Weekly Review of Orthodox Church News

A survey of developments in the Eastern Orthodox and Oriental Orthodox Churches worldwide.

25–31 October 2026

Contents

• Correction
• 1. Top Stories of the Week
  • 1.1 Ethiopia — The Holy Synod: 60 Orthodox faithful killed in two attacks in Arsi
  • 1.2 Sinai — The archbishop agrees to sign the deal with Egypt; its text is unpublished
  • 1.3 Ecumenical Patriarchate — Assisi, the Orientale and a “hope” for Halki
• 2. Eastern Orthodox News
  • 2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate / ROCOR — Metropolitan Mark of Berlin on the OCU’s founding; a Phanar monk’s reply
  • 2.2 Patriarchate of Alexandria — Theodoros II in Angola; a new residence in Madagascar
  • 2.3 Patriarchate of Antioch — The Holy Synod at Balamand, 20–24 October
  • 2.4 Jerusalem / Jordan — Karak: three arrested, nine dead
  • 2.5 Russia — Military chaplains and the Church’s abortion figures
    • Russia beyond Moscow — Yekaterinburg: the Church’s social-service and theology conferences
  • 2.6 Ukraine — Rovenky eparchy terminated; Kirill on Oleshky; churches bombed; parish transfers
  • 2.7 Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo — The Church and the change of government
  • 2.8 Romania and Moldova — A bishop for Bălți; Grosu and the two Metropolises
  • 2.9 Bulgaria — Patriarch Daniil answers critics of the Bartholomew visit
  • 2.10 Georgia — The Patriarchate objects to a casino law rushed through Parliament
  • 2.11 Cyprus — A letter reportedly urging priests to leave the Church, and the Tychikos case
    • Explainer — “Walling off” (apoteichisis): a canon, a tradition and a fault line
  • 2.12 Church of Crete — The clergy on violence
  • 2.13 Poland — The autumn Synod: no cremation, a youth day in Gdańsk
  • 2.14 North Macedonia — Ohrid congratulates the Phanar and sends a delegation to Moscow
  • 2.15 Baltic States — Lithuanian church bills judged unconstitutional; Pikk 64
  • 2.16 Finland — Bishops bar clergy from roles in Lutheran same-sex weddings; polarisation
• 3. Oriental Orthodox News
  • 3.1 Ethiopia — A report of 42 churches destroyed in Wollega; the war in the north
  • 3.2 Armenia — The Catholicos’s trial postponed; the Justice Ministry moves against a judge
  • 3.3 Coptic Orthodox Church — A social-services protocol with the Human Fraternity Foundation
• 4. Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora & Mission Fields
  • 4.1 Africa — The Russian Exarchate at the Russia–Africa summit; Putin thanks Madagascar
• 5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations
  • 5.1 WCC — A delegation in Kyiv to examine the OCU’s membership application
  • 5.2 Assisi 2026 — “Basta con le guerre”
  • 5.3 WCC — Orthodox parliamentarians in Geneva; Faith and Order in Sweden
• 6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates
  • 6.1 Background briefing — Crete at ten: a council that took place, and is still being received
  • 6.2 Heads of state as arbiters of jurisdiction: Africa this week
  • 6.3 When governments change: Belgrade, Podgorica, Tbilisi, Chișinău
• 7. New Academic Literature

Correction. The edition of 24 October stated that the Moscow Patriarchate’s diocese in Lithuania had not answered publicly the proposal to transfer church buildings to the Lithuanian Exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In fact, Bishop Ambrose of Trakai held a press conference on 20 October, Metropolitan Innokentiy wrote to the country’s leaders that the proposal breaches the Constitution, and on 23 October five parishes and the Holy Spirit Monastery appealed to the Seimas (OrthoChristian, 23 Oct — English). See §2.15.

1. Top Stories of the Week

1.1 Ethiopia — The Holy Synod: 60 Orthodox faithful killed in two attacks in Arsi

Following the background report of 5 September 2026 on the East Arsi wave of killings, which began on 30 May 2026, and the report of 24 October on the opening of the Holy Synod’s October plenary.

The statement. On Monday 26 October the Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church (EOTC), meeting in plenary in Addis Ababa, issued a statement of condolence and condemnation. It said 60 Orthodox faithful had been killed in two attacks in the Arsi Zone of Oromia. The figures came from the Arsi diocesan office. No group was named as responsible. Addis Standard’s rendering of the Synod’s wording is “extremely tragic cruelty and suffering inflicted on our citizens”. AP renders it as “brutal and merciless massacres”, and OSV News as a “reprehensible, inhumane deed”. According to all three, the Synod said the killings violated the constitutional rights to life and to freedom of religion, and that attacks, displacement and property destruction targeting Orthodox Christians “in Arsi and elsewhere” had escalated. It called on government institutions to condemn the killings publicly, bring those responsible to justice and give legal protection against repeat attacks. It asked the security forces to protect the affected communities “until the problem is resolved” and to take preventive measures. The Synod announced that it would arrange a meeting with senior government officials. A prayer of absolution (Tselote Fethat) was held on 26 October at the Menbere Patriarch Kidiste Kidusan Maryam monastery, and all EOTC churches and monasteries worldwide were directed to pray for the dead after the liturgy on Tuesday 27 October. ACI Africa quotes the statement as calling the attacks “entirely unacceptable under the teachings of any religion and … incompatible with the human rights of all people” (EWTN News/ACI Africa, 27 Oct — English). (Addis Standard via AllAfrica, 26/27 Oct — English; AP via News4Jax, 27 Oct — English; OSV News via The Leaven, 27 Oct — English)

Note on the text. The Amharic original was not opened. All quotations above are the outlets’ translations, and they differ in wording. OSV says the statement was read “at the start of the Synod’s plenary assembly” on 26 October. Fana, by contrast, reported the plenary’s formal opening on 23 October (see the edition of 24 October).

The attacks. These are the figures as reported:

Date	Place (Arsi Zone, Oromia)	Killed	Source
20 Oct	Gora Silingo, Angada kebele, Merti woreda	14	Holy Synod (diocesan office). A Merti source told BBC Amharic “more than 15” (per AAGE)
24 Oct	Tereta, Chole and Birbo, Shirka woreda	46	Holy Synod. AAGE says sources range from “40+” to “48+”. EEPA: “at least 48 … and more than 31 wounded” in Chole and Birbo
Both	—	>20 seriously wounded; 20 homes burned	Holy Synod
12–18 Oct (earlier, separate)	Sengo Yaya, Ihela Zenbaba (Shirka); Lalo (Honkolo Wabe)	≥6, including a church servant; a priest seriously injured; 5 abducted	BBC Amharic sources, per AAGE (“reported, under review”)

An eyewitness told BBC Amharic that five of the dead were children. A resident whose 75-year-old father was killed said: “They surrounded us from all four directions.” A church official told the BBC that security forces reached the scene but could not stop the assault. Accounts of the time of the 24 October attack vary: about 5 a.m. on 24 October, about 10 p.m. on 23 October, or the evening of 24 October. According to AAGE, the Chole victims were buried in a single grave at the church of St Raphael. (BBC via The Namibian, 27 Oct — English; AAGE Arsi file, updated 27 Oct — English; EEPA Situation Report 775, 29 Oct, via Martin Plaut — English)

