Weekly Review of Orthodox Church News

A survey of developments in the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches worldwide.

18–24 October 2026

Contents

• 1. Top Stories of the Week
  • 1.1 Jordan — Gunmen attack a funeral at a Greek Orthodox church in Karak
  • 1.2 Russia/Ukraine — Moscow’s Synod rules on receiving OCU members, including by baptism
  • 1.3 Bulgaria — Bartholomew at Rila: concelebration, and Epifaniy in the diptychs
  • 1.4 Sinai — The Greek Synod backs an out-of-court agreement with Egypt
• 2. Eastern Orthodox News
  • 2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate — The Books’ Journal interview; the 35th anniversary
  • 2.2 Ukraine — Balta eparchy “affiliated”; Vvedensky Monastery hit; churches on appeasement
  • 2.3 Russia — An anti-war priest wanted; a “smart monastery”
    • Russia beyond Moscow — Verkhoturye and the Urals
  • 2.4 Baltic States — Pikk 64 eviction in Tallinn; a Lithuanian church-property proposal
  • 2.5 Romania and Moldova — A priest-martyr proclaimed; Bessarabia asks for mediation
  • 2.6 Serbia and Bosnia — A True Cross relic; the Church in the election campaign
  • 2.7 Georgia — The Patriarchate and two critical TV channels
  • 2.8 Albania — Police in the cathedral courtyard; the Church’s statement
• 3. Oriental Orthodox News
  • 3.1 Ethiopia — The Holy Synod opens with a peace agenda as war continues
  • 3.2 Armenia — Courts uphold the Catholicos’s authority over his clergy
• 4. Diaspora & Mission Fields
  • 4.1 Background briefing — Byzantine Orthodoxy in Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan
  • 4.2 DR Congo — Legal personality for the Russian Orthodox Church
  • 4.3 Canada — New Lines on a Toronto basement parish
• 5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations
  • 5.1 Orthodox–Catholic — Bartholomew’s Angelicum doctorate; the Pope’s recovery
  • 5.2 Inter-Orthodox — Communion, commemoration and their limits
• 6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates
  • 6.1 The vocabulary of heresy and the practice of rebaptism
  • 6.2 The state as registrar of jurisdictions
  • 6.3 Courts and the autonomy of churches
  • 6.4 Churches in polarised street politics: Tirana, Belgrade, Tbilisi
• 7. New Academic Literature

1. Top Stories of the Week

1.1 Jordan — Gunmen attack a funeral at a Greek Orthodox church in Karak

What happened. On the afternoon of Friday 23 October, at about 2 p.m. local time, gunmen opened fire on mourners at a funeral at the Greek Orthodox Church of St George in the village of Hamoud (al-Qasr district, Karak governorate, southern Jordan). The church belongs to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, whose Jordanian flock is pastored by Metropolitan Christophoros. According to Al Jazeera, the funeral was for a local woman, Mithal al-Halasa; the shooting began about ten minutes after her body reached the church courtyard. Asharq Al-Awsat says the church, founded in 1985, is used by the Christian al-Halasa clan. A witness quoted by Arab News put the crowd at 150–200, most of them aged between 50 and 70.

At least seven people were killed. Prime Minister Jafar Hassan declared three days of national mourning. King Abdullah II visited the wounded at Karak Government Hospital the same evening and promised the “harshest” penalties. Interior Minister Mazen al-Farrayeh called the attack “a terrorist operation carried out by a group of extremists”; the government spokesman, Mohammad Momani, blamed “extremist takfiri ideology” and said investigators were still examining whether the attackers had organisational links. Officials say they know who the perpetrators are but had released no names by 24 October; security raids were reported in villages around Mu’tah. Arab News reported no arrest and no claim of responsibility as of 24 October. Asharq Al-Awsat’s sources describe the attackers as Karak residents holding takfiri views who knew when the funeral would take place. The US Embassy raised its security alert on 24 October.

The figures are still moving, and the sources disagree:

Point	Source and figure
Wounded	10 (Vatican News, citing Jordanian state TV al-Mamlaka, early); 27 (Public Security Director Maj. Gen. Obaidallah Maaytah, via Asharq Al-Awsat, 24 Oct); 34 (Public Security Directorate, via Al Jazeera Net, 24 Oct); 40, two critical (Health Minister Ibrahim al-Budour, via Arab News, 24 Oct)
Gunmen	two (Vatican News; Public Security Directorate); two who fired plus a third who did not (Asharq Al-Awsat, from surveillance footage); three, one with a Kalashnikov and two with pistols (Al Jazeera Net)

(Vatican News, 23 Oct — English; Al Jazeera Net, 23 Oct and 24 Oct — Arabic; Anadolu, Laith Al-jnaidi and Rania Abushamala, 23 Oct — English; Asharq Al-Awsat, 24 Oct — English; Arab News, 24 Oct — English)

The Patriarchate’s statement. In a statement of 23 October, Patriarch Theophilos III, the Holy Synod and Metropolitan Christophoros framed the attack as an assault on the nation as well as on the Church:

• «فلن ينال هذا الفعل الدموي من الوحدة الوطنية والثبات» — “this bloody act will not undermine national unity and steadfastness”;
• «هذه الفعلة المجرمة بعيدة وغريبة عن إسلام البلاد المعتدل» — “this criminal act is far removed from, and foreign to, the country’s moderate Islam”;
• «أي محاولات تهدف إلى اقتلاع أبناء الأرض المقدسة منها أو تهجيرهم لن تزيدهم إلا تمسكاً بأرضهم وتجذراً فيها» — “any attempts to uproot the people of the Holy Land or displace them will only make them more attached to their land and more firmly rooted in it”.

(WAFA, 23 Oct — Arabic; Al-Kofiya, 23 Oct — Arabic)

Reactions across the Orthodox world.

• Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, in Rome, telephoned Theophilos the same evening: «κάθε τρομοκρατική ενέργεια στην πραγματικότητα στρέφεται κατά της ειρηνικής συνυπάρξεως λαών, θρησκειών και πολιτισμών» (“every terrorist act is in reality directed against the peaceful coexistence of peoples, religions and cultures”) (Romfea, 23 Oct — Greek; Vema, 24 Oct — English).
• Patriarch Daniel of Romania sent a message of solidarity to Theophilos on 23 October (Basilica.ro, 23 Oct — Romanian).
• Coptic Pope Tawadros II wrote to King Abdullah II: «نصلي من أجل راحة أرواح الضحايا … وأن يحفظ الله الأردن وكنيستها من كل سوء» (“we pray for the repose of the victims’ souls … may God protect Jordan and its church from all harm”) (Elbalad, 23 Oct — Arabic).
• The Middle East Council of Churches (Beirut) condemned “a grave violation of the sanctity of places of worship” (MECC, 23 Oct — English). Romfea’s listings show condemnations on 23 October from the Patriarchates of Alexandria and Antioch and the Greek and Cypriot foreign ministries as well.
• Outside the churches, Al-Azhar’s Grand Imam, the UN, Saudi Arabia, France and Algeria condemned the attack (Al Jazeera Net; Arab News).

On the vocabulary. Jordanian officials speak of “takfiri” extremists; the Patriarchate stresses the “moderate Islam” of the country. Some Russian-language Orthodox outlets headlined the attack as “Islamist”. These are the labels of their authors. No group has claimed the attack, and the investigation’s findings had not been published when this edition closed. The attack falls in the jurisdiction of a Patriarchate that has long insisted on the integration of its Arab faithful in Jordanian national life; its statement’s emphasis on “national unity” is in that line.

1.2 Russia/Ukraine — Moscow’s Synod sets rules for receiving members of “Ukrainian schismatic structures”, including by baptism

The decision. At its session of 22 October at the Danilov Monastery (journals Nos. 66–98), the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church approved «Указания по принятию из украинских раскольнических структур лиц, желающих присоединиться к Русской Православной Церкви» (“Guidelines for receiving persons from Ukrainian schismatic structures who wish to join the Russian Orthodox Church”) as guidance for diocesan clergy (journal No. 83: «Постановили: утвердить документ…» — “Resolved: to approve the document…”). The Synodal Missionary Department drafted it at the request of dioceses in what the Synod calls “Donbas and Novorossiya”, that is, Russian-occupied Ukraine; the Department for External Church Relations reviewed it.

What it provides, as reported by the ROC-aligned Foma and the pro-UOC Union of Orthodox Journalists (SPZh). The bodies named are the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU), the former “Kyiv Patriarchate” and the former Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Then:

• people baptised in a Church Moscow regards as canonical who later joined these bodies are received by confession;
• people baptised within these bodies are received by baptism, citing a Moscow Patriarchate circular of 17 July 2020 (No. 01/3154);
• clergy ordained in them are received only as laymen, and monastic tonsures are not recognised;
• joining communities come under the local bishop, must serve in Church Slavonic, may not claim special status, and individuals must renounce commemorating “schismatic” leaders.

SPZh adds that the document calls the 2018–19 Tomos a unilateral political act that did not restore apostolic succession. The full text was not available for this edition, so that characterisation rests on SPZh’s summary. (Foma, 23 Oct — Russian; Pravoslavie.ru, journals of 22 Oct — Russian; SPZh, 23 Oct — Ukrainian; EADaily, 22 Oct — Russian)

Why it matters. The OCU is recognised as a canonical, autocephalous Church by Constantinople, Alexandria, Greece and Cyprus (as at September 2026), and not by Moscow and most other Churches. Moscow has called the OCU “schismatic” since 2018; the language of the Synod’s document is Moscow’s own, and is reported here as such. What is new is that a disputed status has been turned into sacramental practice applied in occupied territory: a person baptised by an OCU priest in, say, occupied Zaporizhzhia region is now to be baptised again by Moscow’s clergy, on the ground that the first baptism was not a baptism. Receiving by baptism is the strictest of the three classical modes of reception (baptism, chrismation, confession); it is usually reserved for bodies whose sacraments are held to be wholly void. The guidelines rest on a 2020 circular, but their approval by the Synod gives the practice the force of a synodal act. Constantinople’s own position, set out by Bartholomew this week (§2.1), is the mirror image: it is Moscow’s war theology that he calls “heretical”.

The other side. The OCU, whose sacraments the document treats as void, had not answered publicly by the close of this edition. The position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC, under Metropolitan Onuphry) matters as much: its faithful and the OCU’s share families, villages and, until recently, parishes, and the UOC itself has not, to this review’s knowledge, publicly endorsed rebaptism.

Other decisions of the same session (journals as reprinted by Pravoslavie.ru):

• The ordination oath (journal 82) now covers public statements and social media: «Не выступать публично от лица Церкви без благословения священноначалия» (“Not to speak publicly on behalf of the Church without the blessing of the church authorities”). The change bears directly on clergy who have spoken against the war.
• Bishop Feodosiy (Gazhu) of Isilkul (journal 75), involved in a road accident on 29 July in which a 20-year-old moped rider died, was removed from his see and placed under Metropolitan Dionisy of Omsk (accident reported by Om1.ru, 30 Jul — Russian).
• Alexander Shchipkov left his post as first deputy chairman of the Synodal Department for Church–Society Relations on his election to the State Duma; RIA names Vakhtang Kipshidze as his successor in that post (RIA Novosti, 22 Oct — Russian).
• The bioethics commission becomes the Synodal Commission on Bioethics and High Technologies, with artificial intelligence in its remit (journal 79).
• The Trinity–St Sergius Lavra (Sergiev Posad) gets a new abbot: Bishop Savva, formerly of Armavir, now Bishop of Zaraysk, replacing Bishop Kirill of Sergiev Posad in that office. Metropolitan Konstantin of Petrozavodsk retires at 75 and is succeeded by Avel of Gubkin. Three new bishops were elected (Vasily (Telekhov) for Armavir, Panteleimon (Ledin) for Yeniseisk, Seraphim (Popkov) as vicar of Tarusa).
• Commemorations. The session ended with a requiem litany that included Metropolitan Vissarion of Ovruch of the UOC (died 18 September) — a Ukrainian hierarch commemorated by the Moscow Synod as one of its own.

