tape and later fenced with an Azerbaijani sign announcing archaeological work and forbidding entry, appeared on the Facebook page “Saingilo Youth Movement”. (Radio Tavisupleba; OC Media, Mikheil Gvadzabia, 25 Sept — English)
  • 24 September: the Patriarchate’s statement. It called the church “an important monument of the historical and spiritual heritage of our country and Church”. It said it “has received no information from the relevant state agencies of the Republic of Azerbaijan”. It asked what work is being done, on what studies, by whom, and how the monument is protected. It called on Georgian state bodies to obtain official information and involve Patriarchate representatives and Georgian specialists, since “only timely and coordinated cooperation can ensure the proper protection and preservation of this monument”. (1TV, Tamar Tabatadze, 24 Sept — English; Metronome, 24 Sept — Georgian) Turan noted that the statement itself accepted that the church lies on Azerbaijani territory.
  • 25 September: Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry. It replied that “it is unacceptable to refer to geographical and historical toponyms located in the territory of Azerbaijan by other names” and that such monuments “constitute an integral part of the national heritage of the Azerbaijani people”. It said Azerbaijan “has always respected the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia” and expects the same. According to the Jamestown translation, it advised the Patriarchate against “repeating the well-known approaches of the Armenian Church”. (Trend, 25 Sept — English, state-aligned; JAMnews, 26 Sept — English, independent)
  • 25 September: the “Albanian” frame. A signed opinion piece by Seba Agaeva in the pro-government 1news.az, headlined “Kürmük is not ‘Hereti'”, described the church as Caucasian Albanian heritage built on the ruins of a 1st–3rd-century Albanian monastery. It proposed a “mirror” study of “Albanian heritage” inside Georgia, including Kakheti. (1news.az, 25 Sept — Russian) RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani service linked the ministry’s statement to recent official claims that a 13th-century church in Karabakh is Albanian heritage. (Azadliq, 25 Sept — Azerbaijani)
  • 27 September: Georgia’s prime minister. Irakli Kobakhidze said: “We have no tension, we have friendly relations with the Azerbaijani government… Based on friendship, we can very easily discuss all issues.” (Business Media Georgia, 27 Sept — Georgian) The day before, he had received a birthday call from President Aliyev in which Kurmukh was not mentioned. Georgia’s foreign ministry issued no public position. (Knews, Maia Mamulashvili, 28–30 Sept — Georgian)
  • Other Georgian voices. The opposition party Lelo backed the Patriarchate. Archbishop Zinon of Dmanisi appealed to Azerbaijan’s Muslim clergy to join a dialogue: “This is their living shrine, the memory of ancestors and pillar of faith.” (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Igor Seleznyov, 27 Sept — Russian) An Azerbaijani MP, Arzukhan Alizade, repeated that presenting a monument “under alternative names is unacceptable”. (BakuPost, 30 Sept — Azerbaijani)
  • The bust. Some accounts link the dispute to an incident at a bust of Heydar Aliyev in Tbilisi. The pages consulted date that incident to the morning of 21 September, with the detention of a 40-year-old foreign tourist announced on 30 September. Azerbaijani outlets identify him as an Armenian citizen; Georgia’s interior ministry said only “a foreign citizen”. Jamestown dates the vandalism itself to 30 September. A first court hearing is set for 12 November. (1news.az, 30 Sept — English; Axar.az, 5 Oct — English)

This week’s interpretations.

  • Jamestown (Beka Chedia). He reads the episode as a strain on the strategic partnership. In his interpretation, the Georgian Dream government “demonstrates loyalty toward Baku”. He notes the unmarked Georgian–Azerbaijani border and the earlier dispute over the David Gareji monastery complex, which straddles that border. He raises the possibility that Baku could “advance historical claims to Georgian territory”. He also reports that some Georgian commentators suspect Russian services of fuelling the escalation. These are the author’s interpretations, offered from a Western policy-institute standpoint.


  • Turan (Mehman Aliyev). Writing from Baku, he proposed:



    • publication of the Kürmük project details;

    • a joint expert review;

    • a bilateral agreement on David Gareji;

    • the 1972 UNESCO World Heritage Convention as a framework.


    He added: “There is a fundamental difference between recognising such a link and demanding the territory.” (Turan, 7 Oct — Azerbaijani)


Three claims, kept separate.

  1. The church’s historical attribution is a scholarly question. Georgian historiography treats Kurmukhi as Georgian (Hereti/Saingilo) heritage; Azerbaijani state historiography treats it as Caucasian Albanian. Each framing serves a national narrative, and neither is adopted here. The Finnish scholar Svante Lundgren’s new essay on the place of Armenia in Azerbaijani state ideology, including the Caucasian Albanian frame, is relevant context but is not evidence about Kurmukh (see §7).
  2. The right of the Georgian community to worship there, in its own language and more than twice a year, is a religious-freedom question. It was raised by the Patriarchate in 2024 after a music video was filmed inside the church (NEWS.am, 1 Aug 2024 — English). It is untouched by the attribution question.
  3. Whether the dispute signals territorial ambitions is a political interpretation advanced by some analysts and expressly disavowed by others.

Other Georgian items.

  • Moscow talks. Following the Moscow Patriarchate delegation’s visit of 30 September, which focused on church life in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Archpriest Andria Jaghmaidze said on 8 October that Georgia and Russia are in dialogue on restoring one Georgian church in Russia: “The temple is not in Moscow, but it is in Russia.” He gave no details. (Netgazeti, Salome Chikviladze, 8 Oct — Georgian)
  • Feast of St John the Theologian. On 9 October Patriarch Shio III presented clergy with crosses commemorating 1,700 years of Christianity as Georgia’s state religion. (Orthodox Times, 9 Oct — English)

2.8 Serbian Orthodox Church

A church university without accreditation. The planned “Sveti Sava” university was announced in May 2026 in a memorandum between Prime Minister Đuro Macut and Patriarch Porfirije. Legal changes in late August allow the state to co-found it. As of 7 October it had not applied for accreditation. Three private faculties are reportedly set to join. The Serbian Church’s information service did not answer Danas‘s questions. The president of the Belgrade Banking Academy, one of the institutions named, said: “Nothing is signed. Maybe that’s the plan.” (Danas, Vesna Andrić, 7 Oct — Serbian)

Australia. Patriarch Porfirije’s canonical visit to Australia began on 7 October; see §4.2.