Who is blamed. Oromia regional government spokesperson Hailu Adugna blamed the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and its allies. He accused them of trying to provoke ethnic and religious conflict to divert attention from military losses in the north. AP notes that he presented no evidence. The OLA belongs to the seven-member Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, formed in September, which also includes the TPLF and the Amhara Fano National Movement. AP could not reach the OLA. Its leader, Kumsa Diriba (Jaal Marroo), told AP in February that “our war is not against the people”. AAGE adds that a source linked to the alliance blames the regional authorities instead. The Oromia government said it had begun taking action against those responsible and pledged help to the wounded and displaced. Amnesty International, quoted by AP from a January interview, has documented abuses by both government forces and the OLA. (AP, as above; AAGE, as above)

Arrests of mourners. Borkena, citing BBC Amharic, reports that at least 27 people were arrested in Gobesa, the main town of Shirka woreda, including women carrying infants. It says they were detained while rescuing survivors, recovering bodies or attending funerals, and that at least 13 remained in custody without appearing in court. Local church leaders called the security agents’ claims that the detainees had helped “armed actors” “fabricated pretexts”. Local officials did not answer Borkena’s questions. EEPA separately reports that about 50 people were detained after helping at burials or treating the wounded, “according to witnesses”. (Borkena, 29 Oct — English; EEPA 775, as above) According to AAGE, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission said it was monitoring the 24 October case but had “nothing concrete yet”.

Abroad. Borkena reports, in paraphrase only and without a link or date, a statement by the US House Foreign Affairs Committee calling the killings “unacceptable” and demanding “immediate judicial accountability” (Borkena, 29 Oct — English). The committee’s own text was not found; treat this as unverified.

Standpoints and scale. Borkena is a Toronto-based diaspora outlet whose opinion pages are strongly critical of the government and sympathetic to Amhara and Orthodox causes. The Amhara Association of Genocide Education (AAGE) is an advocacy organisation. Its church-attacks database (last updated 30 October) now counts 44 incidents and waves since 2015 and “1,047+” killed, including “97+” clergy. It says every figure is “a floor, not a ceiling” and that its figures for overlapping events should not be added together. AAGE classes both October entries as “corroborated, under review”. (AAGE church-attacks database — English) For the wider toll, the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO, an NGO) counted 458 killed in East Arsi between September 2021 and June 2026 in a July report; Al Jazeera, citing the same body, gives 432 civilians and 4 militiamen. (Al Jazeera, 27 Oct — English)

Why it matters. This is the largest single toll in the Arsi wave this review has recorded. It is also the first time in this autumn’s plenary that the Synod has spoken in specific terms: it named places, gave a count and made demands of the state. The opening address of 23 October, by contrast, named no conflict. The Oromia killings are separate from the Tigray war and from the church dispute in Tigray.

1.2 Sinai — The archbishop agrees to sign the deal with Egypt; its text is unpublished

Following the report of 24 October on the Greek Standing Synod’s support (22 October) for an out-of-court agreement.

The announcement (24 October, belated pick-up). On Saturday 24 October, the day the Court of Cassation was due to rule, Archbishop Symeon of Sinai issued a statement. It said the brotherhood had reached agreement with the Egyptian state on the monastery’s status and «είναι πλέον έτοιμη να προχωρήσει στην υπογραφή» (“is now ready to proceed to signing”). He will sign «μόλις η κατάσταση της υγείας μου το επιτρέψει» (“as soon as my health allows”), on a date to be fixed with the fathers and the Egyptian government. He said that, with the agreement, «εκλείπει πλέον ο λόγος έκδοσης της απόφασης του Ανώτατου Ακυρωτικού Δικαστηρίου» (“there is no longer reason for the Supreme Court of Cassation to issue its ruling”). He listed the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Patriarchates of Jerusalem and Alexandria, and the Churches of Greece and Cyprus as having backed the signing by patriarchal and synodal letters, and thanked President Sisi. The statement went to Greece’s Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs. (Newsit, 24 Oct — Greek; CNN Greece, 24 Oct — Greek; Proto Thema, Nikos Meletis, 24 Oct — Greek)

Cairo’s version. Egypt’s Foreign Ministry said that Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty had received Symeon’s letter approving the contract “on the monastery and the surrounding lands” and «رحب بالخطاب» (“welcomed the letter”). The ministry presents the contract as implementing «الحكم القضائي الصادر عن محكمة استئناف الإسماعيلية في ٢٥ مايو ٢٠٢٥» (“the ruling of the Ismailia Court of Appeal of 25 May 2025”), with «الالتزام الكامل بالتشريعات الوطنية ذات الصلة» (“full commitment to the relevant national legislation”) and «عدم المساس بالمكانة الروحية والدينية للدير» (“no infringement of the monastery’s spiritual and religious standing”). It says the contract ends all pending cases and that the signing will follow once a ceremony date is set. The sources disagree on the date of the ruling: Symeon gives 28 May 2025 and Cairo 25 May. (Shorouk, 24 Oct — Arabic; Masrawy, 24 Oct — Arabic; TheTOC, 24 Oct — Greek)

The court. A Mada Masr report of 25–26 October is headlined “St. Catherine Monastery’s land ownership lawsuits adjourned after archbishop backs Egypt-Greece deal”. The page could not be opened, so the new hearing date and the party that asked for the adjournment are unverified. (Mada Masr, 26 Oct — English, headline item)

What the deal reportedly contains. The text has not been published. Newsbeast (Georgios Sarris, 26 October) summarises the terms that have been made public:

• Worship sites. Churches, chapels and pilgrimage sites are recognised for the brotherhood’s exclusive use «χωρίς χρονικό περιορισμό και χωρίς οικονομικό αντάλλαγμα» (“without time limit and without payment”). Their use may not change.
• Ownership. There is no recognition of «πλήρους ιδιοκτησίας» (“full ownership”) over all the property.
• Farmland. The Ismailia court assigned these lands to the state. The monastery may seek a lease; «δεν αναγνωρίζεται αυτομάτως ιδιοκτησιακό δικαίωμα» (“no ownership right is automatically recognised”).
• Works. Any construction or repair needs approval from the Egyptian antiquities authorities.
• Internal life. Selection of monks, election of the archbishop and internal administration follow Church rules.
• Residence. Monks receive long-term residence permits.

Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis called it a “historic day” and said it gives the monastery a “solid legal foundation”. (Newsbeast, Georgios Sarris, 26 Oct — Greek; Zawia3, 24 Oct — English)

Athens: government against opposition (25 October).