1.3 Bulgaria — Bartholomew at Rila: concelebration with Daniil, and Epifaniy in the diptychs

Following the report of 17 October on the programme and the petition against the visit.

Saturday 17 October: arrival and protest. Patriarch Daniil received Bartholomew at the Synodal Palace: «Сърцето ни е отворено за Вас с братска любов в Христа» (“Our heart is open to you with brotherly love in Christ”), calling Constantinople the “Mother Church” of the Bulgarians (Bgonair, 17 Oct — Bulgarian). Outside, “dozens” of protesters held placards reading «Вартоломей, не си добре дошъл» (“Bartholomew, you are not welcome”) and «Еретик и икуменист» (“Heretic and ecumenist”); their grievances named ecumenism and the OCU. Neither bTV nor Paragraf named organisers or quoted a protester (bTV, 17 Oct; Paragraf, 17 Oct — both Bulgarian). TopPresa, which is critical of the visit, puts the signatures on the open letter at about 2,300; SPZh says “more than 2,000”.

Sunday 18 October, Sofia: present, but not concelebrating. At St Alexander Nevsky Cathedral the two primates «εκκλησιάστηκαν» — attended as worshippers — at a Liturgy led by Metropolitan Varnavas of Neapolis and Stavroupolis from Bartholomew’s entourage, with Phanar and Bulgarian hierarchs concelebrating (Fos Fanariou, 18 Oct — Greek). That matches SPZh’s report of 17 October that Bartholomew would attend “only as a guest”, although the Synod’s original programme had both primates leading the service (SPZh, 17 Oct — Russian; pro-UOC). Several Bulgarian outlets (bTV, Moreto) wrote loosely that the two “led” or “celebrated” the service. Bartholomew spoke of “unconditional need” for peace: «В този момент светът има безусловна нужда от мир». Daniil asked that problems be resolved «в диалог, а не в противопоставяне и разделение» (“in dialogue, not in opposition and division”). Former king and prime minister Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha attended. The two patriarchs then prayed at Patriarch Neofit’s tomb. (bTV, 18 Oct; Moreto, 18 Oct — both Bulgarian)

Monday 19 October, Rila: a joint Liturgy. On the feast of St John of Rila — the 1,150th anniversary of his birth and the 1,080th of his repose, and the 57th anniversary of Bartholomew’s priestly ordination — Bartholomew and Daniil concelebrated at Rila Monastery. BTA lists the hierarchs who received them at the Dupnitsa Gate: Metropolitans Ioan of Varna, Serafim of Nevrokop, Grigoriy of Vratsa and Arseniy of Sliven, and eight bishops including Abbot Evlogiy of Rila (BTA, Elitsa Ivanova, 19 Oct — Bulgarian). Arseniy was one of the four metropolitans who voted against the Mishev deposition on 2 October; his presence at Rila is on record. Naum of Ruse, Kiprian of Stara Zagora and Yakov of Dorostol do not appear on BTA’s list, which is not proof that they stayed away from the whole visit. The Greek ambassador and regional officials attended; no meeting with the President or the Prime Minister was reported in the sources reached, six days before the presidential election of 25 October.

Epifaniy commemorated. At the Great Entrance, Bartholomew commemorated Metropolitan Epifaniy of the OCU among the primates. This is reported both by SPZh, which adds that some worshippers shouted «Анафема!» (anafema, “anathema!”) and links a video, and by TopPresa, which says the commemoration “cast a shadow”; Trafficnews and Frognews mention no shouts (SPZh, 19 Oct — Russian; TopPresa, 19 Oct — Bulgarian; Trafficnews, 19 Oct; Frognews, 19 Oct — Bulgarian). The commemoration is double-sourced; the shouting rests on SPZh’s account and video. The Bulgarian Church has not recognised the OCU, and the presiding celebrant at a concelebration names the primates he is in communion with; Bulgarian hierarchs thus concelebrated at a service in which the OCU primate was commemorated.

Afterwards. Daniil went on to Mount Athos (Iviron, then Vatopedi) on 21–22 October, accompanied by Metropolitan Apostolos of Miletus as Bartholomew’s representative (Romfea, 21 Oct — Greek).

What the visit settled, and what it did not. (a) It settled the question of communion: the two primates did concelebrate, at Rila, despite the petition. (b) It left open the Sofia protocol: the choice of guest status at the capital’s cathedral, where the petitioners had concentrated their pressure, while concelebrating at the national shrine. (c) It reopened the Ukrainian question inside the Bulgarian Church, which had so far kept the OCU at arm’s length; the diptychs at Rila put it on the record.

1.4 Sinai — The Greek Synod backs an out-of-court agreement with Egypt

Following the report of 17 October on the brotherhood’s request for more time and the 24 October court deadline.

On Thursday 22 October the Standing Holy Synod of the Church of Greece met in extraordinary session under Archbishop Ieronymos. It unanimously approved a two-page letter of support to Archbishop Symeon of Sinai, backing settlement of the dispute over St Catherine’s Monastery through the proposed extrajudicial agreement with the Egyptian government. Symeon briefed the Synod by telephone; the Secretary General for Religious Affairs, Giorgos Kalantzis, attended in person and reported at length. The report is by Dimitris Alexopoulos of Ta Nea, republished by Romfea on 23 October (Romfea/Ta Nea, 23 Oct — Greek). Romfea had noted on 20 October that the agenda had not been announced (Romfea, 20 Oct — Greek).

The Synod’s reasoning, as reported. Members compared the agreement favourably with what a final ruling of Egypt’s Court of Cassation might bring. They asked who would govern the monastery under it: who sets visiting rules (the brotherhood, the Egyptian Ministry of Culture or another body), residence permits for monks, finances, the monastic register and the status of the relics. Ta Nea summarises the Synod’s analysis in four points: past mistakes cost the last decade valuable time; the current archbishop, not recognised by presidential decree, is a weakness in the negotiation; he must now take the initiative directly; and, given the impasse, the only way out is the proposed agreement, “which the Greek government also accepts”. According to government sources quoted by the paper, Symeon was to brief the brotherhood and then agree a signing date with the Egyptian authorities, with the Greek Foreign Ministry’s help.

Three points to note.

• The “no decree” claim is now in a synodal analysis. Last week this review reported, from a single source, the claim that no Egyptian presidential decree recognises Symeon. Ta Nea now attributes that point to the Greek Synod’s own reasoning. It remains a press account of a closed session; no Egyptian source has confirmed or denied it.
• Sinai is autonomous, and the Church of Greece is not its superior. The Archbishopric of Sinai is a separate body whose archbishop is consecrated by the Patriarch of Jerusalem. The Greek Synod’s letter is support, not a decision; the agreement is for the brotherhood, its archbishop and the Egyptian state to conclude.
• The deadlines. The brotherhood’s reply was due on 22 October and the Court of Cassation deadline fell on 24 October, the closing day of this edition; both will be followed next week.

2. Eastern Orthodox News

2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate — “They baptised the war ‘holy'”: Bartholomew’s interview and his 35th anniversary

The interview. Bartholomew gave a long interview to the Athens review The Books’ Journal (issue 180, October 2026, on sale 15 October), conducted by Vyron Karydis under the title «Στεκόμαστε στο πλευρό των Ουκρανών αδελφών μας» (“We stand by our Ukrainian brothers and sisters”). It appeared just before this edition’s window but was taken up widely from 19 October: by Orthodox Times on 19 October, by the magazine’s own web teaser on 20 October, and in full — six questions and answers — by the pro-Phanar Fos Fanariou on 21 October. (Fos Fanariou, 21 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 19 Oct — Greek; The Books’ Journal, 20 Oct — Greek, teaser only)

Karydis’s questions covered the Patriarchate’s role in the international situation; whether the 2019 Ukrainian autocephaly was purely ecclesiological or had wider consequences; the limits of religious diplomacy in war and Orthodoxy’s difficulty in speaking with one voice; close church–state ties; and whether Orthodoxy risks being “trapped in national frameworks”. The operative passages, quoted because the wording is itself the controversy:

• On autocephaly. «Η χορήγηση της Αυτοκεφαλίας στην Ορθόδοξη Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας ήταν μια πράξη αμιγώς εκκλησιαστική», «μια απόφαση που ελήφθη με γνώμονα την ανάγκη αποκατάστασης της ενότητας των Ορθοδόξων πιστών» — “The granting of autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine was a purely ecclesiastical act”, “a decision taken with a view to the need to restore the unity of the Orthodox faithful”.
• On the war’s cause. For four and a half years Ukraine has been tried by a war that «ασφαλώς δεν ξεκίνησε επειδή εδόθη η Αυτοκεφαλία στην Εκκλησία της» — “certainly did not start because autocephaly was granted to its Church”.
• On “hypocrisy”. «…η ρωσική στρατιωτική εισβολή επέτρεψε να διαφανεί ευδιάκριτα η υποκρισία εκείνων των εκκλησιαστικών παραγόντων της Ρωσίας που δήθεν νοιαζόντουσαν για τους ορθοδόξους πιστούς της Ουκρανίας» — “the Russian military invasion made plainly visible the hypocrisy of those church figures in Russia who supposedly cared for the Orthodox faithful of Ukraine”.
• On the “holy war”. «Τον βάφτισαν «ιερό», προσπάθησαν να τον θεμελιώσουν θεολογικά και μεταφυσικά και ευλόγησαν τα πυρά κατά του ουκρανικού λαού… υποταγμένους στο εθνοφυλετικό ιδεολόγημα του «Ρωσικού κόσμου»» — “They baptised it ‘holy’, tried to ground it theologically and metaphysically, and blessed the fire against the Ukrainian people … [wanting them] subjugated to the ethnophyletist ideologeme of the ‘Russian World’.”
• On heresy. «Ανερυθρίαστα ομολόγησαν urbi et orbi τις αιρετικές περί πολέμου απόψεις και θεωρίες τους» — “Without blushing they professed urbi et orbi their heretical views and theories about war.”
• On ending the war. «οφείλουμε να υπερασπιζόμαστε το δίκαιο, να στεκόμαστε στο πλευρό του θύματος μιας επίθεσης» — “we must defend what is just, stand by the victim of an attack”. Religious leaders and “every person of good will” should encourage a ceasefire and dialogue, «τη μόνη οδό για την επίλυση της όποιας διαφοράς» (“the only path to resolving any dispute”); he prays «για το τέλος αυτού του ανίερου πολέμου» (“for the end of this unholy war”).
• On church and state. Their relations are «μία δυναμική διαδικασία» (“a dynamic process”), «στο πλαίσιο του σεβασμού των θρησκευτικών ελευθεριών και των δικαιωμάτων του ανθρώπου» (“within respect for religious freedoms and human rights”).
• On Orthodox unity. «Εμείς δεν βλέπουμε την Ορθοδοξία σαν μία συνομοσπονδία τοπικών ανεξάρτητων Εκκλησιών», but «ως τη μία Αγία, Καθολική και Αποστολική Εκκλησία» (“We do not see Orthodoxy as a confederation of independent local Churches”, but “as the one Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church”). The Patriarchate will continue to exercise «τον πρωτεύθυνο ρόλο του για τη διαφύλαξη της ενότητας της Ορθοδοξίας» (“its role of primary responsibility for safeguarding the unity of Orthodoxy”).
• On the City. He describes the Church of Constantinople as «ο αρχαιότερος εν λειτουργία θεσμός» (“the oldest functioning institution”) in the City and the region “where Europe and Asia meet”. The text does not name Turkey.

