Weekly Review of Orthodox Church News

A survey of developments in the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches worldwide.

1–7 November 2026

Contents

Correction. The edition of 31 October gave the name of the KFOR commander received by Metropolitan Teodosije of Raška-Prizren as “Robert Verguerie”. His name is Major General Roberto Vergori (Eparchy of Raška-Prizren, 29 Oct — English).

1. Top Stories of the Week

1.1 Jerusalem and Moscow — Patriarch Theophilos III at the Kremlin: an Order of Friendship and an offer to help with “talks between brothers”

The visit. Patriarch Theophilos III of Jerusalem arrived in Moscow on 4 November at the invitation of Patriarch Kirill (Orthodoxie.com, 4 Nov — French). On 5 November he prayed at the relics of St Matrona at the Pokrovsky convent, accompanied by the head of the Department for External Church Relations, Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, and Archpriest Nikolai Balashov (gorthodox, 6 Nov — English; a pro-Moscow church-news aggregator). The same day he met Kirill at the patriarchal residence in Chisty Lane. According to the Russian Church’s account as relayed by RIA Novosti, the two «обменялись мнениями о существующих на сегодняшний день проблемах межправославных отношений» (“exchanged views on the current problems of inter-Orthodox relations”), discussed the jubilee of Christ’s Baptism planned in Jordan for 2030, and Kirill repeated his condolences for the attack on the church at al-Hamoud, near Karak, of 23 October (RIA Novosti, 5 Nov — Russian; state agency).

At the Kremlin. Later on 5 November President Vladimir Putin received Theophilos, with Kirill and Metropolitan Anthony present, and handed him the Order of Friendship (gorthodox, 7 Nov — English). The award itself was made by decree in November 2025 “for a significant contribution to strengthening friendship, cooperation and spiritual ties with the Russian Federation” (gorthodox, 18 Nov 2025 — English).

  • Putin: «Между Русской и Иерусалимской православными церквями поддерживаются очень добрые, хорошие отношения» (“Very good, warm relations are maintained between the Russian and Jerusalem Orthodox Churches”) (RIA Novosti, 5 Nov — Russian). A separate RIA headline has him saying Russia pays attention to the situation of Christians in the Middle East (headline item).
  • Theophilos on the award: «Это награждение – честь для всего престола Святого Гроба, для всего православия в Иерусалиме» (“This award is an honour for the whole Throne of the Holy Sepulchre, for all Orthodoxy in Jerusalem”). He called it «подтверждение наших особых отношений» (“confirmation of our special relations”) with Kirill, “the whole Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian people” (RIA Novosti, 5 Nov — Russian).
  • Theophilos on the war: «Я знаю, что есть предложения по переговорам касательно продолжающейся ситуации вдоль вашей западной границы…» (“I know there are proposals for negotiations concerning the continuing situation along your western border…”). He offered to help «облегчить и поддержать священный обряд разговора между братьями» (“to ease and support the sacred rite of conversation between brothers”) (RIA Novosti, 5 Nov — Russian). He did not, in the reported text, name Ukraine or speak of a war.
  • The Patriarchate’s own account says the two discussed “peace efforts and the indigenous Christian presence in the Holy Land”. On the war, Theophilos “discussed ways to encourage dialogue, continuing efforts he discussed with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House on June 4”. The Patriarchate describes his role as “spiritual and humanitarian”, guided by “Blessed are the peacemakers”, supporting dialogue and peace “without intervening in political affairs”. He thanked Putin for supporting “the historic Status Quo arrangements governing Jerusalem’s holy sites”, and Putin “reaffirmed support for the Patriarchate’s work to help indigenous Christian communities remain in the Holy Land”. Theophilos accepted the order “as recognition of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, the Mother of Churches, its pastoral ministry and its guardianship of the holy sites” (Jerusalem Patriarchate, “Articles – Speeches”, 6 Nov — English; Greek version under «Αρθρογραφία – Ομιλίαι», jerusalem-patriarchate.info — official). According to gorthodox, Theophilos also said prayers are offered at the Holy Sepulchre “for the Russian state and its leader”; the Patriarchate’s account does not mention this.

Background. On 4 June, according to the Patriarchate, Theophilos met President Trump at the White House, and Trump was reported to have floated him as a possible go-between on Ukraine (edition of 20 June). In an interview with Breitbart in late August he said he hoped to meet both Putin and Zelensky (edition of 12 September). The Kremlin meeting is the first such step that has taken place. It comes two weeks before Kirill’s 80th birthday on 20 November, for which Sergei Chapnin, in a Moscow Times column of 9 October, listed Theophilos among the primates likely to attend (The Moscow Times, 9 Oct — Russian; opinion).

Reactions. The only response traced in the week came from Fr Kostiantyn Shevchenko, a priest of the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Metropolis of Austria serving the Ukrainian community in Salzburg. In a RISU blog post, «Миротворча місія Феофіла і московська бухгалтерія» (“Theophilos’s peacemaking mission and Moscow bookkeeping”), he argues that the “peacemaking” framing should be read against the Patriarchate’s «локальні фінансові та адміністративні проблеми» (“local financial and administrative problems”) and Russian funding, through which «москва і отримує можливість посилювати свій вплив у Православному світі» (“Moscow gains the chance to strengthen its influence in the Orthodox world”) (RISU, blog, c. 6 Nov — Ukrainian). RISU itself reported the award as a news item (RISU, c. 6 Nov — Ukrainian; headline item). No statement from the Ukrainian government, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) or the Phanar had appeared by 7 November.

Why it matters. The same week opened with President Zelensky’s visit to Patriarch Bartholomew at the Phanar (§2.1) and closed with Theophilos at the Kremlin. Both patriarchs have spoken of peace; they have done so from opposite sides of the Ukrainian church question, and in front of opposite heads of state. See also §6.1.

1.2 Ethiopia — Arsi: the Human Rights Commission counts 48 dead on 24 October; Oromia says 73 are held, and calls them “Fano”

Following the report of 31 October on the Holy Synod’s statement that 60 Orthodox faithful were killed in two attacks in Arsi zone.

The Commission’s findings. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), a state-mandated but formally independent body, published its findings on the attack of 24 October in Birbona Chole kebele, Shirka woreda (Addis Standard via allAfrica, 4 Nov — English). It reports:

  • 48 killed: in Birbona Chole, 41 — 23 locally organised security personnel, 5 militia members and 13 civilians — and a further 7 civilians killed separately by “informal armed individuals”;
  • 20 wounded, 21 houses burned and 247 families displaced, with cattle and pack animals looted;
  • the attackers identified as an armed group calling itself the OLA (“Shane”), entering from four directions;
  • recurring attacks in Aseko, Honqolo Wabe, Guna and Merti woredas; a broader report on south-eastern Oromia is “being finalised”.

It recommends an independent investigation, compensation, early warning, and oversight of informal armed groups operating outside formal security structures.

The counts compared. The Holy Synod’s statement of 26 October spoke of 46 faithful killed at Tereta/Chole/Birbo on 24 October and 14 at Merti on 20 October, 60 in all. The EHRC’s 48 for 24 October is close to the Synod’s figure for that day, but it describes most of the dead as members of local security and militia units. The two accounts need not conflict — the dead may have been Orthodox villagers serving as local guards — but they frame the same killings differently: the Synod as an attack on its faithful, the Commission as an attack on a locality and its defenders. Neither text says the victims’ religion was the motive.

The arrests. On 2 November Oromia government spokesman Hailu Adugna said 73 people had been detained “in connection” with the Shirka attack (Borkena, 2 Nov — English; a diaspora outlet often critical of the government). He described them as members of “Fano”, the Amhara militia movement. That conflicts with the regional government’s own earlier attribution to the OLA and with the EHRC’s finding. No charges were specified, and the detainees’ identities have not been published. The arrests of mourners at Gobesa reported last week have had no published follow-up.

What the Church has said since. No statement by the Holy Synod on the EHRC findings or on the 73 detentions had been published by 7 November. Its planned meeting with senior government officials, announced on 26 October, has not been reported as having taken place.

Advocacy figures. Several commentaries in the week put the toll higher: a Borkena opinion piece (3 Nov) gives “>60 killed” and cites ACLED’s count of 193 incidents since February 2023, about a third of them targeting Orthodox Christians (Borkena, 3 Nov — English; opinion). A guest post by Mintesinot Melaku on Martin Plaut’s blog speaks of a “slow-motion genocide” (martinplaut.com, 3 Nov — English; opinion). Their figures are not independently verified. The Amhara Association of Geneva and Europe’s (AAGE) Arsi file has had no new entry since 27 October (AAGE — English; Amhara advocacy body).

The war in the north, for context. On 2 November fighting was reported in Bizet woreda, Eastern Tigray, between forces loyal to the TPLF and federal troops with the allied “Tigray Peace Forces”; on 5 November residents of Axum, Abiy Adi and Shire chose local administrators under the caretaker regional administration (EEPA Situation Report 777, 5 Nov, via martinplaut.com — English; EEPA is a Brussels NGO sympathetic to Tigray, relying on local sources). The UN reported fresh displacement in Tahtay Adiyabo, Shire and Debre Birhan (Addis Standard via allAfrica, 4 Nov — English). No report on church sites in Axum or Southern Tigray was published in the week.

1.3 Russia and Ukraine — Moscow’s new rules for receiving “schismatics”: rebaptism, a “canonical inquiry” and a report to the bishop

Following the report of 24 October on the Moscow Synod’s guidelines (journal no. 83 of 22 October) on receiving people from “Ukrainian schismatic structures”.

The text. The «Указания по принятию из украинских раскольнических структур лиц, желающих присоединиться к Русской Православной Церкви» (“Guidelines on receiving persons from Ukrainian schismatic structures who wish to join the Russian Orthodox Church”) are published on the Patriarchate’s site (Moscow Patriarchate, 22 Oct — Russian; official). Its main provisions:

  • Who is meant (§2). Three bodies: the «Украинская автокефальная православная церковь» (UAOC), the «Украинская православная церковь киевского патриархата» (UOC-KP) and the «Православная церковь Украины» (OCU). The text says the Tomos establishing the OCU was «односторонним политическим актом, не признанным большинством Поместных Православных Церквей» (“a unilateral political act not recognised by the majority of Local Orthodox Churches”).
  • What the priest is to say (§3). Four “apologetic theses”, including that the Tomos «не восстановила апостольскую преемственность, а лишь закрепила раскол» (“did not restore apostolic succession but only entrenched the schism”), and that «Находясь на канонической территории Русской Православной Церкви, вы можете быть в полноте церковного общения только в единстве с ней» (“Being on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church, you can be in full church communion only in unity with it”).
  • A “canonical inquiry” (§4). The diocesan bishop decides on each reception «на основании результатов канонического дознания» (“on the basis of the results of a canonical inquiry”) by the priest approached. In exceptional cases, «в зоне боевых действий» (“in a combat zone”) among others, the priest decides alone and reports afterwards. For lay people the inquiry establishes the place of baptism and «характер его деятельности в период нахождения в расколе (участие в богослужениях, распространение антиканонических материалов, публичные высказывания, участие в акциях против Церкви и т.п.)» (“the character of his activity while in the schism: participation in services, distribution of anti-canonical materials, public statements, participation in actions against the Church, etc.”). The findings go into a «рапорт» (“report”) to the bishop (§4.3).
  • Communities (§4.1). The inquiry into a parish or monastic community also identifies members who spread «клеветнические или оскорбительные сведения» (“slanderous or insulting information”) about the Church, took part in seizures of its churches, «либо активно поддерживавших такие действия в социальных сетях и медиа» (“or actively supported such actions on social networks and in the media”). Each must renounce «прежних заблуждений» (“former errors”) in writing, or orally where publicity could harm them. Services must be celebrated in Church Slavonic, «на общем для всей канонической территории Русской Православной Церкви церковнославянском языке» (“the Church Slavonic language common to the whole canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church”).
  • Clergy (§4.2). A person «хиротонисан» (ordained, in quotation marks) in one of these bodies is received as a layman. A cleric ordained in the Russian Church who left and was not deposed may be received in his orders, at the bishop’s discretion. Applicants must renounce commemorating the “leaders of the schism”.
  • Forms of reception (§5). A person baptised in the Orthodox Church who later “fell into schism” is received through confession. A person «крещен в расколе (ПЦУ, УПЦ КП, УАПЦ) — присоединяется через таинство Крещения» (“baptised in the schism (OCU, UOC-KP, UAOC) is received through the sacrament of Baptism”), citing the circular letter of the Patriarchate’s administration No. 01/3154 of 17 July 2020. §4.3 gives the reason: «учитывая отсутствие апостольской преемственности в указанных структурах» (“in view of the absence of apostolic succession in the said structures”). Former Catholics and Protestants are received according to the rules for their earlier confession.