• The government. In his weekly review, Prime Minister Mitsotakis said the deal secures the monastery’s Greek Orthodox character «στο διηνεκές» (“in perpetuity”). His spokesman, Pavlos Marinakis, said: «Είναι προφανές ότι θα δημοσιοποιηθεί η συμφωνία όταν ολοκληρωθεί» (“It is obvious that the agreement will be published when it is completed”).
• The opposition. PASOK (Dimitris Mantzos), ELAS, SYRIZA (Rena Dourou), Elliniki Lysi (Kyriakos Velopoulos, who links the deal to Greece–Egypt EEZ talks) and Niki (Dimitris Natsios, who alleges «ομαδικό εκβιασμό», “collective blackmail”, of the monks) demand the full text. All ask whether ownership passes to Egypt and the brotherhood is left with use only.
• Karystianou’s notice. Maria Karystianou’s movement “Elpida gia ti Dimokratia” served an extrajudicial notice on 24 October. It went to Mitsotakis, Gerapetritis, Symeon, Patriarchs Bartholomew, Theophilos and Theodoros, Archbishop Ieronymos and Archbishop Georgios of Cyprus. It demands the text, the supporting church letters, and written confirmation that the brotherhood’s General Assembly approved the deal.

(To Vima, Dionysios Skliris, 25 Oct — Greek; Freddo News, 25 Oct — Greek)

Inside the brotherhood. Newsbomb, relayed by Primenews and olympia.gr on 24 October, reported that «τουλάχιστον έξι μέλη της Σιναϊτικής Αδελφότητας φέρονται να αγνοούν το περιεχόμενο» (“at least six members of the Sinaite Brotherhood reportedly do not know the content”) of the text. It also reported that Articles 8 and 14 of the monastery’s Fundamental Regulations require a general assembly, which appears not to have been held. These are press claims; no member of the brotherhood has spoken on the record. Former Archbishop Damianos wrote to Archbishop Ieronymos, as reported on 24 October. In that letter he said the monks were right not to sign and that the monastery had been “sold” to Egypt. Primenews also notes that the Greek Synod issued no public statement after its session of 22 October. (Primenews, 24 Oct — Greek; olympia.gr, 24 Oct — Greek; inewsgr/Newsbreak, 24 Oct — Greek)

Status on 31 October. No signing has been reported. The archbishop’s health governs the timing. In Cyprus, Phileleftheros headlined on 25 October: «Ιστορική συμφωνία για τη Μονή Σινά: Κατοχυρώνεται νομικά η παρουσία της…» (“Historic agreement for the Sinai Monastery: its presence legally secured…”) (Phileleftheros, 25 Oct — Greek, headline item).

1.3 Ecumenical Patriarchate — Assisi, the Orientale and a “hope” for Halki

Following the report of 24 October on Bartholomew’s Angelicum doctorate and his announced meeting with Pope Leo XIV.

The meeting with the Pope took place (24 October; belated pick-up). Fos Fanariou, the pro-Phanar news site, reported that Bartholomew and Pope Leo XIV met at the Vatican on Saturday 24 October. The meeting was “cordial” («εγκάρδια»). Bartholomew wished the Pope «ταχεία και πλήρη αποκατάσταση της υγείας του» (“a swift and full restoration of his health”) after his recent surgery, and the Pope «ευχαρίστησε τον Παναγιώτατο για τις ευχές και το ειλικρινές ενδιαφέρον του» (“thanked His All-Holiness for his wishes and sincere concern”). The two then discussed, unspecified, “matters that strongly concern their Churches and all of humanity”. (Fos Fanariou, 24 Oct — Greek)

Loreto (26 October). On the feast of St Demetrios, Bartholomew presided at Orthros and, in the evening, at the Akathist Hymn in the Basilica of the Holy House at Loreto. The Archbishop-Prelate and Papal Delegate, Fabio Dal Cin, had invited him. He consecrated a copy of a Byzantine icon of the Theotokos, which will stay at the shrine, where an Orthodox Liturgy is celebrated once a month. His homily, in Italian, set the tone for the week: «Non siamo qui per dimenticare ciò che ancora ci separa» (“We are not here to forget what still separates us”), but to pray together towards «quella piena unità per la quale il Signore stesso ha pregato» (“that full unity for which the Lord himself prayed”). Vatican News headlined the visit as a “spiritual bridge between East and West”. (Fos Fanariou, 27 Oct — Greek/Italian; Vatican News, 26 Oct — Italian, headline item)

Assisi (27 October): two speeches. At Sant’Egidio’s international meeting, forty years after John Paul II’s 1986 gathering, Bartholomew spoke twice. The Pope, who had cancelled his own Assisi visit on 23 October, sent a video message («Solo la pace è santa», “Only peace is holy”).

• The forum address (French), «Le Patriarcat œcuménique : de l’Orient au monde globalisé», was given alongside Cardinal Jean-Marc Aveline of Marseille and Andrea Riccardi, the founder of Sant’Egidio. Its operative lines are on religion and violence. He recalled the 1994 Bosphorus Declaration, «un crime commis au nom de la religion est un crime contre la religion» (“a crime committed in the name of religion is a crime against religion”), and added: «Invoquer le nom de Dieu pour justifier le meurtre constitue, aux yeux de l’Église, un véritable blasphème» (“To invoke the name of God to justify murder is, in the eyes of the Church, a true blasphemy”). He spoke of «le retour de la guerre en Europe et dans les Balkans» (“the return of war to Europe and the Balkans”), of those «qui persécutent aujourd’hui des chrétiens au Moyen-Orient, en Afrique ou ailleurs» (“who today persecute Christians in the Middle East, in Africa or elsewhere”), and of the Church’s duty to be present «là où s’élèvent de nouveaux murs de séparation» (“where new walls of separation are rising”). On Rome he said: «Lorsque, par Son illumination, l’unité dans la foi sera rétablie, nous nous trouverons en pleine communion» (“When, by His illumination, unity in faith is restored, we shall find ourselves in full communion”).
• The homily (Italian), in the Basilica of St Francis on Revelation 7:13–17, asked for «la grazia di un cuore disarmato» (“the grace of a disarmed heart”) and admitted: «non ci siamo impegnati a sufficienza per non fare emergere nuovi nazionalismi» (“we have not worked hard enough to stop new nationalisms from emerging”).
• What he did not say. Neither text names Russia, Ukraine, the “Russian World” or Moscow. This contrasts with the explicit language of the Books’ Journal interview and the 22 October anniversary address (§2.1 of 24 October). The sentence on blasphemy is general, but it is the same charge, that war has been sacralised, that the interview made against “church figures in Russia”. Vatican News quotes him: «La Chiesa ortodossa non abbandonerà la speranza dell’unità» (“The Orthodox Church will not abandon the hope of unity”) and «ciò che ci unisce è più antico di ciò che ci separa» (“what unites us is older than what separates us”). Riccardi quoted an earlier remark of Bartholomew’s, «Noi non vogliamo diventare uno Stato» (“We do not want to become a State”).