What the interview does not say. It names neither Patriarch Kirill nor “Moscow”; it speaks of “Russia” and of “church figures in Russia”.

Two claims, two kinds of evidence. (a) That autocephaly did not cause the war is a historical-political claim. In the interview he directs it at those who, in his words, hinted in the first days of the invasion that autocephaly was to blame, in order to shift responsibility; it can be weighed against the record of the war’s causes. (b) That Russian church figures hold “heretical” views on war is a theological charge. By calling the “Russian World” an ethnophyletist ideologeme he invokes the term of Constantinople’s council of 1872, which condemned ethnophyletism as a heresy; but a charge of heresy against named views is a judgement only a council could make binding, and no council has made it. Bartholomew uses the word in an interview, not in a synodal act.

Moscow’s side. No response from the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for External Church Relations or its spokesmen had been published by the close of this edition. The nearest thing to a reply came from a different direction: Metropolitan Luka of Zaporizhzhia (UOC) — whose eparchy the Ukrainian authorities declared “affiliated” with Moscow on 13 October — had published an article accusing the Phanar of “corporate logic” that undermines synodality, citing Crete 2016, Ukrainian autocephaly and the dialogue with Rome. On 20 October Orthodox Times printed a rebuttal by Hieromonk Nikitas Pantokratorinos, «Το Οικουμενικό Πατριαρχείο δεν είναι εταιρεία» (“The Ecumenical Patriarchate is not a company”), which ends: «το πρωτείο του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου δεν είναι εταιρικό αξίωμα» (“the primacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is not a corporate office”) (Orthodox Times, 20 Oct — Greek; opinion). Luka’s own article is known here only through that summary.

The 35th anniversary (21–22 October). The Phanar marked 35 years since Bartholomew’s election (22 October 1991).

• 21 October, Vespers. A delegation of the Church of Georgia attended. Archbishop Makarios of Australia gave the address. Greek Culture Minister Lina Mendoni represented the Greek government.
• 22 October, Liturgy. Eleven hierarchs concelebrated, including Archbishop Eugenios of Crete and Archbishops Elpidophoros of America and Makarios of Australia; Archbishop Nektarios of Anthidon came from the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The Greek and Ukrainian consuls general attended; the reports mention no Turkish official.
• Messages. Orthodoxia News Agency names written or telephoned wishes from Patriarch Daniel of Romania, from the Church of Georgia and from Archbishop Apostolos of Canada; no message from Moscow is reported. Bishop Graham Usher of Norwich brought the Archbishop of Canterbury’s greetings, and the Old Catholic Archbishop of Utrecht, Bernd Wallet, attended. Metropolitan Epifaniy also sent congratulations.
• The address. Without naming Moscow, Bartholomew repeated the interview’s register: «η επικράτησις εις μίαν μερίδα της Ορθοδοξίας αιρετικών ιδεολογημάτων, αποτόκων ηγεμονιστικών τάσεων και κοσμικών φιλοδοξιών, ετραυμάτισεν αυτάς τας προσπαθείας» — “the prevalence in one section of Orthodoxy of heretical ideologies, the offspring of hegemonic tendencies and worldly ambitions, has wounded these efforts”. He added: «δεν αποθαρρυνόμεθα» (“we are not discouraged”).

(Orthodoxia News Agency, 23 Oct — Greek; Romfea, 23 Oct and 23 Oct, Canterbury envoy — Greek)

Bartholomew then left for Rome (§5.1).

2.2 Ukraine — Balta eparchy found “affiliated”; a Kyiv monastery hit; the churches on appeasement

The fifth DESS finding. Following the report of 17 October on the Zaporizhzhia eparchy. The State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) has found signs that the Administration of the Balta Eparchy of the UOC (Odesa region; Bishop Oleksiy (Groha)) is affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church. The review ran from 4 September to 19 October; DESS lists the order under 20 October and the media reported it on 21 October. The reasoning is derivative: «Управління Балтської єпархії як складова частина УПЦ має ознаку афілійованості з Київською митрополією УПЦ» (“The Administration of the Balta eparchy, as a constituent part of the UOC, shows signs of affiliation with the Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC”), which DESS has already found affiliated with the ROC. DESS adds a second ground, «обов’язкове входження керівника Управління Балтської єпархії УПЦ до статутних органів управління РПЦ» (“the mandatory membership of the head of the Balta eparchy in the statutory governing bodies of the ROC”). Interfax-Ukraine gives the sequence of DESS findings: Korets monastery (October 2025), Holosiiv Hermitage (May 2026), Pochaiv Lavra (22 July 2026), Zaporizhzhia eparchy (October 2026), now Balta. Neither report gives the order’s number or compliance deadline. RISU notes that Balta clergy had complained to Metropolitan Onuphry that their bishop commemorates Patriarch Kirill; it does not date the complaint. (Interfax-Ukraine, 21 Oct — Ukrainian; RISU, 21 Oct — Ukrainian) The Russian state agency RIA Novosti called the measures the “largest wave of persecution in the state’s modern history” (RIA Novosti, 21 Oct — Russian). The UOC had not commented publicly by the close of this edition.

The Kyiv Metropolia case. A Supreme Court notice of 20 October confirms that the appeals of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and the Kyiv Metropolis against the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal’s ruling of 23 July will be heard in written proceedings; no date is set (Supreme Court, 20 Oct — Ukrainian).

The Vvedensky Monastery hit. During the mass Russian missile and drone attack on Kyiv on the night of 21–22 October, debris struck the UOC’s Vvedensky Monastery in Pechersk district, near the Lavra, at about 03:05. The roof and walls were pierced and the windows blown out. The UOC says two novices were lightly injured; SPZh, quoted by Ukrinform, speaks of “two wounded” among parishioners. The Liturgy was served that morning: «Інцидент не став на заваді продовженню молитовного життя обителі» (“The incident did not prevent the monastery’s prayer life from continuing”). Ukrinform reported one dead and 24 injured in Kyiv. (UOC Information Department, 22 Oct — Ukrainian; Ukrinform, 22 Oct — Ukrainian) Separately, the UOC reported on 16 October — picked up on 19 October — that its late-19th-century church of St John the Theologian at Slovianka (Dnipropetrovsk region) was “completely destroyed” by four Russian guided bombs (Religionpravda, 19 Oct — Ukrainian).

The All-Ukrainian Council of Churches on “appeasement”. On 22 October the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations (VRCiRO) condemned the night’s attack and warned against Western moves to warm relations with Moscow, including praise for Putin as a “humanist” after the release of detainees. It asked for sanctions on Russian politicians, businesspeople, journalists “and religious figures” complicit in crimes: «Лише засуджуючи зло, а не виправдовуючи його, це зло можна зупинити» (“Only by condemning evil, not justifying it, can this evil be stopped”) (RISU, 23 Oct — Ukrainian; OCU, 22 Oct — Ukrainian). The release in question appears to include the American Stephen Hubbard, 73, freed on 21 October, whose son Fr Joseph Coleman, a priest of the Church of Cyprus, published an open letter praising the Russian Church and people (RIA Novosti, 21 Oct — Russian; Chronicles, 21 Oct – English; CBS News, 22 Oct – English). No role of the Russian Church in the release has been shown.

Clergy and mobilisation. Two cases, both reported only by the pro-UOC SPZh on the word of relatives and a Telegram channel: Fr Mykolai Matvienko, rector of the Dormition church at Kyrdany (Kyiv region), detained by police and recruitment-centre staff on 22–23 October and sent to a unit; and Fr Maksym Kostiuchenko of St Mark’s, Kyiv, taken on 22 October (SPZh, 23 Oct — Ukrainian). The recruitment centres had not commented. In the opposite direction, the Zakarpattia regional prosecutor reported on 23 October that a 59-year-old OCU archimandrite was caught on a second attempt to help a man evade the draft across the border, and is in custody under Article 332(3) of the Criminal Code (RISU, 23 Oct — Ukrainian). The OCU had not commented.

Vyshkovo follow-up. Following the report of 17 October. The UOC’s Khust eparchy has suspended from ministry the 45-year-old cleric suspected of the shooting of 15 October; the Prosecutor General gives the toll as three dead (aged 62, 64 and 84) and two hospitalised (SPZh, 21 Oct — Ukrainian).

A parish transfer reversed. The UOC reports that on 21 October the Northern Commercial Court of Appeal upheld the appeal of its St Nicholas community at Voloshky (Kovel district, Volyn) against the re-registration that followed a vote of 8 October 2023 to join the OCU; the first-instance court had dismissed the claim in May 2025 (UOC Information Department, 21 Oct — Ukrainian). The court’s text was not available; what exactly was annulled is not stated.

Epifaniy on Jerusalem. In a Facebook post of 21 October, Metropolitan Epifaniy said that the Patriarchate of Jerusalem and other Churches that do not have “open communion” with the OCU are in error: «не конкретна місцева Церква є джерелом істини, а – Ісус Христос» (“not a particular local Church is the source of truth, but Jesus Christ”). He compared Jerusalem’s stance to St Peter’s withdrawal from table fellowship with Gentiles (Religionpravda, 21 Oct — Ukrainian).

2.3 Russia — An anti-war priest on the wanted list; the Synod’s other decisions

Kurmoyarov wanted. The Interior Ministry’s database lists the former ROC priest Ioann Kurmoyarov, a critic of the war who lives abroad and was designated a “foreign agent” in August 2025, as wanted under an unspecified article of the Criminal Code. RIA says he is accused of spreading “false information” about the army and the Church (RIA Novosti, 21 Oct — Russian; state agency). Kurmoyarov’s own comment was not carried. The case comes in the same week as the Synod’s change to the ordination oath (§1.2).

A “smart monastery”. Alexey Agapov of the Innotech XXI foundation says the Ipatiev Monastery in Kostroma will become the ROC’s first «умный монастырь» (“smart monastery”), with sensor and AI systems monitoring frescoes and buildings over 2026–2030 ahead of its 700th anniversary (RIA Novosti, 23 Oct — Russian). The Synod’s new Commission on Bioethics and High Technologies (§1.2) is the institutional side of the same interest.

Russia beyond Moscow — Verkhoturye and the Urals

• Verkhoturye. On 21 October the governor of Sverdlovsk region, Denis Pasler, announced a “large-scale” programme for the old town of Verkhoturye, a major Urals pilgrimage centre with some 140 heritage sites. It includes restoring the main dome of the Exaltation of the Cross Cathedral of St Nicholas Monastery, a pilgrimage route, and 30 houses for teachers and doctors over four years: «Приступаем к реализации масштабного проекта» (“We are starting to implement a large-scale project”) (Ekaterinburg eparchy, 22 Oct — Russian; citing the governor’s social media). Verkhoturye was in this review last week for the sentencing of a priest of a breakaway jurisdiction; the state’s investment is in the canonical monastery.
• Chaplains in body armour. On 20 October four Yekaterinburg priests attended a training camp of the Rosgvardia (National Guard) Urals district covering engineering, body armour and battlefield first aid (Ekaterinburg eparchy, 21 Oct — Russian).
• Ahead. The eparchy hosts the seventh all-Russian conference “Theology in the scientific and educational space” (plenary 29 October) and a conference on church social service, 27–30 October.