Where it is meant to apply. The Synod’s journal no. 83 explains the document’s origin. The Synodal Missionary Department drafted it «в ответ на запросы епархиальных миссионерских отделов епархий, находящихся на Донбассе и в Новороссии» (“in response to requests from the missionary departments of dioceses located in Donbas and Novorossiya”), which said they needed instructions. The Department for External Church Relations amended it. The Synod approved it «в качестве руководства священнослужителям епархий Русской Православной Церкви» (“as guidance for the clergy of the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church”) (Moscow Patriarchate, journals of 22 Oct — Russian; official). “Novorossiya” is a term used in Russia for southern and eastern Ukraine, including the regions it occupies. The document was thus prompted by dioceses in the occupied territories, though it is addressed to all dioceses.

The first published critique. On 2 November the website of Mir Vsem (“Peace to All”; in Germany, Friede Allen e. V.), a fund created in 2023 by Russian Orthodox priests opposed to the war to help clergy persecuted for their anti-war views, published «От Таинства к дознанию: новые указания Синода РПЦ» (“From sacrament to interrogation: the ROC Synod’s new guidelines”) (Mir Vsem, 2 Nov — Russian). Its author signs as “Frater Eleutherius”, a pseudonym. Russia’s Ministry of Justice placed Mir Vsem on its list of “undesirable” organisations in September 2025 (Current Time, 18 Sept 2025 — Russian). The author argues from the Creed’s “one baptism”, Apostolic Canon 47, and Basil’s first canon, confirmed by canon 2 of the Council in Trullo («крещение же раскольников, яко еще не чуждых Церкви, приимати», “the baptism of schismatics, as not yet alien to the Church, is to be accepted”). He notes a “double standard”: the Russian Church does not rebaptise Catholics, Armenians, Copts, Ethiopians or Syriac Orthodox, yet would rebaptise OCU faithful who confess the same Creed, though the document calls the OCU schismatic, not heretical. He says the words “дознание” and “рапорт” evoke police interrogation in Russian, and calls the document «пастырская катастрофа» (“a pastoral catastrophe”) and «серьёзное каноническое нарушение и тяжкое богословское заблуждение» (“a serious canonical violation and a grave theological error”). He also corrects its date for the Tomos: it was signed on 5 January 2019 and handed over on 6 January. The Austrian news service NÖK reported the guidelines on 4 November (NÖK, 4 Nov — German).

The other side. The Moscow Patriarchate has not responded to the critique. The OCU, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), Ukraine’s State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) and the Phanar had made no formal statement on the guidelines by 7 November. Metropolitan Epifaniy’s sermon of 1 November attacked «послідовники Московської патріархії, які ділять Церкву» (“the followers of the Moscow Patriarchate, who divide the Church”), who «вихваляють новітнього кривавого антихриста» (“glorify the latest bloody antichrist”), but did not mention the guidelines or rebaptism (OCU, 1 Nov — Ukrainian).

Why it matters. Whether a Church receives another body’s baptisms is one of the clearest ways it states how far outside the Church it places that body. Under these guidelines, Ukrainians baptised in the OCU who join a Moscow-Patriarchate parish are to be baptised again, after an inquiry that extends to their public statements and social-media activity. By the Synod’s own account, the document answers requests from dioceses in the occupied territories. There the inquiry, the written renunciations and the Church Slavonic rule bear on Ukrainians living under Russian control. The guidelines also bear, indirectly, on the Churches in communion with the OCU, since a rebaptism treats as void a sacrament those Churches accept.

2. Eastern Orthodox News

2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate — Zelensky at the Phanar; the Synod on clergy and weapons; 35 years of Bartholomew

Zelensky’s visit (31 October). After meeting President Erdoğan at the Dolmabahçe Working Office, President Volodymyr Zelensky, with Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, called on Patriarch Bartholomew at the Phanar on Saturday 31 October. It was his fifth visit, the previous one in early April (Fos Fanariou, 31 Oct — Greek; a pro-Phanar site). They met privately for about an hour. The two readouts differ in emphasis and neither gives direct quotations:

  • The Phanar’s: the Patriarch reaffirmed his support for the suffering Ukrainian people; «Η Μητέρα Εκκλησία προσεύχεται για την επικράτηση της ειρήνης και της δικαιοσύνης στην Ουκρανία» (“The Mother Church prays for peace and justice to prevail in Ukraine”); he encouraged peace initiatives and repeated his wish that the thousands of abducted Ukrainian children return to their families.
  • Kyiv’s: Zelensky congratulated him on the 35th anniversary of his enthronement and thanked him for «постійні молитви за мир в Україні» (“constant prayers for peace in Ukraine”). He described peace efforts with partners “including contacts with the American side”, Russian strikes on energy infrastructure, and the humanitarian operation in occupied Oleshky (President of Ukraine, 31 Oct — Ukrainian).

The Turkish daily Posta noted the visit in its report on the Erdoğan–Zelensky meeting (Posta, 1 Nov — Turkish). No Moscow Patriarchate comment was found. Following the report of 31 October on Oleshky: the truce lasted 87 hours, according to Ukraine’s ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets; Melania Trump said «майже 800 людей» (“nearly 800 people”) were evacuated, some to Ukraine and some to Russia (Slovo i Dilo, 2 Nov — Ukrainian). None of the Ukrainian or Russian accounts opened mentions the Moscow Patriarchate clergy whom RIA Novosti had placed with the convoy.

The Synod on weapons (2 November). In its session of 2 November, “in response to a question posed in synod”, the Holy and Sacred Synod declared that «ἡ δι᾿ οἱονδήποτε λόγον κατοχή καί χρῆσις ὅπλων … τυγχάνει πάντῃ ἀπᾴδουσα τῇ ἰδιότητι τοῦ Ὀρθοδόξου κληρικοῦ παντός βαθμοῦ» (“the possession and use of weapons for any reason whatsoever … is wholly incompatible with the status of an Orthodox cleric of any rank”), in accordance with the canonical tradition (Ecumenical Patriarchate, communiqué, 3 Nov — Greek). The communiqué names no case, Church or country, and does not say who asked the question. Ukrainian church media carried it the next day (Religionpravda, 4 Nov — Ukrainian). See §6.2.

The anniversary. On 2 November Bartholomew marked 35 years since his enthronement in 1991; the Synod’s senior member, Metropolitan Ioseph of Proikonnisos, conveyed its congratulations. In Athens on 5 November the Hellenic American Union hosted the presentation of an honorary volume edited by Fr John Chryssavgis. Chryssavgis remarked: «δεν χρειάζεται ούτε να συμπαθεί ούτε πάλι να συμφωνεί κανείς με τον Οικουμενικό Πατριάρχη» (“one need neither like nor agree with the Ecumenical Patriarch”) (Fos Fanariou, 6 Nov — Greek; Orthodox Times, 5 Nov — English).

Audiences and travel. On 4–5 November the Patriarch received, among others, Metropolitan Nahum of Ruse of the Bulgarian Church; Archbishop Rino Fisichella of the Vatican’s Dicastery for Evangelisation; a delegation of nine clergy from the Metropolis of Limassol (Cyprus); and Sergei Chapnin of Fordham University’s Orthodox Christian Studies Center (Ecumenical Patriarchate, 6 Nov — Greek). On 6 November he left for Zurich, at the invitation of Metropolitan Maximos of Switzerland, for the 30th anniversary of St Demetrios church, which he consecrated; the Liturgy is on 8 November (Ecumenical Patriarchate, 6 Nov — Greek).

2.2 Patriarchate of Antioch — Three patriarchs in Damascus list what Syria’s Christians face; 80 years of Moscow’s metochion in Beirut

Damascus, 5 November. Patriarch John X received the Melkite Greek Catholic Patriarch Youssef I Absi and the Syriac Orthodox Patriarch Ignatius Aphrem II at the patriarchal residence. They renewed their condemnation of «الفعل الإرهابي الآثم في كنيسة القديس جاورجيوس في قرية الحمود» (“the sinful terrorist act at the church of St George in the village of al-Hamoud”, Jordan). Reviewing the situation of Christians in Syria, they named «الاعتداءات المتكرّرة والفصل الوظيفي التعسّفي وقرارات الحجز بحقّ بعض المواطنين وتأخير محاكمة الموقوفين» (“repeated attacks, arbitrary dismissals from employment, seizure orders against some citizens, and delays in bringing detainees to trial”), together with the cost of living and “concerns over the Christian presence and its future” (Patriarchate of Antioch, 5 Nov — Arabic). The Syriac outlet SyriacPress adds calls for the rule of law and equal citizenship, from the Syriac Patriarchate’s own account (SyriacPress, 6 Nov — English). The statement names no specific incident. The same day John X received the Governor of Damascus, Maher Marwan Idlibi; no account of their conversation was published.

The European Union’s High Representative, Kaja Kallas, in a written answer to the Greek MEP Nikolas Farantouris posted on 5 November, wrote that “Syria’s transition can only succeed if it is genuinely inclusive” and that the EU “has repeatedly called for full and impartial investigations” of attacks on Christians and other communities, including the bombing of Mar Elias church in Damascus on 22 June 2025 (SyriacPress, 6 Nov — English).

Balamand and Beirut, 31 October – 1 November. The Moscow Patriarchate marked 80 years of its metochion (representation church) in Beirut, opened in May 1946. On 31 October John X received Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk and Archpriest Nikolai Balashov, together with Sergei Stepashin, president of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, and Russia’s ambassador Alexander Rudakov; the Moscow Synodal Choir sang with the choir of Balamand’s St John of Damascus Institute (Patriarchate of Antioch, 31 Oct — Arabic). In an address read at the Liturgy on 1 November, John X said that «أخوّة الإيمان بين أنطاكية وموسكو لا تكسرها وِهاد التاريخ» (“the brotherhood of faith between Antioch and Moscow is not broken by the valleys of history”), asked God «أن يبعد عن كنائسنا كل انشقاق» (“to keep every schism far from our churches”) and prayed for «وحدة الكنيسة الروسية» (“the unity of the Russian Church”) (Patriarchate of Antioch, 1 Nov — Arabic). He did not name Ukraine. The same DECR team accompanied Patriarch Theophilos in Moscow four days later (§1.1).

A Synod decision for the Gulf. A belated pick-up from the Synod at Balamand reported on 31 October. On 23 October the Holy Synod elected Archimandrite Alexi Nassour auxiliary bishop to the Patriarch with the title «أسقف أورفا» (Bishop of Urfa) (Patriarchate of Antioch, 23 Oct — Arabic). On 26 October John X named him «معتمداً بطريركياً على الإمارات» (“patriarchal representative for the Emirates”) (Patriarchate of Antioch, 26 Oct — Arabic). No consecration date has been announced. The Gulf is also where Antioch and Jerusalem dispute jurisdiction over Qatar, though the two Churches have been in communion again since 20 October 2023 (OrthoChristian, 20 Oct 2023 — English); no link between the appointment and that dispute is stated.

2.3 Jerusalem / Jordan — Karak: three men charged with terrorism

Following the report of 31 October on the arrests after the attack on St George’s church at al-Hamoud, near Karak.