(Fos Fanariou, 28 Oct — French/Italian texts; Vatican News, Guglielmo Gallone, 27 Oct — Italian)

Rome, 28 October: Pope Francis’s tomb and the Orientale. In the morning Bartholomew laid flowers at Pope Francis’s tomb in Santa Maria Maggiore, where Cardinal Rolandas Makrickas received him, and prayed before the Salus Populi Romani. He then walked to the Pontifical Oriental Institute, where he studied canon law (coursework to 1966, doctorate defended December 1968). He was received by the Institute’s president, Fr Sunny Thomas Kokkaravalayil. His lecture, “From the Orientale to the Throne of St Andrew: A Canonist’s Confession”, fell on the anniversary of the Paul VI–Athenagoras Common Declaration (28 October 1967). In it he proposed a “juridical ecumenism” and said: “A canonist without theology becomes a bureaucrat. A theologian without law becomes a dreamer.” On Rome: “We pray that our two sister Churches, bound by so many shared canons, may one day share again the one Cup.” He left for Constantinople in the early afternoon. (Fos Fanariou, 28 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 28 Oct — English)

Halki. The news in the lecture concerned the Theological School of Halki, closed since 1971. Bartholomew said: “Today we can speak not only of a wound but also of a hope.” Orthodox Times reports him as calling recent talks with the Turkish authorities, the Ministry of National Education and the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), encouraging. He set out how canon law should be taught at a reopened Halki, open to students from all Orthodox Churches and other Christian traditions. He gave no date for a reopening, and no Turkish source was found confirming the talks. (Orthodox Times, 28 Oct — English)

Ankara, 29 October. The day after returning, Bartholomew flew to Ankara with Metropolitan Emmanuel of Chalcedon for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s official dinner at the Beştepe Presidential Palace, marking the 103rd anniversary of the Republic. Fos Fanariou says he had «φιλικήν αναστροφήν» (“a friendly exchange”) with the President and his aides. He also visited Metropolitan Gregorios of Ankara, where the Papal Nuncio was among the guests at lunch, and called on Rifat Hisarcıklıoğlu, president of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey. Neither Fos Fanariou nor Orthodox Times mentions Halki in connection with the dinner, and no remarks are quoted. Coming hours after the Rome remark on Halki, the dinner is the context in which any Turkish move would be read; on the evidence available, nothing was announced. (Fos Fanariou, 30 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 30 Oct — Greek, headline item)

2. Eastern Orthodox News

2.1 Ecumenical Patriarchate / ROCOR — Metropolitan Mark of Berlin on the founding of the OCU, and a Phanar monk’s reply

Mark’s statement. In October 2026 Metropolitan Mark of Berlin and Germany, the senior hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR, part of the Moscow Patriarchate) in Germany, issued a «Stellungnahme» (“statement”) “in connection with the publication of new documents on the founding of the OCU”. The statement is signed «Oktober 2026». The diocese’s magazine Der Bote posted it on 30 October. It reacts to «kürzlich ans Licht gekommenen Informationen» (“recently revealed information”) about the “so-called Unification Council” of 15 December 2018, which founded the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU). It refers in particular to «das angebliche interne Dokument des Phanar» (“the alleged internal document of the Phanar”). Mark does not say who published the document or what it contains, and he qualifies his reading with «wenn sie stimmen» (“if they are accurate”). The document itself has not been seen here, and its provenance and authenticity have not been established.

His argument, in his own words where it matters:

• Origins. President Petro Poroshenko had asked the Ecumenical Patriarch «eine regierungstreue autokephale Ukrainische Kirche zu schaffen» (“to create a government-loyal autocephalous Ukrainian Church”). Bartholomew then reclaimed the authority over Kyiv that his predecessors had ceded to Moscow «im 17. Jh.» (“in the 17th century”). He issued a Tomos «ohne die anderen orthodoxen Patriarchate, einschließlich der russischen Mutterkirche, zu befragen oder einzubeziehen» (“without consulting or involving the other Orthodox Patriarchates, including the Russian mother Church”).
• The recipients. The Tomos went not to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) under Metropolitan Onuphry but to a body merged from the Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC, whose ordinations Mark considers doubtful.
• The Tomos itself. It subordinates the new Church to the Phanar, «indem der Ökumenische Patriarch sich als „Garant des Statuts” festschreiben lässt» (“by having the Ecumenical Patriarch written in as ‘guarantor of the statute'”). He also mocks the Phanar’s claim to «als „Mutterkirche” die Ukrainische Orthodoxe Kirche „belehren”» (“‘instruct’ the Ukrainian Orthodox Church as ‘mother Church'”).
• Coercion. Western political forces, he says, pushed the Phanar «wider Gewissen, (Kirchen-)Recht und Verstand zu handeln» (“to act against conscience, (church) law and reason”); and «Im Recht gilt, dass Entscheidungen, die unter Zwang getroffen wurden, ungültig sind» (“In law, decisions taken under coercion are invalid”).
• The OCU. It has few active faithful and almost no monasticism, but «diverse Schlägertrupps, die ihr bei der Enteignung von fremdem Kircheneigentum helfen» (“various gangs of thugs who help it expropriate other people’s church property”). «Sie hat sich als rein politisches Konstrukt erwiesen» (“It has proved to be a purely political construct”).
• Conclusion. Mark hopes that Bartholomew «von seiner Position vielleicht doch noch abrückt» (“may yet move away from his position”).

(Der Bote, ROCOR Diocese of Berlin and Germany, 30 Oct — German)

These are Mark’s claims. The canonical status of the OCU is contested: Constantinople, Alexandria, Greece and Cyprus recognise it, and Moscow and several other Churches do not (see the edition of 24 October). Mark’s account of property seizures is the UOC’s and Moscow’s account of the parish transfers reported in §2.6. Ukrainian authorities and the OCU describe the same transfers as votes by communities.

The Phanar monk’s reply. On 27 October Fos Fanariou printed a rebuttal by Hieromonk Nikitas Pantokratorinos, who had answered Metropolitan Luka of Zaporizhzhia on 20 October (§2.1 of 24 October). It is addressed to Mark’s “recent statements”, which it neither dates nor links. Its date, three days before Der Bote‘s posting, suggests that the statement was circulating earlier; when and where it first appeared was not established. Pantokratorinos’s summary of Mark’s points matches the published statement on coercion, on the canonicity of the Tomos and on the 17th-century transfer. The rebuttal turns each point back:

• Coercion. If coercion invalidates, the 1589 recognition of the Moscow Patriarchate by Jeremiah II, also obtained under pressure, falls too: «Δεν είναι δυνατόν η πολιτική παρέμβαση να θεωρείται καταδικαστέα όταν αφορά την Ουκρανία» (“Political intervention cannot be condemnable only when it concerns Ukraine”).
• Mother Church. «Μητέρα Εκκλησία της Ουκρανίας είναι η Κωνσταντινούπολη και όχι η Μόσχα» (“The Mother Church of Ukraine is Constantinople, not Moscow”).
• 1686. The act of 1686, he argues, only allowed Moscow to ordain the Metropolitan of Kyiv, on conditions that included commemoration of the Ecumenical Patriarch.
• Conclusion. The autocephaly is «μια πράξη τετελεσμένη» (“a fait accompli”).