2.4 Baltic States — Tallinn evicts the Moscow-linked Church’s chancellery; a Lithuanian bill on church property

Estonia: the end of Pikk 64. On 19 October the Civil Chamber of Estonia’s Supreme Court refused to hear the cassation appeal of the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church (EKÕK — the Moscow-linked body, renamed in March 2025) against Tallinn’s termination of its open-ended lease of the chancellery at Pikk 64 in the Old Town. The decision is final. The city had ended the lease on 17 April 2024; Harju County Court (29 August 2025) and Tallinn Circuit Court (12 June 2026) found for the city. Mayor Peeter Raudsepp (Isamaa): “The city acted lawfully in terminating the lease and the city-owned premises will be vacated.” (ERR News, 21 Oct — English)

The Church announced on 23 October that its chancellery will move temporarily to Alexander Nevsky Cathedral. Bishop Daniil: «И сейчас для нас завершается целая эпоха» (“And now a whole era is ending for us”). The statement recalls the building’s history — bought in 1829, rebuilt in 1878–84, home of Bishop Platon of Reval in 1918–19, nationalised in 1940 — and that in 2002 the then Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church (now the Orthodox Church of Estonia, under Constantinople) accepted the neighbouring Pikk 66 in exchange for dropping its claim to Pikk 64. It links the ruling to wider pressure since the war and to the Churches and Congregations Act, and says the chancellery was «добросовестным арендатором» (“a conscientious tenant”). (EKÕK, 23 Oct — Russian) The Church held a week of prayer services “for our Church” in Tallinn on 19–25 October (EKÕK — Russian). RIA quoted Archpriest Nikolai Balashov, adviser to Patriarch Kirill, criticising the decision (RIA Novosti, 21 Oct — Russian). The case is a tenancy dispute, decided on civil law; the Church’s statement and Moscow’s comment read it politically, which is their interpretation.

Lithuania: a proposal to transfer six churches. Seimas members Audronius Ažubalis and Arvydas Anušauskas (Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats) are proposing that six Orthodox church buildings now held by the Moscow Patriarchate’s Lithuanian diocese be transferred to the Lithuanian Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and three mosques held by the “Second Muftiate” to the Sunni spiritual centre. Ažubalis: “norim atstatyt istorinę teisybę” (“we want to restore historical justice”). LRT Radio’s programme noted critics who say this would raise tensions and infringe believers’ rights. The buildings were not named, and no bill number or procedural stage was given in the programme pages. (LRT Radioteka, 21 Oct — Lithuanian; LRT, Russian service, 20 Oct — Russian) The Moscow Patriarchate’s Lithuanian diocese had not answered publicly by the close of this edition. The proposal follows the “Libertas Fidei” study presented in Vilnius on 14 October (reported last week), in which Justice Minister Tamašunienė said Lithuania would not follow Estonia’s path of a ban.

2.5 Romania and Moldova — A priest-martyr proclaimed; Bessarabia’s bid for state mediation

Romania. On 23 October, the anniversary of his death in 1975, the canonisation of Priest-Martyr Constantin Sârbu (born 1905), a Bucharest priest imprisoned under communism, was proclaimed locally at the Mihai Vodă Monastery, Bucharest, by Archbishop Casian of the Lower Danube. Patriarch Daniel’s message: «Fiindcă milostenia adevărată se face în taină, Sfântul Constantin Sârbu a ales să fie un făcător de bine neștiut» (“Because true almsgiving is done in secret, St Constantin Sârbu chose to be an unknown benefactor”) (Basilica.ro, 23 Oct — Romanian). Basilica.ro published the synodal Tomos of canonisation alongside. The Bucharest pilgrimage to St Demetrius the New ran in the same week, with the main procession on 24 October (Basilica.ro, 22 Oct — Romanian).

Moldova. On 21 October Metropolitan Antonie of Bessarabia (Romanian Patriarchate) met the Speaker of Parliament, Igor Grosu. According to the Metropolis, he asked for state-mediated dialogue with the Metropolis of Moldova (Moscow Patriarchate), protection of its communities from “abuse, intimidation and aggression”, a building as reparation for Soviet-era losses, and a law recognising the Metropolis and its clergy as victims of Soviet repression. The Metropolis says Grosu welcomed the idea of mediation (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 21 Oct — Romanian). This is the Metropolis of Bessarabia’s account; the Metropolis of Moldova, whose clergy it accuses, had not replied. On 19 October the Bessarabian Synod nominated, «prin consultare deschisă, urmată de vot secret» (“by open consultation followed by secret ballot”), two candidates for the see of Bălți — Archimandrites Nicodim Petre (abbot of Bucium, Iași) and Dosoftei Dijmărescu (Putna) — for election by the Romanian Holy Synod (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 19 Oct — Romanian). Both are monks based in Romania.

2.6 Serbia and Bosnia — A relic for Belgrade on the eve of elections; the Church in the campaign

A True Cross relic. On the evening of 23 October, in an online conversation streamed by the Patriarchate, Patriarch Porfirije and Archimandrite Efraim of Vatopedi announced that part of the Precious Cross given to Vatopedi by Holy Prince Lazar «uskoro bi trebalo da stigne u Srbiju» (“should soon arrive in Serbia”). No date was given (N1, 23 Oct — Serbian; Glas Srpske, 23 Oct — Serbian). It follows the visit of the Belt of the Theotokos from Vatopedi to St Sava’s in Belgrade (20 May–5 June), which the Church reported drew 916,825 venerators. The news agency Beta reports that questions it sent the Church on 19 June about the sums donated during that visit, and their distribution, remain unanswered (Nova.rs/Beta, 21 Oct — Serbian; opposition-leaning outlet). A critic of the hierarchy has made allegations about the money; they come with no evidence and are not repeated here.

The Church in the election campaign. Serbia holds parliamentary elections on 25 October. On public television (RTS, 20 October), academician Radomir Saičić, a candidate on the “Student List”, said the Church leadership «lišava episkopskog trona» (“strips of his episcopal throne”) a bishop “because he hosted students” — Bishop Justin of Žiča, who sheltered students from Novi Pazar, many of them Muslims, at Studenica monastery during their march to Belgrade. The host pointed out that the Assembly of Bishops gave other reasons when it removed Justin in May 2026: canonical and other offences found in a review of the eparchy’s finances. Saičić praised Metropolitan Joanikije of Montenegro as “a real bishop” (KoSSev, 21 Oct — Serbian). He also made a sweeping charge against the hierarchy without naming anyone or giving evidence; it is not repeated here.

Republika Srpska. On 23 October the RS Justice Minister, Goran Selak, and Metropolitan Hrizostom of Dabar-Bosnia signed a contract transferring, free of charge, 774 m² of buildings and land at Istočna Ilidža for a new church: “By signing this contract we are repaying part of the debt for everything the Church has done” (Glas Srpske, 23 Oct — Serbian; pro-RS-government outlet).

2.7 Georgia — The Patriarchate and two critical TV channels

The Patriarchate refused accreditation for the Svetitskhovloba feast at Mtskheta — the centrepiece of the 1,700th-anniversary jubilee reported last week — to journalists of TV Pirveli and Formula, two opposition-leaning channels (13 or 14 October; the source gives both). On 15 October the Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics called the decision “alarming” and “discriminatory”. On 19 October Archpriest Andria Jaghmaidze, head of the Patriarchate’s public relations service, replied that the Charter «ეკლესიის წინააღმდეგ მიმართული რადიკალური მედიის დამცველ ბიუროდ გადაიქცა» (“has turned into a bureau defending radical media directed against the Church”), adding that protecting journalists’ rights “is, of course, important” and that journalists had repeatedly broken church rules during services (Timer.ge, Tamar Abashidze, 19 Oct — Georgian). The Charter’s own statement is known here through Timer.ge’s account. The dispute comes amid wider government pressure on opposition media in Georgia.

In a Facebook post on 18 October, Archimandrite Dorote Kurashvili, a frequent critic of the hierarchy, faulted Patriarch Shio III for not mentioning St Gregory of Khandzta in his Sunday greeting, contrasting this with the attention he said the Patriarch gives to saints venerated in Russia, and wrote that monasticism is in a sorry state «დეკანოზების ხელში» (“in the hands of the archpriests”) (Timer.ge, 18 Oct — Georgian).

2.8 Albania — Police in the cathedral courtyard; the Church asks that holy places be respected

The context. Since 13 October Tirana has seen escalating protests, led largely by students, against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government. The grievances include the cost and condition of education, job prospects, corruption allegations and a planned luxury resort on the southern coast; the protesters demand Rama’s resignation (Al Jazeera, Armin Aljovic, 15 Oct — English). Buildings including the Prime Minister’s office have been set on fire; police have used water cannon and tear gas. By 20 October police reported 271 arrests in seven days and seven officers injured; the Ombudsman, Ahmet Prençi, reported preliminary findings that five of eight detained minors at one Tirana police station alleged abuse (OCCRP/SHTEG, Lindita Cela, 20 Oct — English). Rama has offered “unconditional dialogue” to those who renounce violence, while calling some protesters “extremists” and blaming foreign intelligence services and the opposition, without presenting evidence (Balkan Insight, Blerina Gjoka and Perparim Isufi, 20 Oct — English). On 22 October, the tenth day, the protest was “mostly calm” and academics joined it (Koha, 22 Oct — Albanian).

The churches before the incident. On 18 October Archbishop Joan prayed at the Liturgy in the Resurrection Cathedral that those in authority take “wise and mature decisions in the service of the whole country”: «Sepse Shqipëria është e të gjithëve» (“Because Albania belongs to everyone”) (Reporter.al, 18 Oct — Albanian). The same day the heads of Albania’s religious communities met President Bajram Begaj and appealed jointly that «qytetarët të dëgjohen, institucionet të përgjigjen, drejtësia të garantohet» (“citizens be heard, institutions respond, justice be guaranteed”), asking all sides “to choose dialogue over conflict” (Periskopi, 18 Oct — Albanian).

The incident, 19 October. On the evening of the seventh day, police pursuing protesters followed them into the courtyard of the Orthodox Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ («Ngjallja e Krishtit»). No source says police entered the church building. Accounts differ on what happened there:

• Report TV describes those pursued as masked, violent protesters whom police “escorted” out, and says a minor was injured during the detentions (Report TV, 19 Oct — Albanian).
• BoldNews, which leans to the opposition, ran footage posted by the journalist Osman Stafa showing officers striking young people with batons in the courtyard, “where the young people had sheltered” (BoldNews, 19 Oct — Albanian).
• Fiks.al reports a protester found unconscious after the operation; how is unclear (Fiks.al, 20 Oct — Albanian).
• CNA refers to “the bloodshed of several students” without detail (CNA, 19 Oct — English).

The State Police commented the same day on a separate incident at the Democratic Party headquarters; it had given no public account of the cathedral incident in the sources reached.

The Church’s statement (Tirana, 19 October), in full: «Pas pamjeve të ngjarjeve në oborrin e Katedrales ‘Ngjallja e Krishtit’ në Tiranë, shprehim shqetësimin dhe bëjmë thirrje të respektohen vendet tona të shenjta. Ato asnjëherë nuk janë hapësira konflikti e përplasjeje dhe nuk i pranojnë ato. Katedralja ‘Ngjallja e Krishtit’ është vend i shenjtë lutjeje, vend ku kryhen shërbesat e shenjta dhe ku predikohet kultura e paqes. Kisha Orthodhokse Autoqefale e Shqipërisë bën edhe njëherë thirrje për distancim nga dhuna dhe gjetjen e hapësirës së dialogut.» — “Following the images of the events in the courtyard of the ‘Resurrection of Christ’ Cathedral in Tirana, we express our concern and call for our holy places to be respected. They are never spaces of conflict and clash, nor do they accept them. The ‘Resurrection of Christ’ Cathedral is a holy place of prayer, where holy services are celebrated and a culture of peace is preached. The Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Albania once again calls for distancing from violence and for finding space for dialogue.” (Top Channel, 19 Oct — Albanian; Albeu, 19 Oct — English) The statement names neither the police nor the protesters. One outlet’s headline put in the Church’s mouth words that do not appear in its text.