On 3 November the prosecution at Jordan’s State Security Court said it had completed its investigation and referred the case for trial (The National, 3 Nov — English). Three men — two brothers and their brother-in-law, all Jordanian — are charged. According to the State Security Court’s public prosecutor, as reported by the Emirati daily Al-Khaleej, there are seven charges under the Anti-Terrorism Law no. 55 of 2006: terrorist acts leading to death, as accomplices, nine times over (art. 7/b/1); terrorist acts using weapons, twice over (art. 7/b/3); possession of weapons, and of ammunition, for terrorist use; conspiracy to commit terrorist acts with weapons; promoting the ideas of a terrorist group; and acts endangering public order (Al-Khaleej, 3 Nov — Arabic). This matches both the “seven charges” of Asharq Al-Awsat and the counts listed by The National. The charge of terrorism causing death carries the death penalty (Asharq Al-Awsat, 3 Nov — English). No hearing date has been set, and the defence’s position has not been reported. The number of wounded varies between sources: 34 (The National), 25 (Asharq Al-Awsat).

Belated, 26–27 October: hours after the arrests, Jordan’s air force struck what it called “terrorist positions” in Syria “linked to” the attackers, although the interior minister had said there was “no indication of any external contacts” (Kuwait Times, 27 Oct — English).

In Jerusalem, the Mufti of al-Haram al-Sharif, Sheikh Muhammad Hussein, and a delegation of the Islamic Awqaf offered Patriarch Theophilos their condolences (Jerusalem Patriarchate, 2 Nov — English). A commentary on the Patriarchate’s site complains that “electronic armies” had claimed it impermissible to call the victims martyrs (Jerusalem Patriarchate, opinion — English). The Serbian Patriarchate sent condolences in the week (§2.9).

2.4 Russia — A list of punished anti-war clergy, prepared for Paris; the death of Metropolitan Platon (Udovenko)

Mir Vsem’s dossier (7 November). Priest Valerian Dunin-Barkovsky, who says he has led Mir Vsem for three years “on the advice and blessing of Metropolitan Jean” of the Paris-based Archdiocese (§4.1), published a report «Преследование духовенства священноначалием Московского патриархата за антивоенную позицию» (“Persecution of clergy by the Moscow Patriarchate’s leadership for an anti-war stance”), dated 6 November and “prepared for” that Archdiocese’s General Assembly (Mir Vsem, 7 Nov — Russian; anti-war advocacy). He argues that refusing to read the «Молитва о Святой Руси» (prayer for Holy Rus’, circulated in September 2022) has been treated as oath-breaking under Apostolic Canon 25, in «повторяющаяся практика… непосредственно санкционируемая аппаратом Московской патриархии» (“a recurring practice… directly sanctioned by the apparatus of the Moscow Patriarchate”), and compares it with the late 1920s. He asks the Archdiocese, “heirs of Metropolitan Evlogy”, for a «ясную и недвусмысленную оценку» (“clear and unambiguous assessment”). His appendix lists some thirty clergy, among them Aleksei Uminsky, Andrei Kordochkin, Kirill Hovorun, Andrei Kuraev, Ioann (Burdin), Iakov Vorontsov and Athanasius (Bukin), plus five clergy in Lithuania and two in Belarus. It records two sanctions not previously reported here: Konstantin Kokora, defrocked by the Moscow diocesan court on 11 June 2026 and confirmed by Kirill on 26 June; and Archpriest Andrei Lorgus, defrocked on 23 December 2025 and confirmed by decree of 20 February 2026. These dates are the report’s; the Moscow Patriarchate has not commented. The report does not say whether it was presented to the assembly.

Belated, Kazakhstan: the former priest Iakov Vorontsov, defrocked after opposing the war, was sentenced in Almaty on 7 October to four years for drug possession, after a closed trial in which the judge excluded one of two secret witnesses because the prosecution «доказать не смогло» (“could not prove”) he existed (Novaya Gazeta, 7 Oct — Russian; independent). The conviction stands; his defence says the case was fabricated.

Platon (Udovenko), 1940–2026. Schema-Metropolitan Platon, formerly of Feodosia in Crimea, died in Moscow on 6 November aged 86. Consecrated in 1973, he served in South America, Sverdlovsk and Yaroslavl and sat as a people’s deputy of the RSFSR in 1990–93; in 2012 he was received into the UOC and given the new see of Feodosia, whose eparchy Moscow took over in 2022. Two Churches mourned him. The UOC called him «один із найстаріших ієрархів Української Православної Церкви» (“one of the oldest hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”), without mentioning 2022 or where he died (UOC, 6 Nov — Ukrainian). Kirill «со скорбью воспринял известие о кончине схимитрополита Платона» (“received with sorrow the news of the death of Schema-Metropolitan Platon”) (RIA Novosti, 6 Nov — Russian). RISU noted the 2022 transfer (RISU, 6 Nov — Ukrainian).

Kirill on National Unity Day. Kirill’s greeting to Putin on 4 November was routine and did not mention the war (RIA Novosti, 4 Nov — Russian).

Russia beyond Moscow — Yekaterinburg: a 20-metre “icon” of Nicholas II on a state building; more pupils choose Orthodox culture; a Krasnodar church plot

  • The mural. On 4 November, the feast of the Kazan icon and National Unity Day, Metropolitan Evgeny of Yekaterinburg blessed a giant image of Nicholas II, in colonel’s uniform with icon-like border scenes of “achievements of pre-revolutionary Russia”, painted by Sergei Khramov on the regional office of the state statistics agency Rosstat (ul. Tolmacheva 23), on the route of the July “Tsar’s Days” procession. The project was an initiative of the church television channel Spas, funded by viewers and supported by the city and Rosstat. Present were Vice-Governor Vasily Kozlov, deputy culture minister Roman Dorokhin and the channel’s director Boris Korchevnikov, who said: «Это самая большая икона святого Царя-страстотерпца на планете Земля» (“This is the largest icon of the holy Tsar-Passion-bearer on planet Earth”). Evgeny: «Этот образ – это диалог» (“This image is a dialogue”) (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 4 Nov — Russian; diocesan). The eparchy says over 5,000 joined the Kazan-icon procession the same day (headline item).
  • Schools. According to the eparchy, citing the regional ministry, 37.7% of pupils in its territory chose the “Foundations of Orthodox Culture” module this year, against 28% last year, and 45% in the city of Yekaterinburg — over 20,000 fourth-graders (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 6 Nov — Russian). The figures have not been published by the ministry itself.
  • Krasnodar. On 2 November a district court rejected a suit by residents of the Yubileyny microdistrict, led by Anastasia Vavilova, against the city’s planning decision for an embankment plot transferred to the Church for a new church. They argued the former mayor signed it after the legal deadline; the court held that «законодатель не устанавливает срока, когда проект планировки территории должен быть реализован» (“the legislator sets no deadline by which a territorial planning project must be implemented”). The residents will appeal (SOVA Center, 3 Nov, citing 93.ru and Kommersant-Kuban — Russian).
  • Following the report of 31 October on Yekaterinburg’s social-service conference: the eparchy held further sessions on church help for drug addicts and for disabled and orphaned children (gorthodox, 7 Nov; headline items).

2.5 Ukraine — Bombs on an aid point; two Slovyansk churches hit in a week; Kremenets nuns lose in the Supreme Court

Komyshuvakha, 2 November. Russian guided bombs, at least nine FAB-3000s according to the regional administration, struck a school in Komyshuvakha (Zaporizhzhia region) where humanitarian aid was handed out weekly, and then a shelter. By 3 November 29 people had been killed, 5 injured and 48 were missing (Radio Svoboda, 3 Nov — Ukrainian). The UOC’s Metropolitan Luka of Zaporizhzhia wrote: «молитовно перебуваю разом з Вами та всіма мешканцями Комишувахи… Нехай упокоїть Господь душі невинно загиблих» (“I am with you in prayer, and with all the residents of Komyshuvakha… May the Lord give rest to the souls of the innocent dead”) (UOC, 3 Nov — Ukrainian). The same UOC release carries words of Metropolitan Onufriy of Kharkiv on drone strikes on Vasyshchevo and Lozova.

Churches damaged.

  • Slovyansk: the UOC reported on 4 November that the Resurrection church, “the city’s oldest place of worship”, had been damaged by Russian shelling: windows blown out, the chandelier fallen on the altar, frescoes and façade damaged (UOC, 4 Nov — Ukrainian). On 28 October, as reported last week, a bomb hit the OCU’s St Andrew’s church in the same city: one church of each jurisdiction in a week.
  • Donetsk (occupied): the occupation authorities’ war-crimes “documentation office” said a night drone attack damaged the façade and windows of St Nicholas cathedral and the Resurrection church; the claim is unverified (RIA Novosti, 5 Nov — Russian; state agency).

In the courts.

  • Kremenets. The Cassation Commercial Court of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the UOC’s Holy Epiphany convent in Kremenets (Ternopil region), which had sued the Ministry of Culture for ownership of 591.5 m² of its cell block (case 910/13603/25). The ruling was reported on 6 November; its date was not given. The nuns argued that they live there and would be left homeless. The deputy director of the Kremenets–Pochaiv state reserve, Ihor Derevinskyi, replied that the building is a non-residential monument and «не є законною власністю релігійної організації» (“is not the lawful property of the religious organisation”) (Religionpravda, 6 Nov — Ukrainian, citing Ukrinform). The same reserve holds the buildings of the Pochaiv Lavra.
  • The UOC’s family mission. DESS filed suit on 10 August to dissolve the «Місія — Синодальний відділ Української Православної Церкви у справах сім’ї» and transfer its assets, other than those used for worship, to the state; the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal opened proceedings on 22 September (case 855/12/26). On 23 October the mission lodged a counterclaim. It argued that DESS had acted «виключно на підставі вироку Деснянського районного суду м. Чернігова від 18.06.2025» (“solely on the basis of the verdict of the Desna district court of Chernihiv of 18 June 2025”) against Vasyl Povoroznyuk — Metropolitan Panteleimon of Luhansk — «без встановлення зв’язку описаних у вироку діянь із діяльністю Місії» (“without establishing a link between the acts described in the verdict and the activity of the Mission”). On 5 November a panel of three judges returned the counterclaim: such claims cannot be heard within the special procedure for dissolving a religious organisation (Art. 289-9 of the Code of Administrative Procedure), following a Supreme Court ruling of 3 June 2026 (case 855/2/26). The return «не перешкоджає зверненню до суду з позовною заявою в загальному порядку» (“does not prevent recourse to the courts under the general procedure”) (Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal, order of 5 Nov, published by DESS — Ukrainian). The suit rests on the conviction of the mission’s head, the same kind of ground used against the Rovenky eparchy (edition of 31 October); the dissolution case itself continues.
  • Kropyvnytskyi. On 2 November the regional commercial court opened proceedings on a prosecutor’s claim to cancel a UOC parish’s right to a 0.5-hectare plot in the city’s dendropark, granted in 2012 for a church of which only a cross stands; the prosecutor says the land belongs to the nature-reserve fund. Preparatory hearing: 1 December (RISU, c. 6 Nov — Ukrainian).

Clergy and the war.

  • A mobilised priest. According to the pro-UOC Union of Orthodox Journalists (SPZh), citing a Telegram post, UOC priest Serhiy Shcherbyna, detained by a recruitment centre about ten days earlier, is held at a military base near Novomoskovsk and refuses to take the oath: «отказываюсь приносить присягу народу Украины в Вооруженных силах Украины» (“I refuse to swear the oath to the people of Ukraine in the Armed Forces”), having sworn «присягу Святой Соборной Апостольской Церкви» (“the oath to the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church”) (SPZh, 5 Nov — Russian; pro-UOC). SPZh alleges violence; the army has not commented, and the report rests on a single partisan source.
  • The Sviatohirsk killing. Belated: Monk Varsonofiy (Turiansky) of the UOC’s Sviatohirsk Lavra was shot dead on 23 August, and two others were stabbed; police opened a murder case under the defence prosecutors. In an interview with the Swiss weekly Die Weltwoche (published 2 November according to SPZh), UOC Protodeacon and businessman Vadim Novinsky claimed «Зеленский знает, кто это сделал и какой полк они представляют» (“Zelensky knows who did it and which regiment they represent”) (SPZh, 6 Nov — Russian; pro-UOC). No suspect has been named officially, and the President’s office has not responded. The interview itself was not opened.