The rebuttal, as read for this edition, does not address the “internal document” that occasioned Mark’s statement. Both texts are statements of position, not synodal acts: one by a ruling hierarch of ROCOR, the other by a monk writing in the Phanar’s orbit. (Fos Fanariou, Nikitas Pantokratorinos, 27 Oct — Greek; opinion)

2.2 Patriarchate of Alexandria — Theodoros II in Angola; a new residence in Madagascar

On Tuesday 27 October in Luanda, Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria met President João Lourenço. He set out plans for «την οργάνωση» (“organising”) and consolidating the Orthodox presence in Angola: missionary work, education, philanthropy and humanitarian projects, so that the Church could stand by the Angolan people «χωρίς διακρίσεις και αποκλεισμούς» (“without discrimination or exclusion”). Lourenço was positive about the proposals and said he plans an official visit to Egypt. The Patriarch thanked President Sisi and the Greek government for their support, and conferred the Grand Cross of St Mark on Lourenço. On 29 October he celebrated the liturgy in Greek and Portuguese in the chapel of Greece’s honorary consulate in Luanda, before the small Greek community, a representative of the Angolan government, the Roman Catholic bishop and local catechumens. Theodoros was earlier Metropolitan of Zimbabwe and Angola. Neither report mentions legal registration or the Russian Church. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 27/28 Oct; 30 Oct — Greek)

The parallel presence. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarchate has been in Luanda since May 2026 (see the edition of 23 May). On 25 October its parish of Blessed Augustine held a liturgy in Portuguese and Church Slavonic under Fr Serafim Tony, who was trained and ordained in Russia (Exarchate, 26 Oct — Russian). On 29 October Orthodoxia News Agency reported that the residence of Alexandria’s Diocese of Mahajanga and Northern Madagascar had been completed (headline item: ONA, 29 Oct — Greek). That was the day before Putin thanked Madagascar’s leader for the Russian registration. In both countries this week, both jurisdictions dealt directly with heads of state.

2.3 Patriarchate of Antioch — The Holy Synod at Balamand, 20–24 October

A belated report on the session held 20–24 October.

Session and setting. The Holy Synod of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch held its 16th ordinary session («الدورة العاديّة السادسة عشرة للمجمع الأنطاكيّ المقدّس») from Tuesday 20 to Saturday 24 October 2026 at the Patriarchal Monastery of Our Lady of Balamand (North Lebanon), under Patriarch John X. Metropolitans attended «من الوطن ومن بلاد الانتشار» (“from the homeland and from the lands of the diaspora”); no source opened lists anyone absent. Metropolitan Antonios (al-Souri) of Zahle and Baalbek announced the opening in the Patriarch’s name. The “16th” is not unique. The Synod’s “16th extraordinary session” was held in April 2023; the statement abouna.org carries under that title dates from 25 April 2023 and dealt with the kidnapped Aleppo bishops, the earthquake and Ukraine. (Lebanon24, 20 Oct — Arabic; ONA, 20 Oct — Greek; abouna.org, 25 Apr 2023 — Arabic)

The agenda as announced. Metropolitan Antonios listed:

• reports from the archdioceses at home and abroad;
• Antiochian identity, theological education and the role of the Orthodox episcopal assemblies in the diaspora;
• youth, priestly and monastic vocations, and Christian education (including a possible unifying youth gathering);
• updating the regulations on parish councils, personal status and the administration of endowments;
• a retirement and health-insurance scheme for priests;
• unification of liturgical texts and causes for new saints;
• media and digital outreach;
• general Orthodox and ecumenical affairs, including theological dialogue;
• Lebanon and Syria, coexistence with Muslims, and support for the people of south Lebanon.
  (Lebanon24, 20 Oct — Arabic)

John X’s opening address (20 October). The Patriarchate published an official English text, and Annahar printed the Arabic. Its main lines:

• On governments and the Church. “Everyone asks the Church for everything when governments fail in so many things… We are neither wonderworkers nor do we surrender.” In Arabic: «لسنا صنّاع عجائب ولسنا مستسلمين في آن معاً».
• On presence in the East. “Our presence in this East is not transient” («وجودنا في هذا الشرق ليس قضيةً عابرة»).
• On politics. The Church speaks “the word of truth in matters that unite the nation” while avoiding “the political corridors that divide it”.
• On proselytism. He calls for «نبذ الاقتناص الذي يشاهد هنا وهناك تحت حجج البشارة والمساعدات الإنسانية» (“rejecting the proselytism seen here and there under the pretexts of evangelisation and humanitarian aid”). He names no one.
• On ethnic identity. He rejects «المنطق الإثني المنغلق» (“closed ethnic logic”).
• On the diaspora. The Church of Antioch is «واحدة موحّدة وطناً وانتشاراً» (“one and united, in homeland and diaspora”), and the archdioceses abroad are “an extension” of the Mother See.
• On southern Turkey. The Church does not forget its presence in «طرسوس وأضنة ومرسين وكيليكيا» (“Tarsus, Adana, Mersin and Cilicia”).
• On conciliarity. «المجمعية ليست طقوساً جامدة» (“conciliarity is not rigid ritual”).

The address does not mention Ukraine, Moscow, Constantinople, Qatar, Jerusalem or Karak. (Patriarchate of Antioch, Facebook, 20 Oct — English; Annahar, 21 Oct — Arabic; Al-Dostor, 21 Oct — Arabic)

Day 2 (21 October): Baabda. In the morning the Synod called on President Joseph Aoun at Baabda. Lebanese press accounts of the meeting, published the same day, give the Patriarch’s words:

• «نعول على حكمتكم في لم شمل اللبنانيين» (“we rely on your wisdom to bring the Lebanese together”);
• «لبنان أولاً وآخراً» (“Lebanon first and last”);
• a call for «وقف آلة الحرب التي تستهدف لبنان كله» (“halting the war machine that targets all of Lebanon”);
• «عودة المهجرين وتحقيق الانسحاب الاسرائيلي الكامل» (“the return of the displaced and full Israeli withdrawal”);
• and, of Christians in Lebanon, «نحن باقون فيه بقاء الأرز» (“we remain in it as the cedars remain”).

Aoun replied:

• «أنا رئيس جمهورية لبنان ولست رئيس جمهورية للموارنة او للمسلمين» (“I am President of Lebanon, not president of the Maronites or of the Muslims”);
• wars «لا يمكن ان تنتهي إلا عبر التفاوض والحوار» (“can only end through negotiation and dialogue”);
• «الهدف الاساسي من التفاوض هو تحقيق الانسحاب الاسرائيلي من الاراضي المحتلة» (“the main aim of negotiation is Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories”);
• he contrasted «فئة متمسكة بالحرب» (“a faction clinging to war”) with those who chose negotiation.