A sharper voice. The same evening a metropolitan identified as Anastas — by Report TV as the Metropolitan of Korça — addressed the police directly: «Policia e Shtetit të rikthehet menjëherë në binarët e ligjit dhe të heqë dorë nga çdo formë dhune e arbitrariteti… Mbi ta do të rëndojë gjithashtu përgjegjësia për çdo pasojë që mund të sjellë përshkallëzimi i mëtejshëm i tensioneve» — “The State Police must immediately return to the rails of the law and give up every form of violence and arbitrariness… On them will also rest responsibility for any consequence a further escalation of tensions may bring” (Vox News, 19 Oct — Albanian).

Reading the two statements. The Church’s institutional statement defends the sanctity of the place and calls everyone away from violence; it apportions no blame. The metropolitan’s addresses the police alone. Archbishop Joan’s own words of 18 October, before the incident, spoke to “all who bear responsibility for decisions”. The government’s call for dialogue (20 October) and the Church’s call for “space for dialogue” use similar language; no source links them.

3. Oriental Orthodox News

3.1 Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church — The Holy Synod opens with a peace agenda as war continues in Tigray

The war this week. Following the reports of 10 and 17 October on the federal offensive in Tigray.

• Caretaker administration. On 23 October Redae Halefom Woldeselassie, a senior official of the federally installed six-month Tigray caretaker administration, urged TPLF fighters to lay down their arms: “This is not the time for settling scores … return to your homes.” A few hours earlier, on 22 October, Lt. Gen. Fisseha Kidanu, presented on television as commander of the Tigray army, vowed to reverse the setbacks and urged militias to attack government positions. AP says the renewed fighting has “effectively shattered” the Pretoria agreement of 2022. (Al Jazeera/AP, 23 Oct — English) The state-affiliated Fana reported the head of the caretaker administration saying elections, the rule of law and the return of the displaced are its agenda (Fana, 23 Oct — Tigrinya).
• A priest’s testimony. Late on 20 October a drone strike at Finarwa (Samre district, some 80 km south of Mekelle) killed four civilians, two of them children, as they loaded goats onto a truck. AFP’s source was a local priest: “Four people, including two children, died instantly, and another five were injured.” Neither AFP nor AP could establish who carried out the strike; the federal army did not answer AFP. (AFP via The Peninsula, 22 Oct — English)
• UN and Eritrea. The UN Resident Coordinator, Ozonnia Ojielo, called on 20 October for an end to fighting and looting (Rio Times, 21 Oct — English; secondary, based on The Reporter). Prime Minister Abiy warned Eritrea of “very, very, very severe” consequences if it kept backing Ethiopia’s enemies (Martin Plaut, 20 Oct — English). In Mekelle, which federal forces retook in early October (4 October per AP and Al Jazeera; 3 October per Critical Threats), shops and banks are reopening (Al Jazeera, 22 Oct — English).

The Synod opens. On Thursday 23 October (13 Tikimt 2019 in the Ethiopian calendar) Patriarch Abune Mathias I opened the Holy Synod’s annual October plenary in Addis Ababa. According to Fana’s reports, he said «ተኣማንነት መሰረታዊ ነገር ምዃኑ» (“trust is a fundamental matter”) and that «ዓለም ካብ ናይ ቤተ ክርስቲያን ሰባት ተኣማንነት ትፅበ እያ» (“the world expects trustworthiness from Church people”); he said shortcomings in managing resources, in engagement with the faithful and in apostolic mission were “not keeping pace with the times”. He said the Church can fulfil its mission only “when peace prevails in the country”, and that beyond prayer it must foster understanding, mediate disputes and promote reconciliation. The plenary is to discuss the Church’s role in advancing peace, hold a forum on the country’s peace, and send a peace appeal to the parties concerned. (Fana, 23 Oct — English; Fana, 23 Oct — Tigrinya)

What to read into it. Fana is state-affiliated and its reports paraphrase the Patriarch rather than quote his full address. As reported, the opening speech names neither Tigray, nor the war, nor Eritrea, nor any church site. The Tigrayan church leadership, which separated from the Addis Ababa Synod in 2021, is a party to the conflict’s religious dimension; the peace appeal, when published, will show whether the Synod addresses it. The session continues beyond this edition.

3.2 Armenian Apostolic Church — Courts uphold the Catholicos’s authority over his clergy

Following the reports of 26 September to 17 October on the conflict between the government and the Church.

Three civil suits dismissed. On 22 October the Armavir provincial court of first instance ended the civil case of Gevorg Saroyan, former primate of the Masyatsotn diocese, who sued the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin to be reinstated. Saroyan, whom Catholicos Karekin II removed “for deviating from church canons” and later defrocked, is one of about ten clergy who have sided with Prime Minister Pashinyan’s campaign against the Catholicos. The court held that appointing and dismissing diocesan primates is the Catholicos’s exclusive authority and part of the Church’s self-governance, and lifted its earlier interim order keeping Saroyan in office. On 23 October the same court dismissed suits by two defrocked priests, Fr Aram Asatryan and Fr Tade Takhmazyan, who asked it to void the Catholicos’s decrees: «հոգևորականներին կարգալույծ հռչակելու վերաբերյալ վեճերը քաղաքացիական դատավարության կարգով քննության ենթակա չեն» (“disputes concerning the defrocking of clergy are not subject to examination under civil procedure”). The rulings can be appealed within a month. (Azatutyun, 22 Oct and 23 Oct — Armenian; OC Media, 22 Oct — English)

The sides. Saroyan: «մինչև վերջ գնալու եմ» (“I will go to the very end”); he will appeal (Azatutyun video, 22 Oct — Armenian). The Church’s lawyer Ara Zohrabyan: «Եկեղեցու ինքնավարությունը ոչ թե արտոնություն է, այլ Սահմանադրությամբ և միջազգային իրավունքով պաշտպանվող հիմնարար երաշխիք» (“Church autonomy is not a privilege but a fundamental guarantee protected by the Constitution and international law”). No government comment on the rulings was reported.

Why it matters for the criminal case. Etchmiadzin never complied with the court’s interim order to keep Saroyan in office. On that basis the Investigative Committee charged Karekin II and six bishops with failing to enforce a judicial act; their trial resumes on 30 October. The civil case that produced the interim order is now closed with a ruling for the Church, but the criminal charge concerns non-compliance with an order while it was in force, and remains to be decided.

The tax demand at Etchmiadzin. On 22 October the head of the Vagharshapat (Etchmiadzin) community, Argishti Mekhakyan, defended his order of 6 August to recover AMD 47.6 million in property tax for 2021–2025 from the Church. He says the Church owns 69 properties in the town with total tax obligations of AMD 118.4 million, of which AMD 70.6 million relate to exempt properties and are not claimed; the claim concerns buildings, houses, apartments and land outside the exemption lists, and he says the Church did not submit the list requested in 2022 (Aravot, 22 Oct — Armenian). A lawsuit has been filed against his decision, and the Church contested the demand earlier in October.

A claimed “pause”. The opposition-leaning Armenia Today, citing the newspaper Iravunk and unnamed sources, reported on 20 October that the government will hold back during the UN biodiversity conference COP17 in Yerevan (19–30 October) and start «новый этап действий» (“a new phase of action”) against the Church in November (Armenia Today, 20 Oct — Russian). This is an unverified claim from a partisan source; the government did not comment. Pashinyan made no new public statement on the Church this week in the outlets reached.

A priest answers the government. In 168.am on 19 October, Fr Vrtanes Baghalyan of Byurakan argued that the parliamentary inquiry’s outcome was decided in advance: «Միևնույն մեղադրանքը տասը խոսափողով հնչեցնելը տասը ապացույց ունենալ չի նշանակում» (“Repeating the same accusation through ten microphones does not amount to having ten pieces of evidence”) (168.am, 19 Oct — Armenian; op-ed).

4. Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora & Mission Fields

4.1 Background briefing — Byzantine Orthodoxy in the Indian subcontinent

Why now. On 9 October the Moscow Patriarchate’s Synodal Missionary Department reported that two young Sri Lankans had arrived at the Moscow Theological Academy (MDA). The news falls just outside this edition’s window. It is used here as the occasion for a background briefing on the Eastern (Byzantine) Orthodox presence in Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan, which this review has not previously covered.

Scope. This briefing covers the Byzantine Orthodox jurisdictions only: the Moscow Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. India’s ancient St Thomas Christian Churches — the Malankara Orthodox Syrian Church and the Jacobite Syrian Church — belong to the Oriental Orthodox communion and are a different subject.

Sources and their standpoint. Almost everything published about the Sri Lankan mission comes from the Moscow Patriarchate’s own mission press (sinmis.ru, eomis.ru) or from OrthoChristian, which supports the Moscow Patriarchate. Their figures are consistent with one another but self-reported. ROCOR’s Pakistani mission is documented by ROCOR’s own sites, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s by its metropolis and by Greek church media.

The news item

According to the Synodal Missionary Department, Iov Jayalath and Nikolai Rajapaksha, young parishioners of the community of the Holy Tsar-Passion-Bearer Nicholas II in Kurunegala (North Western Province), have begun the MDA’s preparatory course.

• Their roles. Iov leads the youth choir; Nikolai helps English-speaking catechumens and runs the community’s social media. Both are learning Russian and wish to become priests.
• How they were chosen. Priest Dionisy Grishkov, the Department’s deputy chairman for external mission, interviewed them in April 2026.
• The claim to be first. The report says: «Они стали первыми представителями своей общины, приехавшими на этот курс» (“They became the first representatives of their community to come to this course”).

(sinmis.ru, 9 Oct — Russian)

The Moscow diocesan missionary department’s report on the April trip calls Iov the son of the community’s elder (eomis.ru, 12 May — Russian).

The claim is limited to their own community, and it is correct to keep it there. Earlier South Asians have studied at Russian theological schools. An Indian priest of the Moscow Patriarchate, Fr Clement Nehemiah of Chandrapur (Maharashtra), graduated from the St Petersburg Theological Academy and was ordained in 2018 (azbyka.ru, 11 Dec 2024 — Russian). In 2024 he reported having sent another student there (OrthoChristian, 2024 — English).

Sri Lanka: a Russian mission among Sinhalese converts

Origins. The community grew around a former Protestant pastor known in Orthodoxy as Makary (Jagath Jayalath). Mission accounts say:

• His background. He was linked to an Indian-founded body called the “Believers Eastern Church” and left it, giving up his salary. He then explored the Malankara, Syriac and Coptic churches without finding what he sought.
• Contact with Moscow. He corresponded with the Moscow missionary priest Fr Georgy Maximov from about 2019.
• First baptisms. In November 2022 he, his family and friends were baptised by Fr Kirill Shkarbul, a Russian priest serving in Taiwan.

(sinmis.ru, Fr Dionisy Grishkov, 17 Jun 2024 — Russian; sinmis.ru/Russkiy Mir, 8 Aug 2024 — Russian)

In 2023 the group asked the Synodal Missionary Department for regular care. The first expedition arrived on 13 January 2024 (OrthoChristian, 31 Jan 2025 — English).