Parishes and appointments.

  • The St John Chrysostom parish of Nadtochaivka (Cherkasy region) voted 30–0 on 6 October to join the OCU, as reported on 6 November (Religionpravda, 6 Nov — Ukrainian).
  • In the other direction, priest Vasyl Kovtash, who had left for the OCU, was readmitted to the UOC by Metropolitan Meletiy of Chernivtsi on 3 November after describing his move as «серьезную ошибку» (“a serious mistake”) (SPZh, 6 Nov — Russian; pro-UOC).
  • The UOC Synod appointed Archbishop Spyridon (Holovastov) to the eparchy of Ovruch, vacant since the death of Metropolitan Vissarion in September. Religionpravda relays a claim by the OSINT group Molfar that he holds Russian citizenship; it has not been verified (Religionpravda, 6 Nov — Ukrainian).

2.6 Church of Greece — A UOC monastic house beside St Spyridon’s in Corfu; the Standing Synod

Corfu, 31 October – 1 November. Metropolitan Nektarios of Corfu, Paxos and the Diapontian Islands consecrated a “monastic house” of the UOC, with a chapel of the Venerable Fathers of the Kyiv Caves, near the church of St Spyridon in Corfu town. It was opened “at the request and with the blessing of Metropolitan Onufriy” for the 975th anniversary of the Kyiv Caves Lavra (Orthodox Times, 1 Nov — English). Seven UOC hierarchs attended, including Metropolitan Kliment of Nizhyn, head of the UOC’s information department, and Metropolitan Filaret of Lviv; services were in Greek, Church Slavonic, Ukrainian and Romanian. Nektarios, as quoted by OrthoChristian, said armed conflict between Orthodox peoples is “not from God, but from temptation” (OrthoChristian, 2 Nov — English; pro-Moscow). In August Nektarios took the relic of St Spyridon’s hand to Moscow and was decorated by Patriarch Kirill (editions of 15 and 22 August).

  • The criticism. On the pro-Phanar site Fos Fanariou, columnist Andriopoulos called it a sign of «ενεργή παρουσία της Ρωσικής Εκκλησίας στην Κέρκυρα» (“an active presence of the Russian Church in Corfu”) and described Onufriy’s Church as «ρωσοκίνητη» (“Russia-driven”). He asked whether the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece was informed, who owns and funds the building, whether the monks hold permits, and whom they commemorate (Fos Fanariou, 3 Nov — Greek; opinion). In Ukraine, Prof. Oleksandr Sagan asked on Facebook whether it could cover for intelligence work; Religionpravda notes that he offers no evidence (Religionpravda, 3 Nov — Ukrainian).
  • Open questions. No source states the building’s ownership, its residents or its canonical status, for example whether it is a metochion of a Ukrainian monastery. The Metropolis of Corfu has not published its own account, and the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece has not commented.

The Standing Synod, 3–4 November. Its communiqué (arxon.gr, 4 Nov — Greek; Orthodoxia News Agency, 4 Nov — Greek) records:

  • events for Archbishop Ieronymos’s 60 years of priesthood, 45 of episcopacy and 20 as Archbishop (dates not given);
  • approval of the Church’s 2027 budget;
  • a symposium at the Foreign Ministry on 11 December on the Church’s office at the EU, ahead of Greece’s EU presidency;
  • synodal patronage for the 5th international conference of the Metropolis of Polyani and Kilkis, 16–17 November, on Orthodox witness and ecumenism “ten years after the Holy and Great Synod of Crete”;
  • St Demetrios proclaimed patron of the Judicial Police, at the request of the Justice Ministry’s secretary general.

The communiqué does not mention Corfu or Sinai.

Also in Greece. A pan-Orthodox conference on heresies and “parareligion”, on magic, divination and astrology, met in Corinth in the first days of November; Patriarch Daniel of Romania’s message to it called for «mărturisirea clară a învățăturii ortodoxe» (“a clear confession of Orthodox teaching”) and stronger catechesis (Ziarul Lumina, 3 Nov — Romanian). The relic of the Holy Reed kept at Vatopaidi is to be received in Thessaloniki on 11 November, the first time it has left Mount Athos for the city (Vima Orthodoxias, 5 Nov — Greek).

2.7 Cyprus — The Archbishop gives Tychikos about ten days

Following the report of 31 October on the Tychikos case and the letter to priests.

The ultimatum. Speaking at Tala (Paphos) on 1 November, at the annual memorial for Archbishop Chrysostomos II, Archbishop Georgios said that Tychikos, the former Metropolitan of Paphos, had asked to see him but had not yet made contact: «Ο ίδιος ζήτησε παραμονές της σύγκλησης της Ιεράς Συνόδου, μέσω δικών του ανθρώπων, ότι θέλει να με δει» (“He himself asked, on the eve of the Synod’s session, through his own people, to see me”). According to the outlets, he set a window of about ten days, after which «Θα συνέλθει η Ιερά Σύνοδος» (“the Holy Synod will convene”) to decide (alphanews.live, 1 Nov — Greek; Orthodoxia News Agency, 1 Nov — Greek). The ten days are the outlets’ wording; from 1 November they point to about 11 November.

  • He criticised Tychikos for citing health to miss the Synod and then travelling from Greece to Cyprus the next day.
  • On a separate Church: «Δεν νομίζω να έχει δυνατότητες να δημιουργηθεί μια Εκκλησία εδώ» (“I don’t think there is scope for a Church to be created here”).
  • On house liturgies: «Πρώτα πρώτα δεν τελούνται λειτουργίες» (“First of all, no liturgies are being celebrated”). According to ONA he also warned the faithful against rites by a deposed cleric in private homes, without the Church’s blessing. The two remarks sit uneasily together.

Tychikos’s side. No public reply from Tychikos was found in the week; the supporters’ site tychikos.com had nothing after 29 October (tychikos.com — English; an unofficial site supporting him). His letter to the Synod of 14 October, served on 21 October through a Nicosia court process server, is published there in full. Its wording on where he would serve is more precise than reported last week: he asks for the Synod’s «ἄδεια καί εὐλογία» (“permission and blessing”) so that, «διαμένοντας φιλοξενούμενος εἰς παραχωρηθεῖσαν μοι οἰκίαν ἐν Πάφῳ» (“while staying as a guest in a house made available to me in Paphos”), he may celebrate «εἰς ὅποιον τόπον ἡ Ἱερά Σύνοδος ἤθελε ἐπιτρέψει» (“in whatever place the Holy Synod might permit”), and outside Cyprus with the permission of the competent authorities. The letter also alleges that the suspension of January 2026 was decided in advance: «ἡ ἐπιβολή τῆς ἀργίας ἐγένετο ἐρήμην μου, μέ προειλημμένην τήν ἀπόφασίν Σας» (“the suspension was imposed in my absence, your decision predetermined”), since the Archbishop had announced it at monasteries of the Church of Greece, “as on Aegina”, and to the media before the Synod voted. That is his allegation; the Archbishopric has not answered it.

Two issues, not one. The Synod’s own announcement of 22 May 2025, when it removed him from Paphos, charged the ordination of «ἐνεργοῦ μέλους τῶν ἀποτειχισμένων Θεσσαλονίκης» (“an active member of the walled-off [group] of Thessaloniki”), refusals of mixed marriages and of reception by chrismation, and the dedication of a chapel, and required a confession of faith «στὴν ὁποία νὰ περιλαμβάνεται καταδίκη τοῦ ἀποτειχισμοῦ» (“which must include a condemnation of walling off”) (Orthodoxia News Agency, 22 May 2025 — Greek). Ukraine was not among the charges. His refusals to concelebrate with the Archbishop over the Church of Cyprus’s recognition of the OCU, reported in June 2023 (Cyprus Mail, 11 Jun 2023 — English), were an earlier and separate rift. For the background, see the explainer on walling off in the edition of 31 October.

2.8 Bulgaria — The Synod: “full Eucharistic and canonical communion” with Constantinople; a Bulgarian metropolitan rebukes a Ukrainian one

Following the reports of 24 and 31 October on the reaction to Patriarch Bartholomew’s visit of 17–19 October.

The Synod’s address (3 November). In an address to clergy and faithful, the Holy Synod said the Bulgarian Church «пребъдва в пълно евхаристийно и канонично общение с Константинополската патриаршия, както и с останалите Поместни православни църкви» (“abides in full Eucharistic and canonical communion with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, as well as with the other Local Orthodox Churches”). It warned against «неразумна ревност по Бога» (“unreasonable zeal for God”, cf. Rom. 10:2) and told clergy not to sow «неоснователни страхове» (“groundless fears”) or distrust of the hierarchy. Believers, it said, must not «да хулят своите архипастири» (“revile their archpastors”), nor «да отправят анатема и да се превръщат в самозвани съдници» (“hurl anathemas and turn themselves into self-appointed judges”). It spoke of «някои крайни настроения, непремерени изказвания и неоправдани страхове» (“certain extreme attitudes, intemperate statements and unjustified fears”), and called the joint Liturgy of Bartholomew and Daniil at Rila on 19 October «най-съкровен израз на нашата обща любов и почит» (“the most intimate expression of our common love and reverence”) (Bulgarian Patriarchate, 3 Nov — Bulgarian; official). The address does not mention Metropolitan Epifaniy, the OCU or Bartholomew’s commemoration of Epifaniy at Rila, which provoked the shouts of «Анатема!» reported on 24 October, and announces no sanctions.

Sliven and Zaporizhzhia. On 4 November Metropolitan Arseniy of Sliven publicly rebuked Metropolitan Luka of Zaporizhzhia of the UOC for statements — known here only through Arseniy’s account — that the Bulgarian Synod was split by intrigue and that Daniil was pressed by a hostile majority. Arseniy said the decision to invite Bartholomew was unanimous, cited the 2nd Ecumenical Council’s canon against bishops acting beyond their bounds, demanded an apology and said: “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is not some diocese subordinate to an external center” (Orthodox Times, 4 Nov — English). Luka’s original statement has not been located, and he has not replied publicly.

Context. The Austrian news service NÖK calls the visit “eines der umstrittensten kirchlichen Ereignisse” (“one of the most contested church events”) since Daniil’s election, and observes that criticism has shifted from Bartholomew to Daniil, with words such as «Kapitulation» and «Verrat» (“betrayal”), while the opposing camp is itself divided (NÖK, 4 Nov — German). In a homily at St Nedelya in Sofia on 30 October, before a visiting Serbian delegation, Daniil said “we must not be guided by nationality, political preferences, nationalist sentiments, or chauvinism” (Orthodox Times, 31 Oct — English).

2.9 Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo — The Patriarch’s silence after the election becomes the story

Following the report of 31 October on the parliamentary election of 25 October.

No word from Porfirije. Nearly two weeks after the vote that brought the Student List to power and in which President Vučić conceded, Patriarch Porfirije had made no public comment on the result. BBC News Serbian (Kristina Kljajić) asked the Serbian Orthodox Church for comment and had no reply by publication on 6 November (BBC News na srpskom via RTCG, 6 Nov — Serbian). Those it quotes:

  • the theologian Vladimir Cvetković: «Vrh SPC je podržavao vlast i SNS do te mere da su određeni politički procesi vrlo negativno definisani» (“The SPC leadership supported the government and the SNS to such an extent that certain political processes were defined very negatively”);
  • the former priest and professor Vukašin Milićević, now a Democratic Party politician, who says the leadership gave the SNS «neku vrstu simboličke legitimacije» (“a kind of symbolic legitimation”);
  • Časlav Koprivica of Belgrade’s Faculty of Political Sciences, who calls the timing of the planned church university “Sveti Sava” an «neprijatna koincidencija» (“unpleasant coincidence”);
  • believers asking the Patriarch to address the faithful.