Neither account mentions weapons or Syria. In the afternoon, metropolitans reported on their archdioceses; ONA names none of them. (Safir al-Chamal, 21 Oct — Arabic; Al-Hadeel, 21 Oct — Arabic; ONA, 21 Oct — Greek)

Day 3 (22 October). The session discussed general Orthodox questions and “recent developments in the Orthodox world” with Archpriest Porphyrios Georgi and Dr Michel Abs, Secretary General of the Middle East Council of Churches. ONA does not say which developments. The Synod also examined «το ζήτημα της βιοποριστικής μέριμνας για τον κλήρο» (“the question of provision for the clergy’s livelihood”). No outcome is reported. (ONA, 22 Oct — Greek)

Day 5 (24 October): the closing statement. Lebanon24 reported the statement of the final day («في يومها الخامس والأخير», “on its fifth and final day”). The guests were Deputy Speaker Elias Bou Saab, MPs Ghassan Hasbani, Fadi Karam, George Atallah, Melhem Khalaf, Adib Abdel Massih, Sajee Attieh and Elias Estephan, and the President of the University of Balamand, Dr Elias Warrak. The operative sentences:

• «تعزيز الحوار والتعاون بين المرجعيات الروحية والقيادات السياسية» (“strengthening dialogue and cooperation between spiritual authorities and political leaders”);
• «معتبرين أن الهوية الوطنية فعل انتماء ووفاء ومسؤولية مشتركة تجاه الله والوطن والإنسان» (“considering national identity an act of belonging, loyalty and shared responsibility towards God, homeland and humanity”);
• «مشيرين إلى تراجع قوة القانون أمام منطق العنف، وطغيان شريعة الغاب على المبادئ الدستورية» (“pointing to the retreat of the force of law before the logic of violence, and the law of the jungle overriding constitutional principles”);
• «كما أكدوا على ضرورة مواجهة العنف بكل أشكاله وضرورة حصر السلاح بيد الدولة» (“they also stressed the need to confront violence in all its forms and the need to confine weapons to the hands of the State”). This is the formula used in the Lebanese debate over the disarmament of non-state groups. The text names no party.
• «وطالبوا بقضاء عادل ومستقل» (“and they demanded a fair and independent judiciary”).

The statement says the Christian presence in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Jordan «لا يزال يواجه تحديات كبيرة» (“still faces great challenges”). It says these are not only military but social, political and economic, especially livelihoods, «بالتوازي مع استمرار هجرة العائلات والشباب والكفاءات، وتراجع معدلات الولادة» (“alongside the continuing emigration of families, young people and skilled people, and falling birth rates”). It describes the Church as having remained «حاضنةً جامعةً لرعاياها، وجسرًا للتواصل بينها وبين محيطها» (“an embracing home for its faithful and a bridge between them and their surroundings”). The fathers pledged support for the Patriarch’s national and ecclesial positions. (Lebanon24, 24 Oct — Arabic; ONA, 24 Oct — Greek)

The pastoral message (published 26 October). The Synod also issued a pastoral letter. It opens «في ختام الدورة السادسة عشرة للمجمع الأنطاكي المقدس، نتوجه إليكم بكلمات تعزية ورجاء» (“At the close of the 16th session of the Holy Antiochian Synod, we address you with words of consolation and hope”). It thanks clergy, laity, volunteers and youth working in parishes, social services, health and education, and admits that needs often exceed resources. It compares pastoral care to «عمل الطبيب الذي يواجه أمراضا مزمنة» (“the work of a doctor facing chronic illnesses”), who must also deal with emergencies and set priorities. It remembers «الذين اضطروا إلى الرحيل وبدء حياة جديدة» (“those who were forced to leave and begin a new life”), and it cites Galatians 6:2 («احملوا بعضكم أثقال بعض», “bear one another’s burdens”). (Safir al-Chamal, 26 Oct — Arabic; also Lebanon24 — Arabic, headline item)

What the record does not show. No source opened reports any of the following:

• an election or transfer of bishops;
• a decision on the Tarsus–Adana–Alexandretta diocese;
• an outcome on personal-status law, the parish-council regulations, or the clergy pension and health scheme;
• any disciplinary act.

Neither the closing statement nor the message mentions:

• the Karak attack of 23 October (Jordan is in the Jerusalem Patriarchate’s jurisdiction);
• Gaza by name;
• Qatar, Ukraine, Moscow’s rebaptism guidelines of 22 October, or the Synaxis of 30 November.

2.4 Jerusalem / Jordan — Karak: three arrested, nine dead

Following the report of 24 October on the attack at St George’s, Hamoud (Karak), on 23 October.

The toll. The figure rose from 7 (evening of 23 October) to 8 (Health Minister, 24 October). It reached 9 when a wounded man died at Prince Ali Military Hospital later on 24 October. At the funeral Prime Minister Jafar Hassan named nine victims. At the Interior Ministry’s press conference on 26 October, officials gave 9 dead and 34 wounded. The Church of Cyprus’s communiqué of 27 October gives eight, the figure of 24 October; Cyprus Mail and the Jerusalem Patriarchate give nine. (Jo24, 26 Oct — Arabic; Roya News, 26 Oct — Arabic; Jerusalem Patriarchate, 25 Oct — English)

The funeral (25 October). Patriarch Theophilos III led the funeral at noon on Sunday 25 October beside the church. Latin Patriarch Pierbattista Pizzaballa attended, and a large crowd came from across denominations and faiths. Security personnel carried the coffins, draped in Jordanian flags. The victims were buried together opposite the church, where a memorial will be built. PM Hassan attended on the King’s behalf; the Crown Prince and Queen Rania offered condolences. The Minister of Local Administration ordered that a street in each municipality be named after a victim. Afterwards Theophilos visited the wounded at Prince Ali bin al-Hussein Military Hospital and the Italian Hospital, accompanied by Metropolitan Isychios. The Patriarchate’s report carries no direct quotation from him. (Jerusalem Patriarchate, 25 Oct — English; Jo24, 25 Oct — Arabic; Jo24, 26 Oct — Arabic)

The arrests (26 October). At 05:30 on Monday 26 October the Public Security Directorate announced «إلقاء القبض على الإرهابيين الثلاثة الذين نفذوا الهجوم على كنيسة حمود» (“the arrest of the three terrorists who carried out the attack on Hamoud church”). The raid followed a stand-off of about three hours at an abandoned house in al-Jadida village, some 4.7 km from Hamoud. The men refused to surrender and fired on the security force. All three were wounded; no security personnel were hurt. A government source told Al Jazeera that one was brain-dead. Weapons and a large quantity of ammunition were seized. At the press conference, Public Security Director Maj. Gen. Obeidallah al-Maaytah gave the three names: two brothers and their brother-in-law, all Jordanian. He also said there was «عدم وجود تخطيط مسبق» (“no prior planning”) for the attack. (Jo24, 26 Oct — Arabic; Roya News, 26 Oct — Arabic; Al-Araby al-Aseel, 28 Oct — Arabic)

Motive and links. Interior Minister Mazen al-Farrayeh said there were as yet no indications of links abroad. He said the government is reviewing the conditions that push young people towards extremism. According to Al Jazeera Net (Mohammad al-Tarawneh, 27 October), one of the brothers had served about six years on charges that included conspiracy to commit terrorism and promoting the ideas of the Islamic State, and was released earlier this year. The paper adds that it is unclear whether the men had outside help, because their injuries had so far prevented full interrogation. No group has claimed the attack. No charges or court referral have been announced. (Al Jazeera Net, Mohammad al-Tarawneh, 27 Oct — Arabic; Jo24, 26 Oct — Arabic)