Chronology of the mission, as reported by the Moscow Patriarchate’s mission press.

Date	Event	Source
1890–91	Tsarevich Nicholas (the future Nicholas II) visits Kandy, about 35 km from Kurunegala, on his eastern journey; the mission gives this as the reason for the community’s dedication	sinmis.ru, 17 Jun 2024
9 Nov 1938	According to the mission, a Colombo church is handed to the Russian Far Eastern mission under Archbishop Nestor (Anisimov); the link is broken in 1941 (no independent corroboration found)	sinmis.ru, 17 Jun 2024
Jan 2013	ROCOR ordains three priests for Pakistan in Colombo	OrthoChristian, Monk Theodore (Stanway), 23 Dec 2019
Nov 2022	First baptisms of Makary’s circle, by Fr Kirill Shkarbul (Taiwan)	sinmis.ru, 8 Aug 2024
13 Jan 2024	First expedition of the Synodal Missionary Department	OrthoChristian, 31 Jan 2025
20 Apr 2024	First Liturgy at Melsiripura	sinmis.ru, 17 Jun 2024
16–26 Aug 2024	Third expedition; ten baptised at Kurunegala	sinmis.ru, 27 Aug 2024
11–26 Jan 2025	Fourth expedition; 18 baptised, including a former pastor who is to serve as a lay missionary in Dambulla; 185 communicants (75 Russian compatriots, 110 local); “the community does not yet have parish status”	sinmis.ru, 29 Jan 2025; OrthoChristian, 31 Jan 2025
15 Feb 2025	Patriarch Kirill blesses three Sri Lankan lay missionaries at Christ the Saviour Cathedral; they give him a Sinhala Bible	sinmis.ru, 16 Feb 2025
21–22 Feb 2025	The three visit the MDA and meet the Sri Lankan ambassador in Moscow, Shobini Gunasekara	sinmis.ru, 22 Feb 2025
6–22 Apr 2025	Fifth expedition; first Pascha in Kurunegala (~100 Sinhalese); 35 baptised, “the largest number” so far	sinmis.ru, 5 May 2025
18–28 Aug 2025	Sixth expedition; one baptism; 101 communicants	sinmis.ru, 10 Sep 2025
Dec 2025	After Cyclone Ditwah, aid to 40 families near Kurunegala	eomis.ru, 9 Dec 2025
11 Jan 2026	Seventh expedition; first standing cross raised in Kurunegala on a plot for the first church; 13 baptised	sinmis.ru, 9 Feb 2026
23–28 Apr 2026	Eighth expedition; more than 60 local residents at the Liturgy, 53 communicants; Iov and Nikolai interviewed	eomis.ru, 12 May 2026
by 9 Oct 2026	Iov and Nikolai arrive at the MDA	sinmis.ru, 9 Oct 2026

Where and how many.

• Local Sinhalese communities: Kurunegala, Melsiripura, Maspota, Galgamuwa, Kegalle, Kotapola and Dambulla.
• Catechumen villages: Nagollagama and Araula.
• Russian-speaking compatriots: Colombo, Galle, Unawatuna and Hikkaduwa.
• Members. The mission’s 2024 account says over half the members are aged 15–25, from Buddhist and Protestant backgrounds, and speaks of “several hundred” local believers seeking a church.
• Baptisms. Adding the baptisms reported in each expedition gives a figure in the low hundreds since 2022. This is the review’s arithmetic, not a figure the mission publishes. Expedition counts also differ slightly between sources.

The mission’s work. Sinhala translations are part of it: a prayer book, a calendar, the Akathist to the Sweetest Jesus and, in progress, the Divine Liturgy. The mission names the lack of Orthodox literature in Sinhala as its main obstacle. The 2024 report frames the effort as a “return to Ceylon”, resting on the 1938 episode.

The parish dedication. The mission’s only stated reason for the dedication to Nicholas II is a single sentence: «Будучи ещё цесаревичем, Николай Александрович посетил город Канди» (“While still Tsarevich, Nikolai Alexandrovich visited the city of Kandy”).

What the record shows about structure.

• No exarchate. The work is run directly by the Synodal Missionary Department “with the blessing of the Patriarch”. Sri Lanka is not among the countries of Moscow’s Patriarchal Exarchate of South-East Asia as defined by the Holy Synod on 28 December 2018 (Pravmir, 1 Jan 2019 — English; Exarchate of South-East Asia, dioceses — English). Neither India nor Pakistan is in that list either.
• No resident priest. Services happen when clergy fly in.
• Lay leadership. Makary leads abbreviated lay services and, in the mission’s words, «не настаивает на своем рукоположении» (“does not insist on his ordination”).
• Land. The mission’s February 2026 report describes the Kurunegala plot both as donated and as acquired.

India: one embassy parish, convert communities and an old Greek mission

Moscow Patriarchate, Delhi.

• Founding. The parish of St Thomas in New Delhi was founded after Metropolitan (now Patriarch) Kirill’s visit in December 2006. It meets in a room in the Russian Embassy compound.
• Registration and reach. It was registered as a religious community in 2012. Its rector said in 2013: «Во всей Индии есть один единственный приход» (“In all of India there is one single parish”). He also served Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh. (RIA Novosti, 3 May 2013 — Russian)
• A church never built. A church building has been promised since then but not built (OrthoChristian, 21 Dec 2014 — English).
• Goa. A mostly Russian community there has no permanent priest (Pravoslavie.ru, S. Solovyov, 17 Oct 2019 — Russian).

Restrictions on foreign clergy. India’s restrictions on foreign religious workers shape the mission.

• A refused entry. In January 2016 a Russian Church cleric on a pastoral tour of the region was refused entry at Chennai; reports gave visa reasons (AsiaNews, 18 Jan 2016 — English; Catholic agency).
• Who may lead. Both Russian and Indian clergy say that in practice only Indian citizens can lead parishes and mission work (Solovyov, 2019; azbyka.ru, 2024).

Indian converts (Moscow Patriarchate and ROCOR).

• Chandrapur. In 2012 a former Anglican bishop, Polikarp (Rohan) Nehemiah, and his communities in Chandrapur were received into Orthodoxy through ROCOR and the Moscow Patriarchate.
• Size today. His brother Fr Clement says there are now six small communities, about 300 faithful in all, in Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Goa and Andhra Pradesh. The Liturgy is celebrated about every three months, in Marathi, Hindi, English and Church Slavonic. No source names their ruling bishop. (azbyka.ru, 2024; OrthoChristian, 2024)
• Andhra Pradesh, 2019. A joint ROCOR–Moscow team reported about 350 baptisms there (OrthoChristian, 5 Mar 2019 — English). Its current state is undocumented.
• Earlier ROCOR presence. ROCOR had monastic missionaries in India in 1931–49 and 1952–72.

Ecumenical Patriarchate.

• The metropolis. India belongs canonically, in Constantinople’s view, to the Metropolis of Singapore and South Asia, created in 2008. Its territory runs from Singapore and Indonesia to India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Afghanistan (omsgsa.org — English).
• The metropolitan. He is Konstantinos (Tsilis) (Orthodox Times, 20 Nov 2025 — English).
• Kolkata: first a Greek community church. The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s oldest presence in India had two distinct phases. Greek merchants settled in Calcutta in the eighteenth century and had a church on Amratala Street from 1781. In 1924 they moved to a new church at Kalighat, largely funded by the Ralli family: the foundation stone was laid on 3 November 1924 and the church opened on 19 November 1925. This was a parish for Greek residents, not a mission. As the community dwindled, the church was “practically shut down in early 1972” (Greek City Times, Somen Sengupta, 26 Dec 2022 — English).
• Then a mission among Bengalis. At Christmas 1980 a Greek hieromonk, Fr Athanasios Anthides, who had earlier been a missionary in East Africa, “began a systematic Orthodox Mission” among local people in the rural area of Arambah in West Bengal. He translated a catechism, the Divine Liturgy and a service book into Bengali. After his death on 28 November 1990, Fr Ignatios Sennis arrived in 1991; his “first work was to repair and open” the church “built by Greek merchants in 1924”, which now serves the local Orthodox converts (OCMC, “Focus on India” — English; undated). A 2019 Russian account dates an earlier Greek mission in Calcutta to 1812, closed in the mid-nineteenth century (Pravoslavie.ru/OrthoChristian, S. Soloviev, 25 Oct 2019 — English); this is not corroborated by the other sources.
• Size. A 2019 Russian account cites 2004 figures of 16 communities and about 5,000 faithful. Fr Clement Nehemiah says the mission “is no longer being developed”. These are Moscow-side assessments. The undated OCMC page gives seven native priests and 15 parishes in and around Kolkata; no dated current figures from the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s side were found.

Pakistan: three jurisdictions in Punjab

Ecumenical Patriarchate.

• Founding. A mission was begun in 2004–05 under the Metropolis of Hong Kong, led by Fr John Tanveer, a former Catholic priest.
• Size. In 2013 it reported about 550 faithful in Lahore, Wazirabad, Gujranwala, Faisalabad and other towns (Pravoslavie.ru, 7 Jun 2013 — Russian).
• First church. Pakistan’s first Orthodox church was consecrated on 6 February 2014. Sources disagree on whether it was in Lahore or Wazirabad.

ROCOR.

• Founding. ROCOR opened St Michael the Archangel church at Sargodha on 30 January 2012 (ROCOR Australia, 4 Mar 2012 — English).
• Size. Its most recent profile reports 800+ faithful at four stations, three locally ordained priests and land bought in 2020, under the Eastern American Diocese (ROCOR Eastern American Diocese, 2023 — English).

A split. In 2017 the mission’s former administrator took a Sargodha group of “more than 1,000” over to the Russian Old-Rite Church, which is not in communion with Moscow (rpsc.ru — English; Old Believer source). A ROCOR chronicler calls it a “catastrophe”.

Moscow and Constantinople in South Asia

A claimed territory. On paper the region is the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s: its Singapore metropolis claims all of South Asia.

Moscow’s position since 2018. Since breaking communion with Constantinople over Ukraine in 2018, Moscow has built parallel structures in Asia. Its exarch, Metropolitan Sergiy of Singapore, said in 2019 that the aim was «not … a “parallel Church» but «the restoration of the ecclesiastical mission» in “the countries of South and Southeast Asia”. He accused Constantinople of moving from “first among equals” to “first without equals” (AsiaNews, 29 Aug 2019 — English).

Two missions side by side. The Sri Lankan mission is the most visible Russian work in the subcontinent. It is run from Moscow, outside the exarchate. No public comment by the Ecumenical Patriarchate on it, and no current Phanar activity in Sri Lanka, could be found. In India, a Russian visitor noted in 2019 that the two jurisdictions do not cooperate (Solovyov, 2019).

What the record does not show

• Synod decision. No published Holy Synod decision formally opening Moscow Patriarchate parishes in Sri Lanka. Reports up to January 2025 say parish status was pending; later reports still speak of a “community”.
• Bishop. No named bishop or diocese for Sri Lanka.
• State registration. No state registration of the Sri Lankan community mentioned in any source.
• Independent figures. No count of the faithful independent of the mission itself.
• Sri Lankan voices. No Sri Lankan press coverage, and no Buddhist, Catholic or Protestant comment, is part of the record assembled here; Sri Lankan-language sources remain to be examined. The only Sri Lankan official voice on record is the ambassador’s, reported by the mission. She wished the work «как можно больше пользы для двух дружественных народов» (“as much benefit as possible for the two friendly peoples”).
• The 1938 church. No corroboration of the 1938 Colombo story outside the mission’s own account.
• Recent figures. No current numbers for the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s communities in India and Pakistan after about 2013–2018, and no current name for Moscow’s Delhi rector.
• The MDA. No statement from the MDA itself about its new students.