The pro-government religion portal of Republika noted that the Islamic Community and the Catholic Bishop Ladislav Nemet had congratulated the Student List, and the Patriarch had not. It carried a defence by Archimandrite Hrizostom (Nešić), abbot of Namasija: «naš patrijarh Porfirije ćuti… Isto kao što je i Hristos ćutao pred sinedrionom» (“our Patriarch Porfirije is silent… just as Christ was silent before the Sanhedrin”) (Religija.rs, c. 3 Nov — Serbian; pro-government). The opposition-aligned daily Nova reported, from unnamed sources, on the mood among the Patriarch’s entourage on election night (Nova.rs, 4 Nov — Serbian); its account cannot be checked. The new Assembly must meet by 10 December; ministers have not been named (Srpske.rs, 4 Nov — Serbian).

What the Patriarchate did publish in the week, as relayed by the Montenegrin Metropolis, includes a reception for Metropolitan George of Kitros and condolences to Patriarch Theophilos over the «Гнусни терористички напад» (“vile terrorist attack”) at Karak (Metropolis of Montenegro, 6 Nov — Serbian).

Montenegro. Metropolitan Joanikije received German diplomats led by Ambassador Natalie Kauter at Cetinje on 5 November (Metropolis of Montenegro, 5 Nov — Serbian). Milo Đukanović has not answered Joanikije’s claim of 29 October that he once offered the Metropolis separation from Belgrade.

Kosovo. The eparchy of Raška-Prizren’s own pages give the KFOR commander’s name as Major General Roberto Vergori (see Corrections) (Eparchy of Raška-Prizren, 29 Oct — English).

2.10 Romania and Moldova — A British ambassador visits both Metropolises; Antonie proposes a meeting on neutral ground

Chișinău, 5 November. The UK ambassador, Fern Horine, called on both Orthodox Metropolises in Moldova on the same day.

  • With Metropolitan Antonie of Bessarabia (Romanian Patriarchate) she discussed religious freedom and the safety of communities, “tensions between church structures, including the cases at Dereneu and Grinăuți”, insufficient police protection, and «amenințări, violențe sau împiedicarea accesului la viața religioasă» (“threats, violence or obstruction of access to religious life”). Antonie proposed a meeting of the two Metropolises’ leaders at a neutral venue and said he had asked the Speaker of Parliament «pentru facilitarea dialogului» (“to facilitate dialogue”) (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 5 Nov — Romanian).
  • With Metropolitan Vladimir of Chișinău and All Moldova (Moscow Patriarchate) she discussed «rolul Bisericii în societate» (“the role of the Church in society”) and social and cultural cooperation (Metropolis of Moldova, 5 Nov — Romanian).

The Metropolis of Moldova’s account does not mention the other Metropolis or the proposed meeting, and it has not answered the proposal publicly.

Other items. On 4 November Vladimir read a patriarchal decree raising his vicar Siluan of Orhei to archbishop, on his tenth episcopal anniversary (Metropolis of Moldova, 4 Nov — Romanian). On 3 November Antonie served in Bălți to mark the end of his time as locum tenens of the diocese, whose bishop-elect Nicodim Petre was elected on 29 October; no date has been announced for his consecration (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 3 Nov — Romanian).

2.11 Georgia — The Patriarchate on the casino law: “we did not even manage to ask questions”

Following the report of 31 October. In a video statement reported on 6 November, Archpriest Andria Jaghmaidze, head of the Patriarchate’s press service, said of the gambling law passed in three readings in two days: «ჩვენ შეკითხვების დასმაც კი ვერ მოვასწარით» (“we did not even manage to ask questions”) and «ძალიან ვწუხვართ, რომ ვერ მოვახერხეთ ამაში ღრმად ჩახედვა და გარკვევა» (“we are very sorry we could not look into this deeply”). He said the Patriarchate would raise the matter with the government, and called for state-funded rehabilitation for gambling addicts and enforcement of age rules (Netgazeti, 6 Nov — Georgian; independent). The tone is more procedural than the 28 October statement, in which the Patriarchate sided with the Public Defender. The same day the opposition UNM proposed barring Georgian citizens from casinos and online gambling on the Monaco model (Netgazeti, 6 Nov — Georgian). Whether the President has signed the law could not be established.

2.12 Baltic States — Ten Lithuanian parishes have now appealed to the Seimas

Following the report of 31 October on bills XVP-1977 and XVP-1979. Five more parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate’s diocese in Lithuania — Švenčionys, Ukmergė, Kėdainiai, Mažeikiai and Šiauliai — have written to the Seimas against the bills, bringing the total to ten with the Holy Spirit Monastery. «Мы не желаем переходить в юрисдикцию Константинопольского патриархата» (“We do not wish to pass into the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople”), writes the Kėdainiai parish (Lithuanian Orthodox diocese, undated, early Nov — Russian). Metropolitan Innokentiy has blessed daily molebens with a special prayer «о защите» (“for the protection”) of the Church in every parish, «В связи с тревожными обстоятельствами, вызванными регистрацией в Сейме двух законопроектов» (“in connection with the alarming circumstances caused by the registration of two bills in the Seimas”) (Lithuanian Orthodox diocese, 31 Oct — Russian). On 1 November a Ukrainian community of UOC tradition at the Holy Spirit Monastery voiced concern at «планами политиков изъять храмы» (“politicians’ plans to take away the churches”) (Lithuanian Orthodox diocese, 1 Nov — Russian). The diocese is a party to the dispute; no new statement from the bills’ sponsors or the Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was found.

2.13 Finland — The bishops will reconsider their ruling on same-sex weddings after protests from priests and laity

Following the report of 31 October on § 58 of the Bishops’ Council’s minutes of 25 October.

The protest. A statement of concern with 236 signatures, at least 18 of them priests, was published on 5 November. It asks how priests can care for same-sex couples and rainbow families, notes that Orthodox clergy already appear in vestments beside Lutheran women priests, and links the ruling to rising anti-LGBTQ+ movements and to Russian church rhetoric that framed the war in Ukraine around sexual minorities. «Nyt tehdyssä päätöksessä pastoraalinen herkkyys tunnustetaan, mutta sen käytännön seuraukset kielletään» (“The decision acknowledges pastoral sensitivity but forbids its practical consequences”); «Lakkaako pappi olemasta pappi silloin, kun hän ei ole pukeutunut papilliseen asuun?» (“Does a priest stop being a priest when he is not in clerical dress?”) (Aamun Koitto, 5 Nov — Finnish; the Church’s magazine). The organiser is not named.

The priests’ union. On 4 November the board of the Union of Orthodox Priests wrote to the Bishops’ Council asking it to reconsider, on grounds of priests’ pastoral work. Its chair, Fr Jaakko Vainio, called the 236-signature text «sisällöllisesti hyvä» (“good in content”).

The bishops’ reasoning, as quoted. Clergy «ei toimita eikä avusta» (do not officiate or assist) at same-sex weddings or blessings in other churches: no prayers, preaching or vestments, and no name or title in the programme. «Hän ei voi antaa kirkon nimissä sitä, mitä kirkko ei itse anna» (“He cannot give in the Church’s name what the Church itself does not give”); «Rehellinen pidättyminen on lopulta kunnioittavampaa kuin ele, joka lupaisi yhteyttä, jota ei ole» (“Honest restraint is ultimately more respectful than a gesture that would promise a communion that does not exist”).

The Archbishop’s answer (6 November). Archbishop Elia wrote: «Kirkossa jokaista rakastetaan varauksetta. Jokainen saa rakastaa.» (“In the Church everyone is loved unconditionally. Everyone may love.”) He said «Ohje ei kiellä pappia olemasta läsnä läheisensä juhlassa» (“The guideline does not forbid a priest to be present at a loved one’s celebration”), that the union’s request «on vastaanotettu, ja otan sen vakavasti» (“has been received, and I take it seriously”), and that the Council will hear the union and reconsider at its next meeting; «En halua ennakoida sen lopputulosta» (“I do not want to anticipate the outcome”) (Aamun Koitto, 6 Nov — Finnish). To the public broadcaster Yle he said: «Taustalla ei ole Konstantinopolin ekumeenisen patriarkaatin toivetta eikä painetta» (“There is no wish or pressure from the Ecumenical Patriarchate behind it”) and «Seksuaali- ja sukupuolivähemmistöihin kuuluvat ovat seurakuntiemme jäseniä» (“Members of sexual and gender minorities are members of our parishes”) (Yle, Tapio Räihä, 6 Nov — Finnish). No date for the review was given.

Women in the Church. On 1 November a seminar on “Women in the Orthodox Church”, organised by the priests’ union, Helsinki parish, Filantropia and the University of Eastern Finland, opened with an address on behalf of Patriarch Bartholomew by Bishop Isidoros of Andida: «Mikään näkemys, joka asettaisi naisen miestä vähäarvoisempaan asemaan, ei saa tukea kirkon traditiosta» (“No view placing woman below man finds support in the Church’s tradition”) (Orthodox Church of Finland, 2 Nov — Finnish). It did not speak of a deaconess office. Days earlier the bishops had answered a Church Assembly initiative by saying that liturgical assisting tasks are already open to women, and that no further definition is needed (Aamun Koitto, 30 Oct — Finnish).

2.14 Poland — Remembering the Lemko churches

The Polish Church’s portal reports a project to document the sites of vanished churches in eight Lemko villages, the 75th anniversary of the Warsaw Orthodox seminary, and the patronage of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the Olympiad of Orthodox Religious Knowledge (cerkiew.pl, 2–6 Nov — Polish). The report read does not describe the project’s organisers or method.

3. Oriental Orthodox News

3.1 Armenia — The Catholicos’s trial stalls again; the Church becomes a plank of the united opposition

Following the report of 31 October.

The hearing that did not take place (6 November). The trial of Catholicos Karekin II and six bishops — Archbishops Nathan Hovhannisyan and Haykazun Najaryan, Bishops Mushegh Babayan, Hovnan Hakobyan, Makar Hakobyan and Vahan Hovhannisyan — charged under Article 507(2) with obstructing the enforcement of a judicial act, was to resume at the Etchmiadzin seat of the Armavir court on 6 November. It was adjourned because no prosecutor appeared; the complainant, Arman Saroyan (formerly Bishop Gevorg), was also absent. Judge Serzh Rushanyan cited the prosecutors’ workload (Aravot, 6 Nov — Armenian). The next hearing is set for 4 December (Azatutyun, 6 Nov — Armenian; RFE/RL). No ruling on the defence’s motions to terminate the case was reported.

  • The Mother See’s lawyer, Ara Zohrabyan: «Կարծում ենք՝ իրենք միտում ունեն ձգձգելու այս գործի քննությունը» (“We believe they intend to drag out the examination of this case”); «Սա ուղիղ խոսում է իրենց կողմից այս գործընթացը սաբոտաժ անելու մասին» (“This directly points to their sabotaging of this process”). He argued that the delay keeps the travel ban on the Catholicos and bishops in force, and said the Church will file claims over funds and property connected with Saroyan’s tenure in the diocese of Masyatsotn, where Saroyan remains (Azatutyun, 6 Nov; Golos Armenii, 6 Nov — Armenian; opposition-leaning).
  • The Prosecutor General’s Office gave no explanation beyond what was said in court.

The Church in the political crisis.