2.9 Romanian Orthodox Church and Moldova

The family symposium. Patriarch Daniel opened an international theology symposium, “The Christian Family: Light and Witness in Contemporary Society”, in Bucharest (5–8 October). He said: “The family becomes the place where Christian virtues are learned and practised.” (Basilica.ro, 6 Oct — Romanian)

Iași pilgrimage. The pilgrimage of St Paraskeva at Iași runs from 8 to 15 October; the organisers expect more than 300,000 pilgrims. For the first time the relics of St Paisie of Sihăstria are brought alongside St Paraskeva’s. He is a 20th-century Moldavian elder canonised in recent years, and the novelty is a datum about how a new canonisation enters popular devotion. The programme:

  • 11 October: a “Way of the Saints” procession
  • night of 13–14 October: a vigil
  • 14 October: the feast-day Liturgy

(Adevărul, Anemona Marinescu, 7 Oct — Romanian; Digi24 — Romanian)

2.10 Bulgarian Orthodox Church

Tsar Samuel reburied. On 3 October Patriarch Daniil led a short memorial service at the Basilica of St Sofia in Sofia for the remains of Tsar Samuel (d. 1014). The remains came from Greece in the exchange that returned 48 church objects to Greek monasteries (see §2.11), and Daniil walked in the procession with state leaders. “Bulgaria today receives the bones of its ruler… for that Bulgaria he gave his life,” he said, calling them “a true relic for the state’s, the Church’s and the people’s memory”. On canonisation he was cautious: “things must be studied precisely.” (BTA, 3 Oct — Bulgarian; Mediapool, 3 Oct — Bulgarian)

Bartholomew’s visit, 16–20 October. The Ecumenical Patriarch is due in Bulgaria for the 1,150th anniversary of the birth and 1,080th of the repose of St John of Rila. He is to celebrate the Liturgy at Rila Monastery on 19 October. An open letter and online petition by clergy, monks and laity ask the Synod to withdraw the invitation, citing his ecumenism and his role in Ukraine. (PressTV.bg, Antonia Draganova, 5 Oct — Bulgarian) No detailed official programme had been published by 10 October. The Synod’s decision to send Metropolitan John of Varna to Chantilly (see §1.1) is part of the same rapprochement.

2.11 Church of Greece

The Hierarchy’s session, 6–8 October. The autumn session of the Holy Synod of the Hierarchy was devoted largely to two pastoral reports, before resolving a two-year anomaly over an episcopal election.

  • Ieronymos’s opening address. Archbishop Ieronymos named loneliness, inner isolation and emotional exhaustion as major pastoral challenges “even in an age of advanced communication”. On digital life, the Church “neither rejects new developments nor accepts them uncritically”. (Romfea, 6 Oct — Greek)


  • Report on loneliness. Metropolitan Dorotheos of Syros framed loneliness theologically as the fragmentation caused by the Fall and proposed eight nationwide initiatives, including:



    • parish visiting and support groups;

    • clergy and lay seminars on mental health, domestic violence, school bullying and suicide prevention;

    • cooperation with universities and mental-health services;

    • church listening centres that refer people to specialists;

    • family pastoral care for single parents, the unemployed, the bereaved and the socially excluded.


    (Romfea, 7 Oct — Greek)


  • Code for clergy online. Metropolitan Chrysostomos of Chalkida proposed ten principles for clergy online, among them:



    • “clergy remain clergy online”;

    • a cleric is not an independent authority;

    • not every event requires comment;

    • nothing is shared without verification;

    • no personal branding;

    • online contact should lead to real parish life;

    • clergy need training, including on artificial intelligence.


    He closed by commending “the virtue of virtues: discernment”. (same source)


  • The Asterios case resolved. Archimandrite Christodoulos Kotsifis was elected Bishop of Asterios, auxiliary for the Metropolis of Kaisariani, in October 2024, but never consecrated. On 8 October the Hierarchy accepted, unanimously, the Archbishop’s proposal:



    • Kotsifis withdrew his acceptance in writing.

    • The 2024 runner-up, Archimandrite Kallinikos Nikolaou, takes Asterios.

    • Kotsifis was elected auxiliary bishop of the Archdiocese of Athens with the title of Neochorion, by 54 votes, with 21 blank and 2 invalid.


    The ordinations were set for 10 and 11 October. The canonical questions raised by auxiliary bishoprics in general were referred to the Synodal Committee on Dogmatic and Canonical Issues. (Romfea, 8 Oct — Greek; Romfea, election result — Greek)


  • The background. Political, as relayed by ePolitical, reports that the consecration had been halted because the local metropolitan, Daniel of Kaisariani, did not want Kotsifis. It describes “embarrassment” among some hierarchs at the solution, which brings the number of auxiliary bishops to 25. ePolitical is openly favourable to the Archbishop. (ePolitical, 9 Oct — Greek)


Property tax. Articles 293–294 of a draft omnibus bill would make the Church of Greece the filer and payer of the ENFIA property tax for monastic property it manages through its central finance office (EKYO). Giorgos Palaitsakis of Naftemporiki stresses this “does not amount to a new ENFIA”: existing exemptions stand, and Mount Athos and Sinai keep their special status. The bill has no explanatory memorandum. (Romfea reproducing Naftemporiki, 8 Oct — Greek)