4.2 Africa — The Russian Orthodox Church obtains legal personality in DR Congo

The act. On Friday 16 October, at the Ministry of Justice in Kinshasa, the Minister of State for Justice, Guillaume Ngefa Atondoko Andali, handed the act of legal personality to the “Église orthodoxe russe (EOR) en RD Congo”. ACP, the state news agency, says its report is based on the ministry’s communication unit. MediaCongo says the act followed «le réexamen de son dossier par les services compétents», which weighed the body’s length of presence and its compliance with Congolese law. ACP speaks of «le réexamen rigoureux du dossier». The ministry added that freedom of worship remains «soumis au respect des lois de la République».

Present were Dmitrii Nikitin, first counsellor of the Russian Embassy; Hieromonk Cléonique (Kleonik) Madudu; Fr Nicolas Musoya Museba; Fr Ambroise Bukasa; and the minister’s chief of staff, Me Gaston Osango. Nikitin said the decision «dépasse le cadre d’une simple formalité administrative» (“goes beyond a mere administrative formality”) and provides «un cadre juridique solide pour les paroisses» (“a solid legal framework for the parishes”), and spoke of mutual trust between the two countries. (ACP, 16 Oct — French; MediaCongo/CongoProfond, 17 Oct — French)

Who represents the Church? The three sources disagree.

	MediaCongo (17 Oct)	ACP (16 Oct)	Exarchate of Africa (18 Oct)
Musoya	“représentant légal”	“premier conseiller de cette église”	dean of the parishes in the country
Madudu	delegation member	“représentant légal”	rector of the Archangel Raphael parish, Kinshasa
Bukasa	“premier conseiller de l’Église”	participant	rector of the St Moses the Black parish, Kwilu province

The Exarchate’s account. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Patriarchal Exarchate of Africa announced the act on 18 October: «Русская Православная Церковь юридически закрепила свое присутствие в еще одной стране Африканского континента» (“The Russian Orthodox Church has legally secured its presence in yet another country of the African continent”). It says the minister handed the delegation a «свидетельство о государственной регистрации» (“certificate of state registration”). It gives no total of parishes or clergy in the DRC. (Exarchate of Africa, 18 Oct — Russian; English version)

Earlier reports from the same camp describe how the DRC community began. In October 2022 Fr Georgy Maximov received about 50 members of a non-canonical Orthodox group, led by Madudu, who had been styled its bishop; Madudu and his clergy were received as laymen. By January 2025 Madudu was serving as a hieromonk and had opened a community at Matadi. (OrthoChristian, 1 Nov 2022; 17 Jan 2025 — English; pro-ROC)

The third in a series of 2026 registrations. The Exarchate itself says registrations were obtained «ранее в этом году» (“earlier this year”) in Cameroon, Madagascar and the Republic of Congo. On opened pages:

• Cameroon. A presidential decree of 23 January 2026, signed by Paul Biya, authorises the religious association «Église orthodoxe russe du Cameroun» to operate nationally (Cameroun24 — French; Exarchate — English). RFI’s report of 4 February quoted the French scholar Jean-François Colosimo calling Moscow’s strategy «dangereuse» and «moralement inacceptable» (“dangerous”, “morally unacceptable”) — «Ce n’est que politique» (“It is only politics”). It cited the Exarchate’s own figures of 36 countries, 271 clergy and 332 parishes and communities (allAfrica/RFI, 4 Feb — French).
• Madagascar. The Exarchate says it received a state registration certificate on 7 April 2026; it does not name the issuing authority (Exarchate, 19 Apr — English).
• Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). The registration was announced around 30 April 2026. RFI reported on 6 May that the ROC «aurait reçu» (“reportedly received”) a certificate, citing TASS. It noted that an Orthodox Church of a few thousand faithful under Alexandria has existed in Congo since the 1980s (allAfrica/RFI, 6 May — French). Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation called the move a tool of “hybrid influence” (LIGA.net, 1 May — English; Ukrainian state body).

The canonical frame — party claims.

• Alexandria’s position. The Patriarchate of Alexandria regards Africa as its canonical territory. Its Holy Synod called Moscow’s creation of the Exarchate on 29 December 2021 a «completely illegal establishment of an “Exarchate”, on the basis of its internal “statutes” and not canonical provisions» (Patriarchate of Alexandria, Jan 2022 — English).
• Moscow’s position. Moscow says it acted to receive clergy who would not follow Alexandria after it recognised the OCU in 2019. Alexandria has since “defrocked” the Exarchate’s successive heads; Moscow declared those acts “invalid”.
• Alexandria in the DRC. Alexandria has several dioceses in the DRC. In March 2026 Patriarch Theodoros II visited Kinshasa and Kananga (ACP, 17 Mar — French).
• No reaction this week. Neither Alexandria nor its Metropolis of Kinshasa had reacted to the Congolese act by the close of this edition.
• Congolese silence on the dispute. Neither Congolese report mentions Alexandria or the canonical dispute.

The Exarchate’s schools. On 23 October RIA reported that the Exarchate runs 13 schools with 2,213 pupils in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, the Central African Republic and the DRC, and is building its first clinic in Kenya (RIA Novosti, 23 Oct — Russian; state agency).

4.3 Canada — “The basement where Orthodoxy is being rebuilt”

In a long reportage for New Lines (21 October), the Cairo-based Egyptian-American writer Adam Makary profiles St Silouan the Athonite Orthodox Church in Toronto (New Lines, 21 Oct — English).

The parish. It is an English-language parish renting a basement from a Bulgarian Orthodox church in Regent Park. The Lord’s Prayer is said there in at least sixteen languages, and it holds a Monday-night charity dinner. About 80 people attend on an average Sunday, and its register has grown from about 60 to about 120 since its rector, Fr Paul Tadros, took over.

The rector. Tadros grew up Coptic, was received into Eastern Orthodoxy in 2012 and was ordained in 2019. The article does not name the parish’s jurisdiction. Its own website and diocesan directory identify it as a mission of the American Carpatho-Russian Orthodox Diocese, under the Ecumenical Patriarchate (St Silouan; ACROD — English).

Crossings between Eastern and Oriental Orthodoxy. The piece is distinctive for what happens where the two families meet in North America. It covers:

• Copts in Eastern Orthodox parishes. Tadros remarks provocatively that the Coptic Church begins “in earnest” in 451; the article notes that Copts trace their origin to St Mark.
• Coptic clergy online. Coptic priests have built large online audiences in English. One began podcasting after an Eastern Orthodox priest called Copts heretics.
• The convert boom. The scholar George Demacopoulos doubts how long new converts stay. The anthropologist Candace Lukasik discusses older missionary discourses of “backwardness”.

The article’s critical notes. These are as present as its sympathy:

• Poor follow-up after baptism. One convert describes it.
• Communion. A Maronite parishioner cannot receive it.
• A COVID-era observation. The anthropologist Sarah Riccardi-Swartz, quoted from her own parish experience in Texas in 2020–22, describes many arrivals then as “manosphere-adjacent white men”, while noting that the mix has since widened.
• Abuse victims. She also worries that women abused at home are counselled towards patience: “there’s only so much you can do if a person refuses treatment”, and the women “simply stop coming”.

These are her personal and parish observations given to the reporter. They are not findings of her published ethnography, which concerned a single convert community in West Virginia studied before 2022.

Figures. The article’s census figure for US Eastern Orthodox adherents, 816,653 in 2010 and 675,765 in 2020 (−17%), matches the 2020 US Religion Census report by Alexei Krindatch. Over the same decade Oriental Orthodox adherents rose from 294,762 to 491,413 (2020 Census report — English). “Adherents” there are a parish-reported count of everyone involved in parish life, not a survey estimate. Some figures are imputed: where parishes did not respond, 2010 data or extrapolations were used. The article’s other figures — a post-COVID surge in about one parish in eight, the share of converts, and a 53/47 male–female split — could not be checked against their originals for this edition.

5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations

5.1 Orthodox–Catholic — Bartholomew in Rome: an Angelicum doctorate and the Pope’s recovery

Following the report of 17 October on the Pope’s surgery.

The Pope. Pope Leo XIV left the Gemelli hospital on 17 October, gave the Angelus from the Vatican on 18 October and held the general audience on 21 October (Vatican News, 21 Oct — Italian). On 23 October he cancelled his planned visit to Assisi on 27 October; a Latin American trip on 6–17 November is still being prepared (Ottopagine, 23 Oct — Italian).

The Angelicum. On 23 October the Pontifical University of St Thomas Aquinas (Angelicum) conferred an honorary doctorate in theology on Bartholomew, during a conference on the Holy and Great Council of Crete ten years on. Cardinal Kurt Koch gave the laudatio, noting that Bartholomew has signed more joint declarations with popes than any other patriarch; Cardinals Parolin and Gugerotti attended (AsiaNews, 23 Oct — English). Bartholomew told the audience that the Orthodox Church does not see itself «като федерация от независими църкви, изолирани една от друга» (“as a federation of independent churches isolated from one another”) (Vatican News, 23 Oct — Bulgarian), and to Greek reporters that «η τιμή … είναι προς την Μητέρα Εκκλησία της Κωνσταντινουπόλεως» (“the honour … is to the Mother Church of Constantinople”) (Hellas Journal, 23 Oct — Greek). The pro-UOC SPZh reports him as saying that “primacy without conciliarity leads to excessive centralisation” (SPZh, 23 Oct — Russian). The same sentence about a “federation” — or “confederation” — appears in his Books’ Journal interview (§2.1): it was addressed to Orthodox and Catholic audiences in the same week.

A meeting with the Pope. Bartholomew told Hellas Journal on 23 October that he would meet Pope Leo on the morning of 24 October to wish him a speedy recovery. His Italian programme continues at Loreto (26 October), at Sant’Egidio’s meeting in Assisi on “disarmed and disarming peace”, forty years after the 1986 Assisi meeting, where he speaks on 27 October, and at the Pontifical Oriental Institute (28 October) (Vatican News, programme — Italian).

5.2 Inter-Orthodox — Communion, commemoration and their limits

The week offered unusually concrete evidence of how the Ukrainian question now runs through every inter-Orthodox encounter:

Date	Act	Who	What it shows
19 Oct	Bartholomew commemorates Epifaniy at the Rila concelebration	Constantinople, with Bulgarian bishops	A Church that does not recognise the OCU concelebrates at a service where its primate is named (§1.3)
21 Oct	Epifaniy says Jerusalem “errs” in withholding communion	OCU	The OCU pressing Churches beyond its four recognisers (§2.2)
21–22 Oct	35th-anniversary greetings to Bartholomew	Romania, Georgia (delegation and message), Canterbury; none reported from Moscow	Who chose to be seen at the Phanar (§2.1)
22 Oct	Moscow’s Synod sets reception of OCU members by baptism	Moscow	Non-recognition turned into sacramental practice (§1.2)
22 Oct	Bartholomew’s anniversary address on “heretical ideologies”	Constantinople	The Phanar’s reply in theological terms (§2.1)
23 Oct	Messages of solidarity to Theophilos of Jerusalem after Karak	Constantinople, Romania, Alexandria, Antioch, Coptic Church	Grief that crosses the dividing lines (§1.1)

The Moscow Synod’s journal releasing a deacon to the Georgian Church in Germany is addressed to “Catholicos-Patriarch Shio III” — a small sign that, for Moscow, relations with Tbilisi remain normal while Georgia also sends delegations to the Phanar.