  • The opposition’s agenda (4 November). After a meeting convened by Narek Karapetyan, head of the Strong Armenia faction, opposition forces adopted a joint statement on nationwide consolidation with four aims: preventing what they call the “Aliyev constitution”, peace without one-sided concessions, protecting the Church, and restoring democratic freedoms (News.am, 5 Nov — Armenian). On 6 November Tigran Abrahamyan of the Strong Armenia faction said: «չեմ բացառի, որ այս օրակարգով … նման հանդիպում կայանա Ամենայն Հայոց Կաթողիկոսի հետ» (“I will not rule out that such a meeting will take place with the Catholicos of All Armenians on this agenda”) (Azatutyun, Ruzanna Stepanyan, 6 Nov — Armenian). On 4–5 November the party’s leader Samvel Karapetyan was arrested and remanded in custody for a month in an unrelated case concerning Electric Networks of Armenia (OC Media, 4–6 Nov — English).
  • Pashinyan, 5 November. At a government briefing the Prime Minister said one “very important person was missing” from the opposition gathering, referred to Karekin II by his secular name, Ktrich Nersisyan, and remarked that if they met in that format, “there will be a revolution by Sunday evening” (News.am, 5 Nov — English).
  • Pashinyan, 6 November, at the Third World Armenian Congress: «Մեր պետությունը մեր ինքնությունն է և մեր ինքնությունը մեր պետությունն է» (“Our state is our identity and our identity is our state”). On the Mother See: «Միածինն էլ միամիտ չէ, նա իջել էր Հայաստանի մայրաքաղաքում, որովհետև Վաղարշապատը այդ ժամանակ Հայաստանի մայրաքաղաքն էր» (“The Only-Begotten was not naive either: he descended in Armenia’s capital, because Vagharshapat was then the capital”) (News.am, 6 Nov — Armenian). The phrase plays on the tradition that Christ descended at Etchmiadzin, whose name means “the Only-Begotten descended”.
  • The constitution. Justice Minister Srbuhi Galyan said on 2 November that the article on the Armenian Apostolic Church would be carried over «նույնությամբ» (“unchanged”) into the draft new constitution, as a political decision, though many members of the Constitutional Reform Council object (News.am, 2 Nov — Armenian). The report does not say in which direction they object.
  • A poll. A survey by MPG, the Armenian member of Gallup International, published on 6 November, found 46.7% viewing Pashinyan’s public remarks on the Church negatively and 30.4% positively. 79.1% had never heard of the government’s report of 24 September on “the crisis in the Armenian Apostolic Church”; 3.2% had read it in full (Aravot, 6 Nov — Armenian). Sample size, method and fieldwork dates were not published.
  • Antelias. Catholicos Aram I of Cilicia received Armenia’s ambassador to Lebanon on 6 November for more than an hour; «Քննարկման առարկա դարձավ նաև Հայաստանի ներքին կացությունը» (“Armenia’s internal situation was also discussed”) (168.am, 6 Nov — Armenian).

A defrocked priest’s “Liturgy”. On 1 November the diocese of Aragatsotn condemned a Liturgy celebrated at St Gevorg church in Garnahovit (Talin district) by Armen Arakelyan, the former Fr Koryun, whom it describes as defrocked and as a former leader of the “New Armenia, New Patriarch” movement: «Կարգալույծ հռչակված անձի կողմից մատուցված «Պատարագը» չի կարող դիտվել որպես Եկեղեցու կողմից…» (“A ‘Liturgy’ celebrated by a person declared defrocked cannot be regarded as the Church’s…”) (News.am, 1 Nov — Armenian). Arakelyan’s own account was not found.

Galstanyan. The trial of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and 17 co-defendants continued on 5 November at the Shengavit seat of the Yerevan court; no account of the session was published (Yerkir.am, 5 Nov — Armenian; ARF-affiliated).

3.2 Syriac Orthodox Church — A Turkish court halts a fine on a Tur Abdin church; a Mosul street for a murdered priest

  • Azakh (İdil, Şırnak province). Belated: on 7 October Şırnak’s First Administrative Court unanimously suspended a municipal fine of 1,170,743 lira and closure and demolition threats against the guesthouse annex of the Syriac Orthodox church of the Virgin Mary in Azakh (Beth Zabday), holding that “the mere existence of an unlicensed building is not sufficient grounds” to fine the church foundation. The ruling is not final, and a separate suit against the demolition orders is pending (SyriacPress, 4 Nov — English; a Syriac community outlet).
  • Mosul. Nineveh Governorate named a street after Fr Bulos (Paulos) Iskandar, a Syriac Orthodox priest kidnapped on 9 October 2006 and found beheaded two days later; Archbishop Mor Nicodemus Daoud Matti Sharaf attended (SyriacPress, 4 Nov — English).
  • Patriarch Ignatius Aphrem II’s meeting with John X and Patriarch Absi in Damascus is reported in §2.2.

3.3 Coptic Orthodox Church — A Copt held over a post about religion in schools

According to the US advocacy group Coptic Solidarity, republishing an account first carried by the Christian Post, Sherif Wagih Fahmi, a 41-year-old engineer, was arrested at his home in Alexandria on 5 October by officers posing as gas-company workers, after posting online against what he called the Islamisation of education. His sister says he was held by National Security in Smouha and then at a police station, on a charge of “publishing false information”; priests were told he would be freed within weeks. The group says 14 people have been arrested since September for voicing non-Islamic beliefs (Coptic Solidarity, 5 Nov — English; Coptic advocacy). The account comes from his family through advocacy channels; the Egyptian authorities’ version has not been published. The Coptic Church has not commented publicly.

4. Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora & Mission Fields

4.1 Western Europe — Paris elects an auxiliary bishop for Moscow’s confirmation; Benelux bishops sit together; a founder of German-language monasticism dies

Paris: the rue Daru Archdiocese elects a bishop. On 6 November the Ordinary General Assembly of the Archdiocese of Orthodox Churches of Russian Tradition in Western Europe elected Archpriest Maciej Leszczynski auxiliary bishop by secret ballot, under Article 33 of its statutes (Orthodoxie.com, Jivko Panev, 6 Nov — French).

  • The vote. He was the sole candidate and received 133 votes for, 7 against, 2 blank and 1 spoiled. The report speaks of 144 delegates; the ballots listed total 143.
  • Confirmation. «L’élection est ensuite soumise à la confirmation du patriarche de Moscou et du Saint-Synode de l’Église orthodoxe russe.» No confirmation had been announced by 7 November. The Archdiocese’s own site had published nothing on the assembly (archeveche.eu — English).
  • The candidate. Born in Sokółka (Poland) in 1983, he trained as an iconographer in Bielsk Podlaski, at the Warsaw Orthodox seminary and the Christian Theological Academy in Warsaw, and at the Institut Saint-Serge in Paris. He was ordained deacon in October 2021 and priest in April 2022. He serves at the cathedral of St Alexander Nevsky in the rue Daru, where he leads French-language catechesis, and is rector at Le Creusot and Vaux-sur-Mer. He is a member of the Orthodox–Catholic dialogue committee of the French Catholic Bishops’ Conference, and directs the Saint Andrei Rublev icon school in Paris. In a 2024 interview he said of iconography: «L’icône est une manière de rendre visible ce qui est invisible pour nos yeux» (Ouest-Est, 27 Jun 2024 — French).
  • Background. The Archdiocese, which had been an exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, joined the Moscow Patriarchate in 2019; part of its parishes stayed with Constantinople. It is the second auxiliary chosen in a year, after Bishop Augustin of Taldom, ordained at the rue Daru cathedral on 14 December 2025 for Great Britain and Scandinavia. In June, according to the anonymous blog Parlons d’Orthodoxie, Metropolitan Jean (Renneteau) of Dubna had told clergy and laity that two other candidates submitted to Patriarch Kirill since 2023, Archimandrite Victor (Crețu) and Archpriest Anatoli Negruta, had received no answer in three years, and the Archdiocese Council had asked a June assembly to consider electing them «à titre exceptionnel» (Parlons d’Orthodoxie, 22 Jun — French; an anonymous blog openly hostile to Moscow). That assembly was postponed. The report of 6 November does not mention those two candidates.
  • The forecast and the rue Daru documents. On 31 October Parlons d’Orthodoxie reported that the agenda now included the ordination of the priest it calls “Matthieu Lechtchinski” — the same person, in a French transliteration — and described the candidacy as «au minimum un compromis avec Moscou» (its opinion). It linked the timing to archival documents published shortly before by the Moscow Patriarchate’s parallel diocese in France, the diocese of Chersonese, which say the plot of the rue Daru cathedral was bought by Emperor Alexander II and the government Holy Synod (Parlons d’Orthodoxie, 31 Oct — French). RISU relayed this on 2 November, with Sergiy Shumylo, a researcher at Vilnius University and director of the Libertas Fidei centre, calling the publication «по суті шантажем» (“essentially blackmail”) and arguing that Russia, which does not regard itself as the Russian Empire’s legal successor, lacks a basis for such claims (RISU, 2 Nov — Ukrainian). These are opinions; no legal step concerning the cathedral has been reported, and the Chersonese diocese has not commented on how its publication should be read.
  • So far. The assembly chose a single candidate by an internal vote and submitted him to Moscow, rather than electing the two earlier candidates without Moscow’s consent. That is consistent with the blog’s “compromise” reading and with no rupture. The second day of the assembly (7 November), Moscow’s response, and any decision on the earlier candidates or on Metropolitan Jean’s succession remain to be reported.
  • A dossier addressed to the assembly. Mir Vsem’s report on clergy punished for anti-war views was prepared for this assembly (§2.4).

Berlin, January 2027. Mir Vsem has announced a conference in Berlin on 15–16 January 2027, «Церковь без будущего, или будущее без Церкви? В поисках выхода из кризиса российского Православия» (“A Church without a future, or a future without the Church? Seeking a way out of the crisis of Russian Orthodoxy”) (Mir Vsem, 3 Nov — Russian). Speakers include Sergei Chapnin, Sister Vassa Larin, Ksenia Luchenko («Возможно ли русское православие без Московской Патриархии?», “Is Russian Orthodoxy possible without the Moscow Patriarchate?”), Natallia Vasilevich and Archimandrite Athanasius (Bukin), with a Ukrainian panel that includes Archpriest Andriy Dudchenko of the OCU’s Kyiv Theological Academy and Maksym Butkevych. Parlons d’Orthodoxie relayed the announcement on 4 November.

Benelux. The 33rd Orthodox Episcopal Assembly of the Benelux met in Brussels on 4 November under Metropolitan Athenagoras of Belgium (Ecumenical Patriarchate). Present were Metropolitan Isaac (Antioch), Bishop Symeon of Domodedovo (Moscow Patriarchate, for the Archdiocese of Russian tradition), Bishop Mark of Neamț for the Romanian Metropolitan Iosif, Bishop Dositheos (Georgia) and Bishop Joachim of Apollonias (Metropolis of Belgium, communiqué, 4 Nov — Greek). The assembly:

  • condemned «μετὰ τῆς μεγαλυτέρας αὐστηρότητος» (“with the utmost severity”) the attack on the church at Karak and the persecution of Christians in Lebanon and Syria;
  • reaffirmed its «ἀκλόνητον ὑποστήριξιν» (“unwavering support”) for the Ukrainian people, echoing an open letter of Belgium’s churches, with the Moscow Patriarchate’s bishop present;
  • welcomed the Dutch state’s recognition of the Orthodoxe Zendende Instantie, the joint Eastern and Oriental Orthodox body that sends prison chaplains, recognised provisionally from 2023 (Tweede Kamer, evaluation, 2026 — Dutch);
  • reported a “Trust Committee” working on governance, particularly on possible sexual abuse in the Church;
  • announced that Patriarch Daniel of Romania will visit Brussels on 29 May 2027.

The day before, the Committee of Representatives of the Orthodox Churches to the EU (CROCEU) prepared a conference on “the values of the Holy Fathers in the age of AI” (Brussels, 19–20 November) (Metropolis of Belgium, 3 Nov — Greek).

Germany.