The returned treasures. Following the report of 3 October, the objects returned from Bulgaria are on display at the Museum of Byzantine Culture in Thessaloniki until 5 November; they then go back to their owners:

  • Eikosiphoinissa Monastery
  • the Monastery of the Forerunner near Serres
  • the Metropolis of Serres–Nigrita

Greek outlets count 48 objects, while the Bulgarian outlet PressTV counts 53. (SKAI, 5 Oct — Greek; PressTV.bg, 5 Oct — Bulgarian)

The Ecumenical Patriarchate called the exchange a “beginning” (§2.1). In a signed opinion piece, Konstantinos Cholevas argues that further treasures of Eikosiphoinissa and of Xanthi are still owed. He also reports that historians in Skopje called Samuel a “Macedonian” ruler and described the exchange as “a conspiracy of Greece and Bulgaria”. (Hellasjournal, 4/9 Oct — Greek) The episode shows how restitution can turn medieval remains into material for three national churches’ historiographies.

2.12 Church of Cyprus

Archbishop Georgios gave a wide-ranging interview to public radio (RIK).

  • The Cyprus problem. He said recent developments “do not seem to lead to a result”. He expressed reservations about new crossing points, which he said consolidate faits accomplis.
  • The Holy See. He asked for its support, saying it “has many ambassadors”.
  • Dialogue with Rome. He defended it against critics: “We made no concession. We held no concelebration.”
  • Churches in the north. Restored churches there should return to worship.
  • The Avvakoum case. Deposed clergy cannot celebrate valid sacraments.

(Orthodoxia News Agency, 9 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 9 Oct — English)

He is due at the Vatican on 19–21 October to meet Pope Leo XIV. Defence Minister Vasilis Palmas called on him on 9 October to discuss the Church’s relations with the National Guard. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 9 Oct — Greek)

2.13 Orthodox Church of Finland

On 5 October the parish council of Turku voted to sue the City of Turku over settlement and structural damage to the Church of St Alexandra, the city’s 19th-century Orthodox church. Repairs are planned for April 2027 to May 2028. (ort.fi, 5 Oct — Finnish)

3. Oriental Orthodox News

The Armenian Apostolic Church’s conflict with the Armenian government is covered in §1.3, and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church amid the renewed war in §1.2.

3.1 Coptic Orthodox Church

6 October: church bells for the army. On 6 October churches across Egypt rang their bells at 2:05 p.m., the minute the 1973 war began. They did so at the request of the Defence Ministry’s Morale Affairs Department, which asked Pope Tawadros II for the gesture. The Bishop of Minya, Anba Makarios, announced it and attended the governorate’s ceremony beside representatives of al-Azhar. (al-Watan, 6 Oct — Arabic; al-Wafd, 6 Oct — Arabic)

The Pope’s own words.

  • 4 October, anniversary message. Tawadros said the “spirit of October” will remain a constant driving force for Egyptians, and the Church a pillar of national unity: “We are confident in the wisdom of the state’s leadership.” (al-Ahram Gate, 4 Oct — Arabic)


  • Before the window. On 30 September Tawadros asked clergy to preach “positive and encouraging” sermons against the “war of despair”, in support of the President’s directives. That was reported on 3 October.


  • 8 October, Coptic Studies conference. Tawadros opened the fourth international conference of the Institute of Coptic Studies, “Coptic Studies and Deepening Awareness of Coptic Identity”, at St Mark’s Cathedral, Abbasiya.



    • He called Coptic identity “part of national identity”.

    • He thanked the state for restoring the churches burned in 2013.

    • He called the 2016 church-construction law “a step toward repairing identity”.

    • He described the President’s Christmas visits as “an affirmation of equality”.


    (al-Dostor, 8 Oct — Arabic)


Other audiences.

  • 6 October. He received Dr Michel Abs, Secretary-General of the Middle East Council of Churches (MECC), and participants in an MECC regional conference in Egypt on confronting hate speech. (al-Dostor, 6 Oct — Arabic)
  • 7 October. He told the priests of South Shubra: “When you celebrate the liturgy you are a worship leader, when you preach a teacher, but when you visit your people in their homes you are a father.” (al-Dostor — Arabic)

For diaspora items see §4.5.

3.2 Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church

Constitution review. On 9 October Catholicos Baselios Marthoma Mathews III issued a decree (kalpana) inviting dioceses and faithful to propose amendments to the 1934 Constitution, the founding charter of the Church’s governance and the legal pivot of its century-long dispute with the Jacobite faction. It has not been amended since 2011.

  • A study committee set up by decree on 6 December 2022 prepared the guidelines.
  • The Managing Committee discussed them on 15 April and 30 September 2026.
  • The deadline for proposals is 31 December 2026.

(OVS Online, 9 Oct — English; OVS writes from the Malankara Orthodox side of the dispute)

The Jacobite dispute online. The same outlet reports that, at the Church’s complaint, Meta blocked in India a Facebook page it describes as “the face of the Jacobite faction”, for defamatory content about the Catholicos and bishops. Only the complainant’s account has been published. (OVS Online, 9 Oct — English)

4. Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora & Mission Fields

4.1 Ghana — The Moscow Patriarchate’s first Liturgy in Accra: for whom?

The event. On Sunday 4 October 2026 a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated the Divine Liturgy in Accra for the first time. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa reported it on 8 October under the headline “For the first time in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church a Liturgy has been celebrated in Ghana”.

  • Celebrant. Priest Georgy Maksimov, chairman of the Exarchate’s Missionary Department. He was sent by the Patriarchal Exarch, Metropolitan Konstantin of Cairo and North Africa.
  • Why. The Exarchate says the visit answered a request from “Russian Orthodox faithful living in Ghana”.
  • Venue. The premises of the Russian House in Accra, provided by its head. Fr Georgy consecrated the house the same day.
  • Other services. After the Liturgy he served a water-blessing and a memorial litia; those who wished could confess and receive communion.
  • The baptism. The day before, 3 October, “the cleric performed the sacrament of Baptism on a [female] compatriot”, that is, a Russian woman.
  • Present. The Russian ambassador, Andrei Ordash; the Serbian ambassador, Milutin Stanojević; Russian embassy staff; and “compatriots”.

(Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, 8 Oct — Russian; Foma, 9 Oct — Russian; Global Orthodox, 9 Oct — English/Russian, a Moscow-aligned outlet relaying the Exarchate)

Two quotations, in the Exarchate’s wording.

  • Ambassador Ordash: “This is the first Divine Liturgy in the country’s history celebrated by a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church.” He called it a “cornerstone which could in future become the foundation of a Russian Orthodox parish here, on the territory of Ghana”. The report paraphrases him as saying such a parish would unite compatriots and serve as a humanitarian bridge between the two peoples.
  • Ambassador Stanojević: “I hope this event will become regular and will probably lead to the creation of a church, because there is a community here and it needs the Word of God.”

The Global Orthodox English version paraphrases these quotations rather than quoting them, and calls the Russian ambassador “Alexey”. The Ghana News Agency interviewed him in July as Andrei Ordash. (GNA, 20 July — English)

What “first” means. The claim is that this is the Russian Church’s first Liturgy in Ghana, not the first Orthodox Liturgy there. Ghana is canonical territory of the Patriarchate of Alexandria:

  • Alexandria set up a Diocese of Ghana for expatriates in 1959.
  • A Ghanaian movement led by Fr Kwame Joseph Labi was received into communion by 1982.
  • The Archdiocese, now Metropolis, of Accra dates from 2009, with its Cathedral of the Transfiguration in Accra and Ghanaian clergy. (OrthodoxWiki, “Ghana” — English; Patriarchate of Alexandria, 5 Nov 2018 — English)
  • In April 2026 Ghanaian priests of the Metropolis under Metropolitan Daniel of Accra opened a new community at Apiedu in the Ashanti region. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 5 Apr 2026 — Greek)

The jurisdictional background.

  • Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria recognised the Orthodox Church of Ukraine on 8 November 2019.
  • On 29 December 2021 the Moscow Patriarchate’s Holy Synod created the Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa, receiving 102 clergy from eight countries who had belonged to Alexandria.
  • Alexandria’s synod replied in January 2022, calling the Exarchate “completely illegal”, an “immoral invasion and incursion of the Russian Church”. It invoked the condemnation of ethnophyletism (1872) and “neo-colonialism”. (Orthodox Times, 12 Jan 2022 — English)
  • Moscow’s Synod has said the step was not a claim on Alexandria’s territory. (Wikipedia, citing Moscow synodal journals — English)

Each side describes the other’s presence in its own terms; in neutral terms, two Orthodox jurisdictions now operate in parallel on the same ground.

Who was this Liturgy for? Testing a reading. The record supports the view that the Accra initiative, at this stage, is aimed at Russian and other Slavic expatriates rather than at Ghanaians.

  • The request came from Russian faithful “living in the country”.
  • The person baptised was a Russian compatriot.
  • The congregation named is diplomats, embassy staff and compatriots.
  • No source reports any Ghanaian cleric or faithful taking part.
  • The ambassador’s own aim is a parish to “unite compatriots”.
  • The venue is an institution of Russian state cultural policy. A partner “Russian House” in Accra was announced in March 2025 as an NGO project, run by the Centre for People’s Diplomacy with Rossotrudnichestvo’s support. Rossotrudnichestvo is the Russian state agency for cultural diplomacy. The Exarchate’s report does not name the operator. (russiaspivottoasia.com, 14 Mar 2025 — Russian)

Three points cut the other way, or remain open.

  1. “There is a community here.” The Serbian ambassador did not say which community. Foma reports that he came with his wife and “a representative of the Serbian community”, which suggests the Serbian diaspora, but no source says so.


  2. The celebrant’s record. Fr Georgy Maksimov is not a chaplain to expatriates by profile. Born in 1979, he is a missionary theologian and writer on Islam and has headed the Exarchate’s Missionary Department since at least 2023. His journey to Accra was the end of a tour of Nigeria from 25 September to 3 October. (Exarchate, 6 Oct — Russian) The Exarchate reports that on that tour he:



    • baptised 58 people in Benue State on 1 October;

    • met leaders of a 15-parish Orthodox group in Anambra State, which it calls “non-canonical”, seeking reception;

    • received letters from two communities describing themselves as “abandoned by the Greek Church”, one of which, at Ukpor, it says Alexandria had “neglected for six years”;

    • was made a high chief by an Igbo traditional ruler.


    These are the Exarchate’s own claims; Alexandria’s account of those communities has not been published.


  3. The pattern elsewhere. The Exarchate’s practice elsewhere shows how a chaplaincy for compatriots can become the nucleus of a mission. In the same week it reported a priest sent long-term to the Seychelles “to organise church life” for embassy staff, compatriots and tourists, and baptisms of six local people in Mozambique. (Exarchate news, 5–7 Oct — Russian)


Reactions. The Metropolis of Accra’s own news that week concerned the renovation of its church at Breman (see §2.2). In Ghana, two academic commentators had already framed the Russian Church’s arrival in the Ghanaian press as “soft power”, before the Liturgy took place.

  • Lord Mawuko-Yevugah (GIMPA) called the Church’s expansion into West Africa “the spiritual spear of this hybrid apparatus”. (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 22 Sept — English)
  • Samuel K. B. Nkrumah-Pobi (University of Ghana) argued that the influence “should be seen as emerging rather than already decisive”. (The Ghanaian Chronicle, 2 Oct — English)

Both are attributed interpretations. The documented facts are narrower: a first Russian liturgy for Russians, in a Russian state-linked building, with a stated hope of a parish.