6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates

6.1 The vocabulary of heresy and the practice of rebaptism

In the same week, Constantinople and Moscow each moved the Ukrainian dispute into the language of sacramental and doctrinal error.

• Constantinople (§2.1) speaks of Russian church figures professing “heretical views and theories about war”, of an “ethnophyletist ideologeme” and, at the Phanar, of “heretical ideologies” in “one section of Orthodoxy”. The charge is aimed at teaching — about war and about the “Russian World” — not at the validity of anyone’s sacraments. It has been made in an interview and a festal address, not in a synodal condemnation.
• Moscow (§1.2) does not speak of heresy but acts as if the OCU’s sacraments were void: those baptised by its clergy are to be received by baptism, its priests as laymen. The charge is aimed at the sacraments themselves, and it is now a synodal act applied in occupied territory.

These are different kinds of claim. The first is a doctrinal accusation that leaves Moscow’s priesthood and sacraments untouched. The second is a judgement about the OCU’s sacramental reality, made without any doctrinal charge. Each side’s move answers the other’s; neither engages the other’s ground. The person most directly affected is the layperson in a village of occupied southern Ukraine, baptised in an OCU parish before 2022, whose Church membership now depends on who controls the territory.

6.2 The state as registrar of jurisdictions

Three stories this week turned on a state’s paperwork rather than a church decision:

• DR Congo (§4.2) granted legal personality to the Moscow Patriarchate’s Church — the third or fourth such act in Africa in 2026 by the Exarchate’s own count, after Cameroon (decree of 23 January), Madagascar (7 April) and Congo-Brazzaville (late April). The Russian embassy attended and framed it as bilateral trust. Alexandria, which regards these countries as its canonical territory, has no say in a civil registry.
• Estonia (§2.4): the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the Moscow-linked Church’s appeal ends a civil tenancy, not a canonical status — but the Church and Moscow read it as part of a wider pressure.
• Lithuania (§2.4): conservative MPs propose that the legislature transfer buildings from one Orthodox jurisdiction to another, in the name of “historical justice”.

Moldova’s Metropolis of Bessarabia, meanwhile, asked Parliament to mediate between it and its Moscow-linked rival (§2.5). The pattern is not new — Ukraine’s DESS findings (§2.2) are its most developed form — but this week it reached from the Baltic to central Africa. Where two Orthodox Churches claim the same people, the state’s register increasingly decides which one is legally present. For Moscow in Africa, registration is a gain; for Moscow in the Baltics, it is the ground on which it is losing.

6.3 Courts and the autonomy of churches

Armenia’s Armavir court (§3.2) declined to judge whether the Catholicos was right to defrock priests: such disputes, it said, “are not subject to examination under civil procedure”. The ruling sits with a broad European tradition that courts do not review a church’s internal discipline — and it was handed down in a country whose government is seeking, through a parliamentary inquiry and draft legislation, to reshape the Church’s governance from outside. The court protected the Catholicos’s authority over his clergy; the government’s programme aims to limit it. Elsewhere this week courts were asked to decide church questions of a different kind: a Ukrainian appeal court reversed a parish’s transfer from the UOC to the OCU (§2.2), and an Estonian court ended a lease (§2.4). In each case a court ruled on property or procedure and left canonical status alone — which is exactly the line the Armenian court drew.

6.4 Churches in polarised street politics: Tirana, Belgrade, Tbilisi

In three Orthodox-majority or Orthodox-plural capitals, Churches were drawn this week into conflicts between governments and their critics:

• Tirana (§2.8): the Church defended the sanctity of its cathedral courtyard without blaming anyone, while one metropolitan addressed the police directly. Archbishop Joan’s earlier words — “Albania belongs to everyone” — and the joint appeal of religious leaders placed the Church as a voice for dialogue in a confrontation between a government and protesting students.
• Belgrade (§2.6): on the eve of elections, an opposition candidate used state television to tie the removal of a bishop to his hospitality to student marchers, while the Patriarch announced the coming of a major relic. The Church made no electoral statement.
• Tbilisi (§2.7): the Patriarchate refused accreditation to two critical channels for its jubilee feast and accused a media-ethics body of defending “radical media”.

The positions differ — mediator in Albania, contested reference point in Serbia, party to a media dispute in Georgia — but the question each Church faces is the same: whether it can remain, in Joan’s phrase, the Church “of everyone” when the streets and the screens are divided.

7. New Academic Literature

Works published in the last months, verified on publisher or journal pages; none previously listed in this review. One-line summaries; DOIs and ISBNs as given on the landing pages.

Anthropology, sociology and political science

1. Jenia Gorbanenko, Orthodox Icons and Cosmonaut Exemplars: Which Way to Heaven? London: Routledge, 2026, 234 pp. eBook ISBN 978-1-003-75013-0; DOI 10.4324/9781003750130. Published 23 October 2026. An ethnography of the practice of sending icons to the International Space Station and of Orthodox parishes linked to Russia’s space industry, showing how serving cosmonauts practise their faith and how dead cosmonauts are remembered as Orthodox exemplars. (Print ISBN not shown on the publisher page.)
2. A. V. Atanesyan (Yerevan State University), “From revolution to polarization: the state-church conflict in contemporary Armenia”, Polis. Political Studies (Moscow) 2026, no. 5: 177–191. DOI 10.17976/jpps/2026.05.12. Explains the Pashinyan government’s campaign against Catholicos Karekin II by revolutionary rather than reformist politics and post-2020 pressures; argues that public trust in the Church remains high while the divided opposition failed to convert it into electoral support in June 2026. (English title as shown on the journal’s English page.)
3. Наталия М. Великая и Марина Е. Родионова (Natalia M. Velikaya, FCTAS RAS; Marina E. Rodionova, Financial University), «Религиозные организации как акторы гендерного дискурса: сравнительный анализ России и Казахстана (на примере РПЦ и ДУМК)», Наука. Культура. Общество 32, no. 3 (2026): 41–60. DOI 10.19181/nko.2026.32.3.3. A critical discourse analysis of statements by the Russian Orthodox Church and Kazakhstan’s Spiritual Administration of Muslims, 2016–2026, on family, motherhood and reproduction.
4. Ventsislav Bozhinov, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church against Folk Traditions: The Nestinar Ritual in Strumyani and Parvomay as Invented Traditions”, Balkanistic Forum 35, no. 2 (2026): 357–372. DOI 10.37708/bf.swu.v35i2.20. Two fire-dancing cases show how the Bulgarian Church’s post-schism concern for the “purity” of practice brings it into conflict with local tradition. (Affiliation — South-West University “Neofit Rilski” — from index metadata.)
5. Alexandru Lazăr (Babeș-Bolyai University), “The Parish as an Embassy: The Role of the Diaspora in the Cultural and Religious Diplomacy of the Romanian Orthodox Church After 1990”, Saeculum 61, no. 1 (2026): 142–157. DOI 10.2478/saec-2026-0012. Romanian diaspora parishes as informal cultural embassies, under the strains of secularisation and generational change.
6. Vaja Vardidze (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin), “Church–State Relations in Georgia and Armenia and the Impact of this Relationship on the Process of Democratization”, Teka Komisji Prawniczej PAN Oddział w Lublinie 19, no. 1 (2026): 453–474. DOI 10.32084/tkp.10724. A comparison across seven spheres concluding that democratisation in both countries is “non-linear” and meets constant resistance.

Law and history

7. Anargyros Anapliotis, “Kirchenrechtliche Struktur orthodoxer Migrationsdiözesen in Deutschland, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der ukrainischen Kirchen”, NomoK@non (LMU Munich), 2026. DOI 10.5282/nomokanon/357. Surveys the seven Orthodox Churches with dioceses in Germany and the five jurisdictions to which Ukrainian refugees belong; the author argues that four of them can be treated as canonical under an emergency provision of the Quinisext Council — his own canonical reading. (The page gives 12 July 2026 as publication date but also carries an earlier “issued” date in its metadata.)
8. Георгиос Нектариос Лоис (Georgios Nektarios Lois; Hellenic Open University / Singidunum University), «Неканонско проглашење аутокефалности Православне Цркве Грчке (1833): политичке интервенције краља Отона и дипломатија великих сила», Лесковачки зборник 66, no. 1 (2026): 81–92. DOI 10.46793/LZ-LXVI1.081L. Argues that the unilateral autocephaly of 1833, driven by the Bavarian regency with British and French involvement, subordinated the Church of Greece to the state; “uncanonical” is the author’s characterisation.
9. Душан Р. Бајагић (Dušan R. Bajagić; Institute for Recent History of Serbia), «Однос Српске православне цркве и других православних цркава са протестантским црквама: званични став у Гласнику… (1920–1941)», Лесковачки зборник 66, no. 2 (2026): 7–21. DOI 10.46793/LZ-LXVI2.007B. The interwar Serbian Church’s support for the ecumenical movement’s practical aims, its closest ties being with the Anglicans.
10. Aaron Michael Butts (University of Hamburg), “Ezana of Aksum: The First Christian African King”, Aethiopica 28 (2025, published 19 May 2026): 7–38. DOI 10.15460/gfj9t143. Coins and inscriptions suggest that Ezana, like Constantine, presented his Christianity differently to different audiences.

Theology, liturgy, music and manuscripts

11. Iuliu-Marius Morariu, Spiritual Autobiography in the Eastern Orthodox Space. London: Routledge, 2026, 240 pp. eBook ISBN 978-1-003-79304-5; DOI 10.4324/9781003793045. Spiritual autobiography through John of Kronstadt, Silouan the Athonite and Berdyaev, and why the genre is rarer in Orthodoxy than in Western Christianity.
12. Артем Н. Гладков (Artem N. Gladkov; Sts Cyril and Methodius Postgraduate and Doctoral School, Moscow), «Опыт классификации видов вокальной деятельности в контексте православной антропологии», Вопросы теологии 8, no. 2 (2026): 359–377. DOI 10.21638/spbu28.2026.210. Liturgical singing treated as an ascetic practice within theological anthropology.
13. Daniel Mocanu (Faculty of Orthodox Theology, Cluj), “From the Koinonikon to the Priceasnă: The Transformation of the Liturgical Soundscape and the Digital Influence in Contemporary Romanian Orthodox Music”, Studia UBB Musica 71, no. 1 (2026): 21–39. DOI 10.24193/subbmusica.2026.1.01. Survey data from Transylvanian parishes on the replacement of the Byzantine communion chant by the devotional priceasnă, and the role of YouTube repertoire.
14. Selomon Afework Yenesew (Bahir Dar University), “Evaluate the status and associated factors of Gəˀəz manuscripts heritage preservation: The case of Qäranǝyo Mädḫane ˁAläm church, northwest Ethiopia”, PLOS ONE 21, no. 8 (2026): e0345893. DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0345893. An inventory of 71 mostly seventeenth-century manuscripts in an Ethiopian Orthodox church, about 31% in bad or dangerous condition. (Title as published.)
15. Jacob A. Lollar and Samuel P. Cook, “The Martyrdom of Luke the Evangelist: A Syriac Translation of a Coptic Apocryphon?”, Communio Viatorum 68, no. 1 (2026): 99–144. DOI 10.14712/30296374.2026.10. Argues that the Coptic version is the original, with a comparative edition and the first English translation of both versions.

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This review covers the period 18–24 October 2026.

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This text was generated by Claude (Anthropic), Claude Opus 5.5, on 24 October 2026. It has been edited by Orthodox.News. https://claude.ai