  • Basilius (Grolimund), 1943–2026. Schema-Archimandrite Basilius (Hans-Peter Grolimund) died on 3 November. Born in Muri, Switzerland, and raised a Catholic, he became Orthodox after studying theology in Athens and was tonsured in 1971 by St Justin (Popović) at Ćelije. After years on Mount Athos (Stavronikita, Simonopetra) and in France, he founded with Justin (Rauer) the skete of St Spyridon at Geilnau an der Lahn, later stavropegic under the Serbian Patriarch, and the hermitage at Eiterfeld-Unterufhausen in Hesse, where he was buried on 7 November (Orthodoxie.com, 4 Nov — French).
  • Munich. The city’s pan-Orthodox parish conference held a joint Liturgy at the Greek Orthodox All Saints church under Bishop Sofian of Kronstadt (Romanian Metropolis), with clergy of Bulgarian, Greek, Macedonian, Romanian, Russian, Serbian and Ukrainian communities; Sofian spoke of prayer «trotz bestehender Schwierigkeiten und Meinungsverschiedenheiten» (“despite existing difficulties and disagreements”) (orthodoxnews.de, c. 6 Nov — German; German edition of the pro-UOC SPZh). Which Russian and Ukrainian jurisdictions took part is not stated.
  • The Moscow Patriarchate’s Berlin diocese held its third youth congress at Braunlage-Hohegeiß (29 October – 1 November) and has published “basic requirements for ordination” (Diocese of Berlin and Germany, 2 Nov — German).

United Kingdom. The Romanian Archdiocese asked its faithful to support an endowment appeal of the Institute for Orthodox Christian Studies in Cambridge, which seeks USD 100,000 by 31 December, to be matched by an anonymous benefactor (Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese, 5 Nov — English).

4.2 The Americas — The OCA on assisted suicide; Canada under its new archbishop; a Russian state order for a Toronto priest

  • OCA. On 2 November the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church in America elected Bishop Gerasim (Eliel) to the see of Dallas and the South (OCA, 2 Nov — English). On 4 November it issued a statement, prepared by a commission he chaired, saying the Church does not bless assisted suicide or euthanasia, distinguishing them from pain relief, hospice care and the withdrawal of treatment that no longer benefits, and encouraging advance directives: “The dignity of a human person does not rest on strength, independence, or usefulness”; “You are not a burden to the Body of Christ” (OCA, 4 Nov — English). The OCA’s territory includes Canada, where medical assistance in dying is legal; the statement does not name any law.
  • Canada. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocese’s new Archbishop Apostolos held his first Archdiocesan Council on 3 November in Scarborough: “We are not here to judge either the past or anyone.” He promised a full accounting of revenues and expenditure and created five archiepiscopal districts with vicars (Orthodox Times, 4 Nov; 5 Nov — English).
  • Toronto. Archpriest Vladimir Malchenko, rector of Holy Trinity Cathedral and dean of ROCOR’s Eastern Canadian district, received Russia’s Order of Friendship, presented during the Kazan-icon feast and National Unity Day celebration of 4 November (ROCOR, 5 Nov — English). The post does not say who presented it.
  • Chile. ROCOR’s Bishop John of Caracas and South America presided at the Kazan-icon church in Santiago on 1 November, ordained Deacon Roberto León to the priesthood, and met Protopresbyter George Abed of the Antiochian Church in Chile; the Russian ambassador attended (ROCOR, 6 Nov — English).
  • Brazil. In Ponta Grossa (Paraná), where the city’s heritage council proposed listing eight churches and the Catholic diocese objected to six, the Ukrainian Orthodox parish of São Jorge supports the listing of its own church: «É um tombamento voluntário, não é um processo inquisitório» (“It is a voluntary listing, not an inquisitorial process”), said its vice-president Eduardo Solek (Diário dos Campos, 4 Nov — Portuguese).
  • Buenos Aires, ahead. Pope Leo XIV’s programme in Argentina includes a meeting with leaders of Christian communities and religious traditions at the Palacio San Martín on 9 November, at which Orthodox Churches are expected to be represented (Vatican, programme — Spanish; Infobae, 4 Nov — Spanish).

4.3 Asia and Africa — A wooden church for Japan’s first Orthodox cemetery; Moscow’s Exarchate divides Malawi

  • Japan. In Minami-Alps (Yamanashi prefecture), the first Liturgy was celebrated in a Maramureș-style wooden church, built in Romania and reassembled at what is described as Japan’s first Orthodox cemetery, founded by Romanian Orthodox Christians for those who wish to be buried rather than cremated and open to Orthodox of any jurisdiction (Orthodoxie.com, 4 Nov — French; OrthoChristian, 3 Nov — English, citing Basilica.ro). Fr Daniel Corîu, the Romanian Patriarchate’s representative in Japan, said burial has theological grounds, the body returning to the earth “until the General Resurrection”. In May the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Metropolis of Hong Kong declared Fr Corîu persona non grata for celebrating in its territory without permission (editions of 31 May and 6 June).
  • Malawi. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarch for Africa, Metropolitan Konstantin, divided the single Malawi deanery into Northern and Southern deaneries by decree of 29 October, “citing the development of church life” (Exarchate of Africa, 5 Nov — Russian; official). The Patriarchate of Alexandria regards the Exarchate’s presence in Africa as an intrusion into its canonical territory; it issued no statement in the week.

5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations

5.1 Rome — The Pope to Eastern Christians: “a peace that is unarmed and disarming”

Receiving participants in a symposium of L’Œuvre d’Orient and the Institut Chrétiens d’Orient on Eastern Christians and peace-building on 4 November, Pope Leo XIV called them “servants of a peace that is unarmed and disarming, humble and persevering” (Vatican, 4 Nov — English). He did not name any Orthodox Church. The same week Archbishop Fisichella was received at the Phanar (§2.1).

5.2 Inter-Orthodox — Who sits with whom

The week offered several small signs of how Orthodox Churches divided over Ukraine still meet, and where they do not:

  • In Brussels, Bishop Symeon of Domodedovo sat in the Benelux Episcopal Assembly under an Ecumenical Patriarchate metropolitan, and the assembly expressed support for the Ukrainian people (§4.1). He is a bishop of the Paris-based Archdiocese of Russian tradition, which belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate but whose ruling bishop, Metropolitan Jean of Dubna, wrote to Patriarch Kirill on 9 March 2022 calling the invasion of Ukraine a «guerre monstrueuse et insensée» (“a monstrous and senseless war”) and rejecting his description of it as a “metaphysical” struggle (open letter, 9 Mar 2022, relayed by the Institute for Ecumenical Studies, Fribourg — French). In a February 2023 interview with Radio Svoboda’s Russian service he said that Russia «a attaqué l’Ukraine comme Hitler a jadis attaqué la Pologne» (“attacked Ukraine as Hitler once attacked Poland”) (Radio Svoboda, Marina Ochrimovskaya, Feb 2023 — Russian; French translation in Orthodoxie.com, 21 Feb 2023). His presence is therefore less a sign of rapprochement between Moscow and Constantinople than an example of how Orthodox Churches in Western Europe try, as far as they can, to keep the Ukrainian conflict from disrupting local church life and relations.
  • In Munich, clergy of several jurisdictions, including Russian and Ukrainian communities, concelebrated (§4.1).
  • In Sofia, the Bulgarian Synod affirmed full communion with Constantinople, and a Bulgarian metropolitan publicly rebuked a hierarch of the UOC (§2.8).
  • In Corfu, a metropolitan of the Church of Greece opened a house for the UOC (§2.6).
  • In Beirut and Moscow, the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem received the Moscow Patriarchate’s external-relations team in the same week (§2.2, §1.1).

6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates

6.1 Honours and inquiries: two instruments of Moscow’s church diplomacy in one week

Two kinds of act by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian state stood out in the first week of November, and they point in opposite directions.

Honours, aimed outward. Putin handed the Order of Friendship to the Patriarch of Jerusalem at the Kremlin (§1.1); the same order was presented to a ROCOR archpriest in Toronto (§4.2). The DECR’s leadership marked 80 years of the Moscow metochion in Beirut with Russia’s ambassador and the head of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society at Balamand (§2.2). The Russian Exarchate in Africa reorganised Malawi into two deaneries (§4.3). In Corfu a metropolitan of the Church of Greece, decorated by Kirill in August, opened a house for the UOC beside the church of St Spyridon (§2.6). Theophilos’s offer to help with “talks between brothers” adds a peace-making register to this outward face.

Inquiries, aimed inward. At the same time the guidelines of 22 October require a “canonical inquiry” and a “report” to the bishop on Ukrainians baptised in the OCU who seek to join the Russian Church, and their rebaptism (§1.3). Mir Vsem’s list of some thirty clergy punished for anti-war positions, with two sanctions dated in 2025–26, was addressed to an archdiocese whose own bishop-candidates had gone unanswered by Moscow for three years (§2.4, §4.1).

What the two have in common. Both define belonging. Honours draw primates, clergy and states abroad into a relationship with Moscow; inquiries test the belonging of those who come from the other side of the Ukrainian divide, or stand apart within. Two scholarly works listed in Section 7 approach the same subject from outside: Aslı Yiğit describes the Russian Church in Serbia as a soft-power instrument, and Bjarge Schwenke Fors traces its “Holy Rus” claims in the Norwegian Arctic. Both are arguments, not settled findings, and Schwenke Fors’s material ends in 2024.

What the record does not show. Whether Theophilos’s mediation offer has any echo in Kyiv; whether the rebaptism rule is being applied, and where; and how the Moscow Synod will answer the Paris election. The Phanar, Kyiv and the OCU had not responded to any of these by 7 November.

6.2 Clergy and weapons: the Phanar draws a line

On 2 November the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Synod declared the possession and use of weapons “for any reason whatsoever” wholly incompatible with clerical status (§2.1). The communiqué names no case. The question is live across the Orthodox world. As reported on 31 October, Russian military priests are being issued drone detectors, and a former FSB officer serving as chaplain of the Russian Volunteer Corps, which fights on Ukraine’s side, was ordained an OCU priest on 26 October. Mir Vsem’s dossier this week documents greetings from the Russian Church’s military department to snipers (§2.4). In Ukraine, UOC priests who refuse military service are in dispute with the state over mobilisation (§2.5).

The Synod’s ruling does not address military chaplaincy as such, nor clergy mobilised against their will; it concerns possession and use. Its effect will depend on how the OCU, which has received its own Tomos from the Phanar, and the other Churches in communion with Constantinople receive it. Neither the OCU nor any other Church had commented by 7 November.

6.3 Silence as a stance

Several church leaders this week said nothing on matters on which they were publicly expected to speak, and the silences were themselves reported as positions.

  • Belgrade. Patriarch Porfirije’s silence after the defeat of the party that critics quoted by BBC Serbian say his leadership supported became a story in its own right, and BBC Serbian’s request for comment went unanswered (§2.9). His defenders compared it to Christ before the Sanhedrin; his critics read it as discomfort with the new majority.
  • Sofia. The Bulgarian Synod defended the Rila Liturgy without mentioning the commemoration of Epifaniy that caused the protest (§2.8).
  • Kyiv and Moscow. The UOC’s obituary of Platon (Udovenko) omitted his transfer to Moscow’s jurisdiction in 2022; Kirill’s message omitted his years in the UOC (§2.4).
  • Chișinău. The Metropolis of Moldova’s account of the British ambassador’s visit omitted the proposal for a meeting with the other Metropolis (§2.10).

In each case the silence lets a Church avoid choosing between audiences — the faithful and the state, the protesting and the loyal, two jurisdictions claiming the same bishop, or a mediator and a rival. It does not settle the question; it defers it, and the questions are already on public record.

7. New Academic Literature

Recently published works, verified on the publishers’ or journals’ own pages unless noted. Seventeen entries in English, Russian and Greek, in history, law, political science, media studies, chant and sacred space.

Oriental Orthodox

  1. Weston Bland (University of Oxford), “Rethinking the Coptic 1950s: Memorializing the Laity in the Early Nasser Era,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, FirstView (online 4 November 2026), pp. 1–17. DOI 10.1017/S0020743826101834. Open access.
    Bland challenges the view that the 1952 coup ended lay-led Coptic communal politics in favour of a church–state alliance. Reading press memorials for four prominent Coptic laymen who died in 1956–58, he finds “continuity and optimism”: the memorials tied the dead to the new regime while stressing reform, pluralism and resistance to clerical corruption. The source base is four memorialised lives.