4.2 Australia — Patriarch Porfirije’s canonical visit

Patriarch Porfirije of Serbia left Budapest on 6 October for a canonical visit to the Serbian Metropolis of Australia and New Zealand, which runs to 19 October. He is the third Serbian patriarch to visit, after Pavle (2004) and Irinej (2016).

  • His party. Metropolitans Ilarion of Timok and Arsenije of Niš, Bishops Sergije of Bihać-Petrovac and Isihije of Valjevo, and Archimandrite Danilo. (Politika, 6 Oct — Serbian)
  • Arrival. Metropolitan Siluan and Ambassador Rade Stefanović welcomed him in Melbourne late on 7 October. (Orthodox Times — English)
  • 8 October, Holy Trinity Cathedral, Brunswick. At a doxology he said: “Where there is love, there is everything; there is our home, regardless of whether this is geographically true.” (Orthodox Times, 8 Oct — English)
  • 9 October, St Sava Monastery, Elaine. He prayed at the tomb of Elder Nikanor of Hilandar. He said the Church abroad “is a guardian of national identity” with a missionary task, and that God “does not distinguish between people by skin colour”. (Sputnik Srbija, 9 Oct — Serbian; Russian state-owned)
  • Still to come. The consecration of St Stephen’s church at Keysborough (11 October), then Canberra and Sydney (14–18 October).

4.3 North America

The Assembly of Canonical Orthodox Bishops of the USA held its fifteenth meeting in Pittsburgh on 3–6 October. (Orthodox Observer, 6 Oct — English) It:

  • approved an American Sign Language lexicon of Orthodox terminology;
  • reaffirmed its mandate for a common catechism;
  • called for “an immediate cessation of hostilities wherever war persists”;
  • discussed artificial intelligence;
  • marked the tenth anniversary of Crete.

The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s US hierarchs. On 6 October a separate synaxis brought together twelve hierarchs of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, the Carpatho-Russian diocese (ACROD), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the USA and the Albanian diocese. It heard reports on the Patriarchate’s vicariates for Palestinian/Jordanian and Slavic communities and on outreach to African-Americans. (Orthodox Times, 7 Oct — English)

Chantilly’s funding. The National Herald reports that the Patriarch asked the US metropolises, through Archbishop Elpidophoros, to help fund the Chantilly conference, with “repeated reminders”. (The National Herald, Theodore Kalmoukos, 7 Oct — English)

4.4 Western Europe

  • Italy. The Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Western and Southern Europe held its congress near Rome on 7–10 October, devoted to the Christian family. Romania’s ambassador, Gabriela Dancău, called Romanian parishes “places of faith, solidarity and continuity”. (Basilica.ro — Romanian)
  • Germany. On 8 October the Greek Orthodox Metropolis of Germany awarded Bavarian Minister-President Markus Söder its Golden Cross, first class, at All Saints parish in Munich. He said: “For Christians, the Cross is always also a responsibility.” (Orthodox Times, 9 Oct — English)
  • France. The Patriarch’s visit to Chantilly and Amiens is covered in §1.1 and §2.1. The Assembly of Orthodox Bishops of France, under Metropolitan Dimitrios, welcomed him. (Orthodoxie.com, Christophe Levalois — French)

4.5 Asia, the Gulf and the Oriental diasporas

  • Okinawa (Japan). Metropolitan Ambrosios of Korea, the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s exarch for Japan, visited Okinawa on 2–4 October. He celebrated Liturgy in a private home and launched fundraising to buy a building for the island’s first Orthodox church, before serving in Tokyo. (Orthodox Times, 8 Oct — English)
  • Thailand. During floods in Ratchaburi province, the Moscow Patriarchate’s Dormition Monastery is sheltering evacuees and the Church’s Thailand fund is distributing aid. (Profile Russia, 4 Oct — Russian)
  • Coptic diaspora.
    • On 6 October Anba David, Bishop of New York and New England, asked Pope Tawadros for permission to found a new convent in Massachusetts, dedicated to the Virgin Mary and St Mary of Egypt. (al-Dostor, 6 Oct — Arabic)
    • Young Copts from the United Arab Emirates who had served in Upper Egypt were received by the Pope. Their visit was coordinated by a Holy Synod office that links diaspora dioceses with needy areas at home. (al-Dostor, 7 Oct — Arabic)
  • Bahrain (Malankara). In Bahrain for the feast of St Mary’s Orthodox Cathedral, Catholicos Baselios Marthoma Mathews III met Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa and received a Golden Visa. (OVS Online, 8 Oct — English)

5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations

5.1 Moscow and Alexandria in Africa

The Accra Liturgy and the Nigerian tour (see §4.1) extend the parallel jurisdiction the Moscow Patriarchate has maintained on Alexandria’s territory since December 2021. Two features are new this week:

  • Abandoned communities. The Exarchate is now publicising letters from communities that describe themselves as abandoned by Alexandria.
  • State presence. Russian state presence is part of the announcements: the ambassador in Accra, the Russian House, and an Exarchate priest at the 18th regional conference of Russian compatriots for Africa and the Middle East in Tunisia on 3–4 October, alongside the Russian foreign ministry and Rossotrudnichestvo. (Exarchate, 9 Oct — Russian)

On Alexandria’s side, the week’s documents come from Bukoba. The diocese’s 6 September statement called the Russian presence an “invasion” that “will not be blessed”. Its 8 October self-criticism on dependency is reported in §2.2.

The Bukoba bishop’s August accusations against Moscow reached international attention through Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service, which republished them on 14 August. Moscow’s Department for External Church Relations has not answered them publicly. (SZRU, 14 Aug — English; Ukrainian state intelligence)

5.2 Orthodox–Catholic

Amiens. The gift of a fragment of the relic of St John the Baptist by the Catholic Bishop of Amiens to the Ecumenical Patriarch on 9 October (see §2.1) returns to Constantinople part of the plunder of 1204.