2.5 Russia — Military chaplains and the Church’s abortion figures

• Military clergy and a drone detector. On 30 October RIA Novosti quoted Priest Georgy Shabalov, acting head of the press sector of the Synodal Department for Cooperation with the Armed Forces: «Каждый военный священник сегодня, отправляющийся на передовую, с собой имеет это необходимое приспособление» (“Every military priest going to the front today takes this essential device with him”). The device is the “Nabat v3”, a passive detector that picks up the radio and video signals of drones and unmanned boats, and so warns of an approaching drone at a range of up to 2 km. It was shown at a training gathering of military clergy on 28 October. Shabalov also claimed that the device «было разработано и усовершенствовано нашими священнослужителями» (“was developed and improved by our clergy”); RIA adds that these clergy used their engineering skills and built it “on the basis of a parish”. That claim is not corroborated. Russian technology reports from the summer name the maker as GoDrone, a resident of the Centre for Unmanned Systems and Technologies, which tested the device in August. They make no mention of a church connection. (RIA Novosti, 30 Oct — Russian; state agency; Hi-Tech Mail.ru, 4 Aug — Russian) The device is real and in use at the front; what the Church’s own spokesman asserts is its clerical origin. The pro-OCU Religionpravda, citing the Ukrainian outlet Ostrov, reports that the Moscow Patriarchate’s military department described an «повітряний хресний хід» (“aerial procession of the cross”) with relics of St George over the Kupiansk and Lyman sectors. The flight is undated, and no Russian source was opened. (Religionpravda, 30 Oct — Ukrainian)
• “Traditional values”: the abortion campaign. Archpriest Fyodor Lukyanov, chairman of the Patriarchal Commission on the Family, told RIA on 29 October: «Тысяча пятьсот три частные клиники уже отказались от абортов, это 53% от общего числа частных клиник в стране» (“1,503 private clinics have already given up abortions, which is 53% of all private clinics in the country”). He said 19 regions now have no abortions in private clinics, among them Vologda, Kursk, Sverdlovsk, Crimea, Sevastopol, Tuva, Chukotka and Zabaykalsky krai. He also said 32 federal subjects have adopted laws banning “inducement” to abortion. These are the Church’s figures and were not independently checked. The occupied Crimea and Sevastopol are counted as Russian regions. (RIA Novosti, 29 Oct — Russian; state agency)

Russia beyond Moscow — Yekaterinburg: the Church’s social-service and theology conferences

The XVII Interregional Conference on Church Social Service met in Yekaterinburg from 27 to 30 October “with the blessing of Patriarch Kirill”. It was organised by the Synodal Department for Charity, the Yekaterinburg eparchy and the eparchy’s Orthodox Mercy Service. Participants included heads of diocesan social departments, sisters of mercy and staff who help men returning from the front. The plenary on 28 October (theme: «Главные препятствия в социальной деятельности — и как их преодолеть», “The main obstacles in social work and how to overcome them”) was opened by Metropolitan Evgeny of Yekaterinburg, with Archpriest Mikhail Potokin, chairman of the Synodal Department, and the regional Minister of Social Policy Andrei Zlokozov. Zlokozov described Church–state relations in the region as «синергия» (“synergy”). Participants came from the Urals Federal District, Moscow, the Far East, Donbas and the “new territories”, as the eparchy calls Russian-occupied Ukraine. (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 28 Oct — Russian)

Concrete items reported:

• A national database and interactive map of verified church social projects, «Церковь помогает» (“The Church Helps”), funded through the Presidential Grants Fund project “Professionals Nearby 2.0” (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 30 Oct — Russian).
• The Yekaterinburg shelter “Teplyi Priem”, where veterans of the “special military operation” work in a leather workshop.
• The eparchy’s medical department for clergy, set up in autumn 2024: 97 check-ups in its first year and 50 in its second, with current funding for 160 a year.
• The “Keys” exam-tutoring project: 40 centres in 21 regions and nearly 2,000 children this year (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 28 Oct — Russian).
• The Nadezhda Monetova prize for work with the homeless, awarded to Nun Marfa (Guskova) of the Minsk St Elisabeth Convent (Belarusian Exarchate).

Alongside it, on 29–30 October, the Missionary Institute and the Yekaterinburg Seminary held the 7th all-Russian conference “Theology in the Scientific and Educational Space”, with participants from Moscow, St Petersburg, Kazan, Surgut, Tobolsk and Khabarovsk, among other cities. It opened at the state historical park “Russia – My History”. A round table dealt with the new school course «Духовно-нравственная культура России» (ДНКР, “Spiritual and Moral Culture of Russia”), which replaces the former “Foundations of the Spiritual and Moral Culture of the Peoples of Russia”. A plenary speaker was Pavel Suslonov of the regional Department of Internal Policy, speaking on “the truth of Orthodoxy and its mission in a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional society”. (Yekaterinburg eparchy, 29 Oct — Russian) The Yekaterinburg eparchy is the source for both conferences, and its regional-government partners appear on its platform. No independent secular coverage was found.

2.6 Ukraine — Rovenky eparchy terminated; Kirill on Oleshky; churches bombed; parish transfers

A court terminates the UOC’s Rovenky eparchy; the Kyiv Metropolia appeal still has no date

Belated pick-up (decision of 21 October, reported 24–26 October; not in the edition of 24 October). Following the report of 5 September on the DESS suit. On 21 October 2026 the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal (Kyiv) granted the suit of the State Service for Ethnopolitics and Freedom of Conscience (DESS) to terminate the religious organisation «Управління Ровеньківської єпархії Української Православної Церкви» (“Administration of the Rovenky Eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”), registered in 2013 in Rovenky, Luhansk region, which is under Russian occupation. DESS’s own notice of 22 October gives the case as No. 855/11/26 and calls it «завершення розгляду справи шляхом ухвалення рішення» (“completion of the case by adoption of a decision”). This identifies the “case completed by decision” notice carried forward from last week. RISU quotes the operative line «Шостий апеляційний адміністративний суд припинив діяльність релігійної організації» (“The Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal terminated the activity of the religious organisation”). It adds that the claims were dismissed «в іншій частині» (“in the remaining part”) without saying which part. It is therefore not clear whether the court granted DESS’s request to transfer the eparchy’s property, funds and other assets to the state, “except property of religious use”. The decision can be appealed by cassation to the Cassation Administrative Court of the Supreme Court within twenty days of publication. (DESS, 22 Oct — Ukrainian; RISU, 24 Oct — Ukrainian; Religionpravda, 26 Oct — Ukrainian)

Which legal route this is. Three routes now run side by side, and it matters which one each case follows.

• Affiliation finding, then prescription. DESS examines a body and finds “signs of affiliation” with the Russian Orthodox Church. It then issues a prescription (припис) to cut the ties, and goes to court only if the body does not comply. This is the route for Korets, the Holosiiv Hermitage, Pochaiv, Zaporizhzhia and Balta.
• Derivation. A body is found affiliated because it forms part of the already-affiliated Kyiv Metropolis. This was the reasoning used for Balta last week.
• Conviction-based termination suit. Rovenky follows this third route, with no affiliation finding and no prescription. DESS sued directly «у зв’язку із засудженням уповноваженої особи організації» (“in connection with the conviction of the organisation’s authorised person”) under Art. 111-2(1) of the Criminal Code (collaboration: aiding the aggressor state).