  2. Michael Y. Henein and Mina Salama (The European Academy of Coptic Heritage), “Lyrics and music analysis of the Third Canticle ‘Hoos’ according to the Coptic rite,” TEACH – Journal of Christian Studies 5 (published 18 August 2026). DOI 10.56877/teach-jcs.2026.26.
    An analysis of the Third Hoos (the canticle of the Three Youths, Daniel 3) as a dialogue between the chanter and all creation. The authors argue that its unusually wide melodic range expresses spiritual ascent, and that it was composed for the monastic midnight Praise rather than for congregational singing. The journal is published by a Coptic heritage academy and describes itself as peer-reviewed.


  3. Marcin Piotr Bider (University of Siedlce), “The Origin of the Women’s Diaconate in the Apostolic Armenian Church (4th–12th Century). An Introduction to a Periodization in the Historical-Legal Perspective” [Polish parallel title: Geneza diakonatu kobiet w Apostolskim Kościele Ormiańskim (IV–XII w.)], Vox Patrum 99 (2026): 61–82 (published 15 September 2026). DOI 10.31743/vp.18973.
    Working from liturgical and canonical sources, Bider finds no evidence of Armenian deaconesses in the 4th–5th centuries and locates their origin in female monasticism. They appear in monasteries from the 9th century; an ordination rite first appears in the 12th-century Maštocʿ. Their tasks included charitable and educational work among women, bringing Communion to women and the sick, and assisting at women’s baptisms.


  4. Lusine S. Tumanyan, Khachik A. Harutyunyan and Arman S. Nalbandyan (Matenadaran; Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, Yerevan), “Revival of Monastic Life in Armenia in Seventeenth Century: Halidzor and Tatev Hermitages,” Christianity in the Middle East [Христианство на Ближнем Востоке] 10, no. 3 (2026): 94 ff. DOI 10.65324/cme030.
    Drawing on the 17th-century historian Arakʿel of Tabriz (Davrizhetsi), architectural plans and excavations, the authors study the Halidzor and Tatev hermitages, which revived Armenian monasticism after long wars, including the Great Hermitage destroyed by an earthquake and landslide in 1658, and describe daily monastic practice. The issue page confirms authors, title and start page; the affiliations and abstract come from the OpenAlex index.


History, law and politics

  1. Е. В. Акельев (Evgeny V. Akelev; HSE University, Moscow), «Вновь открытое письмо патриарха Адриана Петру I от 19 мая 1696 года в контексте взаимоотношений Церкви и государства в конце XVII века» [A rediscovered letter of Patriarch Adrian to Peter I of 19 May 1696 in the context of church–state relations in the late 17th century], Вестник НГУ. Серия: История, филология 25, no. 8 (2026): 141–147 (published 24 October 2026). DOI 10.25205/1818-7919-2026-25-8-141-147.
    Akelev publishes an unknown letter, preserved among the papers of the patriarch’s secretary Karion Istomin, which accompanied the Russian edition of Peter Mogila’s Orthodox Confession and pointed the young tsar to its prohibition of communion with “heretics”. He argues that it contradicts the received picture of Adrian as a weak patriarch unwilling to oppose Peter’s closeness to foreigners.


  2. Evgenia Kermeli, “The Pluri-Legal Ottoman Orthodox Church: Jurisprudence and Coercion,” in Marco Cavarzere (ed.), Legal Pluralism in Early Modern Catholicism: Courts – Laws – Comparisons (Einheit und Vielfalt im Recht / Legal Unity and Pluralism 8; Köln: Böhlau, 2026; copyright dated 2027), 211–240. DOI 10.7788/9783412536541.211; ISBN 978-3-412-53654-1. Open access (CC BY-NC-ND).
    Against the image of an insular Orthodox community whose legal autonomy preserved national identity, a view reinforced by Balkan nationalism, Kermeli treats Orthodox Christians as part of a legally plural Ottoman society in which litigants moved between ecclesiastical, communal and kadı courts. She argues that by the 18th century the Patriarchate, deploying excommunication and nomokanon manuals in a competitive legal environment, had become an Ottoman institution with a dual role: guarantor of Orthodox subjects’ compliance with imperial rule and upholder of Christianity.


  3. Иеромонах Геннадий (Э. А. Поляков) (Hieromonk Gennady (Eduard A. Polyakov); St Petersburg Theological Academy), «Ведущий православный представитель экуменического движения в первой половине XX века митрополит Фиатирский Герман (Стринопулос; 1872–1951)» [The leading Orthodox representative of the ecumenical movement in the first half of the 20th century: Metropolitan Germanos (Strenopoulos) of Thyateira], Труды кафедры богословия СПбДА 3 (31) (2026): 162–187. DOI 10.47132/2541-9587_2026_3_162. Peer-reviewed.
    A study of the views of the metropolitan who led Constantinople’s delegations in inter-Christian dialogue for three decades, from early optimism about full unity to doubts about the dialogue of his day and rejection of the “branch theory”. Under him the delegations refused intercommunion without prior doctrinal agreement. The author notes that Germanos’s views must be reconstructed from scattered articles and speeches.


  4. Marina A. Sigirci (Lomonosov Moscow State University), “Temporary Orthodox churches of the Russian emigration in Constantinople (1920–1924): reconstruction of the network and functioning,” Christianity in the Middle East 10, no. 3 (2026): 38–48. DOI 10.65324/cme027.
    From archival material, Sigirci identifies at least 24 temporary churches set up by Russian émigrés in Constantinople after the evacuation of the Crimea and shows that they served social and charitable as well as religious functions. Affiliation and abstract are from OpenAlex; the issue page confirms the rest.


  5. Natalia Shlikhta, “Claiming religious freedom in Soviet Ukraine: ‘letters to the authorities’ of Orthodox believers in Chernihiv, 1960s–early 1970s,” European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire (published online 15 October 2026). DOI 10.1080/13507486.2026.2732974.
    From the files of the Ukrainian commissioner of the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs (Central State Archive, Kyiv, Fond 4648), Shlikhta follows the first decade of a petitioning campaign, begun in 1962, to reopen Chernihiv’s Holy Trinity church, closed under Khrushchev: hundreds of letters with thousands of signatures, sent to local, republican and all-union authorities. She shows how self-proclaimed loyal Soviet citizens gradually gained agency, appealing to international bodies for religious freedom and in defence of Ukrainian religious heritage. A contribution to a special issue on social and religious change, using a lived-religion approach.


  6. Δημήτριος (π. Σπυρίδων) Ι. Τόδης (Dimitrios (Fr Spyridon) Todis), Ο από Άρτης και Ιωαννίνων Αρχιεπίσκοπος Αθηνών και πάσης Ελλάδος Σεραφείμ (Τίκας) και το βορειοηπειρωτικό ζήτημα [Archbishop Seraphim (Tikas) of Athens, formerly of Arta and Ioannina, and the Northern Epirus question], doctoral dissertation, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, School of Theology, 2026. DOI 10.12681/eadd/62806.
    Based on unpublished archives of the Archdiocese of Athens, the Holy Synod and the Metropolis of Ioannina, and on oral testimony, the thesis follows Seraphim’s resistance years, his sees and his campaigning for the Greek minority in southern Albania. The full text is embargoed until October 2028; the record is in the Greek national archive of doctoral theses.


  7. Aleksandar Spasenovski (Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Skopje), “Churches and Religious Communities in the Macedonian Constitution: Competing Visions of Recognition and Equality, 1991–2001,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 46, no. 10 (2026), article 6 (online 30 October 2026). DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2969.
    Spasenovski reconstructs four competing drafts of 1991, from naming Orthodoxy the official religion to a general clause of separation and equality, and compares the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Amendment VII of 2001 in the light of later rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. He argues that the 1991 text already guaranteed separation and equality, and that 2001 widened the explicit recognition of named communities.


  8. Aslı Yiğit (Polis Akademisi, Institute of Security Sciences, Ankara), “The Instrumentalization of Orthodoxy: The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a Soft Power Tool in Serbia,” Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi 14, special issue (2026): 1–19 (published 25 August 2026). DOI 10.14782/marmarasbd.1797002.
    The article treats the Russian Church as a hybrid instrument serving both Russian soft power and its own ecclesiastical interests, working in Serbia through the memory of the 1999 NATO bombing, the alignment of claims over Kosovo, and non-state channels including oligarchic finance. The author calls the result “religious statecraft”. It is an argument from a security-studies perspective.


  9. Tamara Novak, “Motherland, Mother Church: From Soviet Religious Diplomacy to the Russian World,” Development 69 (2026): 417–426 (published 8 October 2026). DOI 10.1057/s41301-026-00530-5.
    Through historical cases of the Russian state’s use of the Church, Novak argues that ecclesiastical authority continues to be employed to pursue international goals, promote narratives favourable to the government and facilitate the occupation and forced integration of Ukrainian territories, and draws conclusions for the limits of peace negotiations. A short thematic-section article; the author’s affiliation is not shown on the publisher’s page.


  10. Bjarge Schwenke Fors, “‘Our Orthodox Land’: The Moscow Patriarchate Challenging Norwegian Sovereignty in the Arctic,” in Mark Bassin and Per Anders Rudling (eds), Re-Imagining Space and Society in Central and Eastern Europe: New Geographies of Politics, History and Culture (Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2026), 167–190. DOI 10.1515/9783112205037-007; book ISBN 978-3-11-220503-7 (format not stated). Chapter open access.
    Through the cross at Pyramiden and the church at Barentsburg on Svalbard, and the Kirkenes parish, a planned chapel at Vardø and the Boris and Gleb church on the border, the chapter argues that the Patriarchate uses its “Holy Rus” vision to mark space in the Norwegian Arctic in ways that subtly undermine Norwegian sovereignty. Its sources, mainly secondary literature, church material and media, run to 2024.


Media, chant and sacred space

  1. Е. А. Горынцева and Л. Г. Свитич (Ekaterina A. Goryntseva and Luiza G. Svitich), «Динамика репрезентации православных ценностей в российских федеральных изданиях» [Dynamics of the representation of Orthodox values in Russian federal newspapers], Вестник Московского университета. Серия 10. Журналистика, 2026, no. 4: 22–43. DOI 10.55959/msu.vestnik.journ.4.2026.2243.
    A content analysis of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Komsomolskaya Pravda and Moskovsky Komsomolets comparing 2019 with 2023 finds a rise in the share of publications about Orthodox values, which the authors link to the socio-political climate and the official promotion of “traditional values”. Two sample years and three newspapers.


  2. Peter C. Bouteneff, “Another Paradise, Fairer than the Old: Adam’s Lament through Silouan, Sophrony, and Pärt,” Journal of the International Society for Orthodox Music 10, no. 1 (2026): 1–16. DOI 10.57050/jisocm.163610. Open access.
    Bouteneff traces how Saints Silouan and Sophrony shaped Arvo Pärt’s setting of Adam’s Lament, from the hymnography of the Expulsion through Silouan’s meditation. Pärt sets only part of the text, shifting its weight toward mourning, yet, Bouteneff argues, follows the emotional shape of Silouan’s text more closely than is usual in his work. Author and pages are confirmed from the DOI registry, the journal’s page being behind a bot check.


  3. Oleh Sokolovskyi, Olha Hordiichuk and Viktoriia Omelchenko (Zhytomyr Ivan Franko State University; Zhytomyr Polytechnic; Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv), “Saint Sophia of Kyiv as a Sacred Space of Religious Memory and National Identity,” Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 46, no. 10 (2026), article 7 (online 30 October 2026). DOI 10.55221/2693-2229.2927.
    Reading the cathedral’s architecture and iconography, the Virgin Orans as “Unshakable Wall” and Kyiv as a new Jerusalem, the authors trace how medieval meanings have been preserved and revived, and argue that in wartime the cathedral works as a symbolic space joining the sacred with national identity and resilience.



This review covers the period 1-7 November 2026.


This text was generated by Claude (Anthropic), Claude Opus 5.5, on 7 November 2026. It has been edited by Orthodox.News. https://claude.ai

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