Chantilly. The Holy See’s Dicastery for Promoting Christian Unity reported the conference and Fr Hyacinthe Destivelle’s paper on the Encyclical and Message. (christianunity.va, 9 Oct — English)

Cyprus. Archbishop Georgios’s defence of dialogue with Rome (“no concession… no concelebration”) comes ahead of his Vatican visit of 19–21 October (see §2.12).

Gaza. A Catholic mother and daughter were buried from the Greek Orthodox Church of St Porphyrios. The Orthodox Patriarchate called them martyrs, and the Pope wrote to their parish (see §2.4). It is a small instance of the shared life of Gaza’s two remaining Christian communities.

5.3 Sweden — The Christian Council of Sweden suspends the Russian Orthodox Church

At its meeting on 17 September 2026, the board of the Christian Council of Sweden (Sveriges kristna råd, SKR) decided to suspend the membership of the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Sweden. The council published the decision on 1 October. (Sveriges kristna råd, “Styrelsebeslut i medlemsfråga”, 1 Oct — Swedish)

What the council says. According to its statement:

  • The rationale. The decision formalises an arrangement that has applied in practice since 2022. It refers to Russia’s war against Ukraine and to the Russian state’s relationship with the Moscow Patriarchate. The security situation, the council says, has made cooperation between the organisations impossible since the war began.
  • The legal basis. An extraordinary annual meeting in 2026 clarified the membership criteria. Member churches must now stand behind and respect the council’s basic commitments to human dignity, peace, democracy, non-discrimination and respect for others. The same meeting gave the board the power to suspend a member.
  • The effect. While suspended, the church may not take part in the council’s activities, receive funds the council passes on to its members, or take part in its decision-making. This lasts until the board lifts the suspension.
  • The purpose. The board says the step is needed for the council to remain the churches’ independent voice, to protect the security of the other member churches and to preserve trust in its work.
  • No further comment. The statement ends: “Sveriges kristna råd kommer inte göra några fler uttalanden än detta” (“The Christian Council of Sweden will make no statements beyond this”).

How it was reported. The Christian daily Dagen broke the story on 1 October, in a report by Arash Asadi. Its deck recalls that the church “has been singled out by Säpo as a tool for Russia’s ‘security-threatening activity'”. Its lead adds that the Security Service has previously assessed that Russia uses the denomination for influence activities against Sweden. (Dagen, Arash Asadi, 1 Oct — Swedish; paywalled, headline and lead read)

On 5 October the public broadcaster SVT (Västmanland) reported the decision from the angle of the Moscow Patriarchate’s parish in Västerås. The construction of that parish’s church has prompted questions in recent years about Russian influence and security risks. SVT notes that the council declined to explain why the decision came only now, if cooperation has been impossible since 2022. The parish’s rector, Fr Pavel Makarenko, did not respond to SVT’s requests for comment. (SVT Nyheter Västmanland, 5 Oct — Swedish)

The other side. The Russian Orthodox Church in Sweden had published no response in the sources consulted. The Säpo assessment is reported here as Dagen relays it; the Security Service’s own wording was not consulted for this item.

5.4 Middle East

The Coptic Pope’s reception of the MECC’s Secretary-General, Michel Abs, on 6 October came during an MECC regional conference in Egypt on confronting hate speech “to promote human dignity and living together” (see §3.1).

6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates

6.1 A council measured by its reception

The most telling word at Chantilly was “shelves”. Ten years after Crete, the Phanar’s own speakers described the Council’s documents as largely unreceived in practice:

  • Emmanuel of Chalcedon: texts “left on the shelves are remembered only on anniversaries”.
  • Job of Pisidia: a “pious wish” for regular councils, defeated by “the crisis” of Orthodoxy.
  • John of Albania: a hope for “more regular” synodal cooperation.

Under this candour lies an argument about where authority in Orthodoxy sits. For the Phanar, Crete’s conciliar character was complete with ten Churches. Bartholomew’s 2016 phrase “a synod after the Synod” puts the remaining work in reception, not in reconvening. For the Churches that stayed away, reception is precisely the problem: Antioch’s 2016 statement said a council without more than half the faithful could not bind it.

Chantilly did not resolve that disagreement. It did show a softening of form on the other side. The Bulgarian Synod sent a metropolitan while he stressed his personal capacity, and Antioch’s best-known lay voice came in his own name. The Synaxis of 30 November will show whether softer forms become substance.

6.2 Relics, monuments and sovereignty

In one week, sacred objects and buildings served as currencies of statehood in five places:

CaseDate (2026)What moved or was claimedWho actedRegister in which it was framed
Amiens → Phanar9 OctFragment of the Head of St John the BaptistCatholic bishop of AmiensEcclesial reconciliation; return after 1204 (ec-patr.org)
Greece ↔ Bulgaria3–5 Oct48 (or 53) church objects ↔ remains of Tsar SamuelTwo governments, two ChurchesNational restitution; a “beginning”, per the Phanar (SKAI)
Kurmukhi / Kürmük24 Sept–7 OctName and attribution of a churchGeorgian Patriarchate vs Azerbaijani foreign ministryHeritage vs sovereignty and toponymy (Trend)
Sinairuling due 24 OctTitle to monastery landsEgyptian courts; Greek government; brotherhoodProperty law vs religious use (Ta Nea via Romfea)
Lebedyn, Ukraine5 Oct1839 bell towerUkrainian prosecutor and courtState heritage ownership vs a UOC monastery (RISU)

The common thread is that the state increasingly sets the terms on which churches hold sacred objects. Governments negotiated the Greek–Bulgarian exchange. A foreign ministry answered the Georgian Patriarchate. A court, guided by two governments, is settling Sinai. Only at Amiens did two churches act alone.

6.3 Mission in Africa: dependency and the parallel jurisdiction

The documents of this week put two models of mission side by side.

  • Alexandria’s Bukoba diocese blames its own model (“We were 60 years late — the mission was a mistake”) for dependence on Greek and Cypriot money. It is moving towards locally funded clergy.
  • Moscow’s Exarchate presents its expansion through firsts and mass baptisms, often in partnership with Russian embassies and cultural institutions: Accra, Niamey earlier, the Seychelles, the Tunisia compatriots’ conference.

Two Ghanaian academics were already debating, before the Accra Liturgy, whether this is “soft power” and whether it is “emerging” or “decisive” (§4.1). For African Orthodox, the stake is practical: whichever jurisdiction pays clergy, builds churches and educates catechists will hold parishes whose people may care little for the 2019 dispute over Ukraine that created the rivalry.

6.4 Churches and the wartime state

Several primates this week aligned their Churches’ calendars or honours with the state’s war memory or war effort.

  • Russia. Patriarch Kirill decorated Ramzan Kadyrov and praised President Putin’s service. In Tambov, a cathedral is to be rebuilt as a war memorial bearing soldiers’ names (§2.5).
  • Egypt. The Coptic Church rang its bells at the request of the army’s morale directorate. Pope Tawadros, a week after urging preaching against “despair” in line with presidential directives, called Coptic identity “part of national identity” (§3.1).
  • Ethiopia. The opposite pattern appears. The Catholic bishops and the Pope have addressed the new war in Tigray. The Orthodox Church, whose hierarchy is itself divided along the war’s lines, made no corresponding public intervention this week (§1.2).
  • Armenia. The conflict runs the other way: the state seeks to reorganise the Church, and the Church invokes “religious freedom and Church autonomy” against Parliament (§1.3).

What these cases share is a question about the Church’s freedom to keep its own counsel in wartime: whether it is required to sound like the state, or to stay silent where the state is at war with part of its flock.

6.5 Loneliness, screens and young people

The Church of Greece spent its Hierarchy session on loneliness and on a ten-point code for clergy online (§2.11). Bartholomew put youth “at the centre” of Crete’s legacy, and the Phanar’s Rethymno bioethics conference warned against turning childbearing into a measure of spirituality (§2.1).

In Moscow, a Patriarchal commission spokesman asserted “growing youth interest” in Orthodoxy without data (§2.5). Ksenia Luchenko’s new article in OWEP argues the reverse: that Russian Orthodox youth work since 2022 has become a channel of militarised patriotic education, reflecting Orthodoxy as national identity rather than any rise in youth religiosity (§7).

Among Ukrainian medical students in wartime Kyiv, Ishchuk and colleagues find “belonging without belief” and movement in both directions (§7). How Churches measure young people’s faith is becoming as contested as the faith itself.

7. New Academic Literature

Finland — Ortodoksia 66 (2026), “Polarisaatio” (yearbook of the Association of Orthodox Clergy in Finland and the Department of Orthodox Theology, University of Eastern Finland, with the Karelian Theological Society; ISSN 2489-5326 online, 0355-5690 print; open access, CC BY 4.0; published 26 September 2026).

  1. Krystallia Latsara (University of Helsinki), “Between Unity and Polarization: The Holy and Great Council of Crete and Contemporary Orthodox Challenges Ten Years After”, Ortodoksia 66 (2026), pp. 114–128. DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.178610. English; essays and surveys section. According to its abstract, it revisits the Council’s preparation, the issues raised during it and its impact over ten years, and warns of the outcomes if internal conflicts are not addressed. Read alongside §1.1.
  2. Svante Lundgren (Lund University), “Armenia azerbaidžanilaisin silmin” [Armenia through Azerbaijani eyes], Ortodoksia 66 (2026), pp. 168–179. DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.185331. Finnish; essays and surveys section. It argues that anti-Armenian hostility has become part of Azerbaijani state ideology, including the rewriting of history through the Caucasian Albanian frame and the destruction of Armenian heritage. The author writes from a committed standpoint; his conclusions are his own, and the essay does not concern the Georgian church at Kurmukhi (§2.7).
  3. Esko Ryökäs, “Mistä kasvoi tarve ortodoksisille diakonissoille?” [Where did the need for Orthodox deaconesses arise?], Ortodoksia 66 (2026), pp. 39–63. DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.178248. Finnish; section not confirmed. As its title indicates, a historical inquiry into the origins of the call for deaconesses in Finnish Orthodoxy. It appears in the same volume as Andreas Bergman’s systematic-theological response to the final report of the Finnish working group on the female diaconate (pp. 129–142, DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.179285).
  4. Serafim Seppälä, “Eläinten uskonnollisuus ortodoksisen teologian kysymyksenä” [Animal religiosity as a question of Orthodox theology], Ortodoksia 66 (2026), pp. 9–38. DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.178955. Finnish. Per its title, a theological study of whether, and how, Orthodox theology can speak of the religiosity of animals.
  5. Maria Takala-Roszczenko, “Nuorten Ortodoksisten Pappien Liiton rakentamisen vuodet 1926–1939” [The founding years of the Union of Young Orthodox Priests, 1926–1939], Ortodoksia 66 (2026), pp. 64–80. DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.185857. Finnish. A history of an inter-war Finnish clergy association.

Ukraine, Albania, Kazakhstan — Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 46, no. 9 (George Fox University; ISSN 2693-2229; online 30 September 2026; article numbers, not page ranges)

  1. Mariia Chikarkova (Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University), “Transformation of Lived Vernacular Religiosity during the Russo-Ukrainian War: The Symbolism of Ukrainian Graffiti and Nativity Scenes”, OPREE 46(9), Art. 3. DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2917. English. A material-culture study of wartime graffiti (the Virgin, Pokrova, David and Goliath) and Nativity scenes. It argues that Christian symbols are reinterpreted through protection, loss, displacement and hope, so that tradition is reshaped rather than merely preserved.
  2. Nataliia Ishchuk, Anna Laputko, Yaroslava Demydenko, Iryna Vasiuk and Serhii Kiriienko (Bogomolets National Medical University, Kyiv), “Faith, Doubt, and Belonging: Spiritual Trajectories of University Students Under Conditions of Full-Scale War”, OPREE 46(9), Art. 6. DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2924. English. A case study of Kyiv medical students. Orthodox identity predominates among the affiliated, while “belonging without belief” and agnostic positions are common; the war has moved attitudes in both directions.
  3. Olena Predko, Denys Predko and Ihor Maksymenko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv), “Religious Situation in Ukraine: Main Trends and Prognostic Visions”, OPREE 46(9), Art. 17. DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2845. English. Finds that religious institutions have proved resilient, that the Orthodox field is being restructured around national identity and security, and that religiosity is individualising. It names post-war risks: property disputes, politicisation and staffing shortages.
  4. Ali Ukenov (Eurasian National University), “Religion and International Relations: The Concept of Soft Power and Orthodoxy in Kazakhstan”, OPREE 46(9), Art. 13. DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2864. English. Based on twenty interviews with clergy and parishioners and the case of the former priest Yakov Vorontsov. It finds the Moscow Patriarchate’s soft power in Kazakhstan uneven and contested, with parishes putting pastoral work ahead of geopolitics.
  5. Fatos Tarifa (University of New York Tirana), “The Rise and Fall of the First Atheist State: Albania’s Rediscovery of Faith”, OPREE 46(9), Art. 4. DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2869. English. Traces Hoxha’s 1967 ban on religion, the 1976 constitutional atheism and the post-1990 revival, as a case of both the force and the limits of coercive secularisation.

Russia — Христианское чтение [Khristianskoye Chteniye] 2026, no. 3 (St Petersburg Theological Academy; a church academy journal)

  1. Bishop Silouan (Nikitin) (rector, St Petersburg Theological Academy), “Святейший Патриарх Московский и всея Руси Кирилл как управляющий приходами Московской Патриархии в Финляндии (1978–1984 гг.)” [Patriarch Kirill as administrator of the Moscow Patriarchate’s parishes in Finland, 1978–1984], pp. 90–103. DOI 10.47132/1814-5574_2026_3_90. Russian. An archival study of Kirill’s handling of the Helsinki parishes and his contacts with the Finnish Orthodox and Lutheran Churches.
  2. S. L. Firsov (St Petersburg Theological Academy; Herzen State Pedagogical University), “Дела и дни. К истории служения Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла в первой половине 2020-х годов” [Works and days: on the history of Patriarch Kirill’s ministry in the first half of the 2020s], pp. 113–127. DOI 10.47132/1814-5574_2026_3_113. Russian. Surveys 2020 to mid-2026, including clergy and episcopate statistics and the Patriarch’s stance on the war (“special military operation”) and “traditional values”. It argues that church–state ties have deepened to an unprecedented degree.
  3. Priest Boris Sandar (Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University), “Поступление в Московскую духовную семинарию Русской Православной Церкви в конце 1950-х — начале 1980-х гг. (по материалам интервью священнослужителей Московской епархии)” [Admission to the Moscow Theological Seminary, late 1950s to early 1980s, from interviews with clergy of the Moscow diocese], pp. 176–187. DOI 10.47132/1814-5574_2026_3_176. Russian. An oral history of Soviet-era obstacles to seminary entry. The title on the journal’s issue page differs from the article’s own; the article’s is used. It is a counterpart to the study of present-day admissions cited on 3 October.
  4. A. Yu. Zhdanov (Kunstkamera, Russian Academy of Sciences), A. V. Zheveleva and A. M. Pervushin (St Petersburg State University), “Православные святыни Трабзона: русские экспедиции 1910-х гг. и современный статус” [Orthodox shrines of Trabzon: the Russian expeditions of the 1910s and their present status], pp. 426–442. DOI 10.47132/1814-5574_2026_3_426. Russian. Assesses the condition and public perception, including online debate, of Trabzon’s Byzantine church-mosque monuments, against F. I. Uspensky’s expeditions of 1916–17.

German-language periodicals

  1. Xenia Lutschenko [Ksenia Luchenko] (Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, Budva, Montenegro), “Orthodoxe Jugendarbeit zwischen Katechese und Kriegserziehung” [Orthodox youth work between catechesis and war education], OWEP — Ost-West. Europäische Perspektiven 3/2026 (“Aufwachsen in unsicheren Zeiten”), pp. 191–197. German. Publisher’s page. It argues that since 2022 the Russian Orthodox Church has become a key channel of militarised patriotic education for young people, reflecting Orthodoxy as national identity rather than rising youth religiosity.
  2. Harutyun G. Harutyunyan, “Konfliktreich. Kirche und Politik in Armenien” [Conflict-laden: Church and politics in Armenia], Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West (RGOW) 9–10/2026, thematic issue “Richtungsentscheid. Ungarn und Armenien nach den Wahlen”. German. Publisher’s page. Surveys the escalating conflict between the Pashinyan government and the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church, including the prosecution of the Catholicos and bishops’ demands for his resignation and reform. The RGOW site has moved from g2w.eu to rgow.eu.

Book

  1. Pantelis Kalaitzidis, Orthodoxy and Modernity: Introducing a Constructive Encounter, East West Ecumenism / Ost West Ökumene 1 (Paderborn: Brill Schöningh, 2026), 507 pp. E-book DOI 10.30965/9783657795345 (per library catalogue). The print ISBN 978-3-506-79534-2 is unconfirmed (trade listing and RGOW review only). English. As its title states, an introduction to a “constructive encounter” between Orthodox theology and modernity; first volume of a new ecumenical series. Reviewed by Regula M. Zwahlen in RGOW 9–10/2026. (ARCE library record)

This review covers the period 4-10 October 2026.


This text was generated by Claude (Anthropic), Claude Opus 5.5, on 10 October 2026. It has been slightly edited by Orthodox.News. https://claude.ai

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