According to Religionpravda (pro-OCU), Moscow’s Synod placed the Rovenky eparchy under the Patriarch’s direct jurisdiction in October 2022, which gives the case a different factual setting from eparchies in government-held territory. The judgment text was not found in the court register in this window. RISU’s article also once misnames the body as an “ПЦУ” (OCU) eparchy, which is a slip.

The Kyiv Metropolia appeal: still no date. Following the report of 24 October. The Supreme Court’s notice of 20 October remains the latest act. It says the appeals of the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra and of the UOC and its Kyiv Metropolis (proceedings A/990/21/26 and A/990/22/26) against the Sixth Administrative Court of Appeal’s ruling of 23 July were admitted by a ruling of 15 October 2026 for written proceedings. No decision date is given. The notice also numbers the case inconsistently: «№ 855/11/26» in its title and «№855/11/25» in its body. Since DESS uses 855/11/26 for Rovenky, 855/11/25 is very probably correct for the Metropolia, but that is an inference. (Supreme Court, 20 Oct — Ukrainian)

Oleshky: a humanitarian truce, and Patriarch Kirill blames “Ukrainian mines”

The setting. Oleshky (Russian: Aleshki) lies on the occupied left bank of the Dnipro, across from Kherson. It has been cut off from supplies of food, medicine and water. Novaya Gazeta cites about 2,000 residents still in the town. A “regime of silence” (ceasefire) on the Kherson front took effect at 04:00 Moscow time on 27 October. The White House announced it on 23 October, and the Russian ombudsman Yana Lantratova says it is run jointly with her Ukrainian counterpart Dmytro Lubinets, with Melania Trump mediating. Peskov said it could become «прецедентом для других участков» (“a precedent for other sectors”). According to RISU, the truce runs to the evening of 1 November, and evacuees going to Ukraine would travel via Anapa and a Russian military flight to Homel (Belarus). (Novaya Gazeta, 27 Oct — Russian; RISU, 30 Oct — Ukrainian) On 25 September the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and the WCC had appealed for an end to the “humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky” (WCC, 25 Sep — background). A Novaya Gazeta headline of 16 October reports that Pope Leo XIV urged Putin to cease fire and allow the evacuation (headline item).

Kirill’s address. On 29 October Patriarch Kirill issued an «Обращение… по случаю начала гуманитарной операции в Алешках Херсонской области» (“Address… on the start of the humanitarian operation in Aleshki, Kherson region”). As quoted by RIA Novosti, he said that «весь город буквально усеян украинскими минами и взрывными устройствами» (“the whole city is literally strewn with Ukrainian mines and explosive devices”). He said Russian servicemen «делают все возможное, чтобы обеспечить безопасность жителей» (“are doing everything possible to ensure the residents’ safety”), and that Moscow Patriarchate clergy and the Patriarchal humanitarian mission are delivering aid kits. He named «супруга президента Соединенных Штатов Америки госпожа Мелания Трамп» (“the wife of the President of the United States, Mrs Melania Trump”) among the mission’s participants: «С тревогой наблюдаю за происходящим и молюсь Христу Спасителю» (“I watch what is happening with anxiety and pray to Christ the Saviour”). (Patriarchia.ru, 29 Oct — Russian, body not machine-readable, title only; RIA Novosti, 29 Oct — Russian; state agency) On 30 October an unnamed church source told RIA that Moscow Patriarchate representatives were in the convoy that set out that morning. They included Metropolitan Kirill of Stavropol and Bishop Iosif, styled “of Skadovsk and Aleshki”, a title that places the occupied town in a Moscow Patriarchate see (RIA Novosti, 30 Oct — Russian; single anonymous source).

The Ukrainian reading. RISU headlined the address «Кирил (Гундяєв) у катастрофі в Олешках звинуватив українців» (“Kirill (Gundyaev) blamed Ukrainians for the catastrophe in Oleshky”). The pro-OCU Religionpravda wrote that the Patriarch had “finally noticed” the disaster, and noted that this was his first public word on it. Both present the mine claim as Kirill’s assertion, not established fact, and so does this review. (Religionpravda, 30 Oct — Ukrainian)

Bombs on churches in Slovyansk, Kherson and Kharkiv region

• Slovyansk (Donetsk region), 28 October. OCU priest Vitaliy Danchak reports that the OCU church of St Andrew the First-Called in the city centre was damaged when «Російські війська застосували дві авіабомби ФАБ-250» (“Russian forces used two FAB-250 aerial bombs”). Homes and shops were also hit. (RISU, 30 Oct — Ukrainian)
• Kherson (Antonivka), reported 28 October. The UOC’s Kherson eparchy church of St Anthony of the Caves is «фактично зруйновано» (“effectively destroyed”). Archpriest Heorhiy Huliaiev’s photographs show the roof broken, scorch marks, and water and debris inside: «святиня у результаті російської агресії зазнала значних руйнувань» (“the shrine suffered significant destruction as a result of Russian aggression”). The date and weapon are not given. (UOC Information Department, 30 Oct — Ukrainian) Antonivka is on the government-held bank, within the zone of the Kherson-front truce that began on 27 October. The source does not say whether the damage predates the truce.
• Kharkiv region. The UOC reports a church in its Kharkiv eparchy damaged by “another Russian shelling” (headline item, page rate-limited). The pro-UOC SPZh reports the Ascension church of the UOC at Zolochiv damaged (headline item, 30 Oct).
• Dnipro and Kremenchuk. On 29 October Metropolitans Iriney of Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolai of Kremenchuk (UOC) offered condolences after Russian strikes on the Dnipro railway station and on a residential area of Kremenchuk. Mykolai: «Серед дня російська ракета влучила по території між багатоквартирними житловими будинками» (“In the middle of the day a Russian missile struck the area between apartment blocks”). He mentions small children among the injured. Neither statement gives casualty figures. (UOC Information Department, 29 Oct — Ukrainian)

Epifaniy: “No nation has a monopoly on Christian identity”

Preaching on 25 October on Galatians 2:11–16 (Paul rebuking Peter at Antioch), Metropolitan Epifaniy concluded: «ніякий народ і ніяка культура не мають монополії на християнську ідентичність» (“no nation and no culture has a monopoly on Christian identity”). The OCU headlined this as a refutation of the “Russian world” teaching that Russian religious tradition holds an exceptional place in the Church. He criticised, without naming them, those «хто відкидає Православну Церкву України тому, що так робить Москва» (“who reject the Orthodox Church of Ukraine because Moscow does so”) and those «хто розриває спілкування зі Вселенським Патріархатом» (“who break communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate”). (OCU, 25 Oct — Ukrainian) The sermon develops the Antioch analogy that he applied to Jerusalem on 21 October (reported last week). It does not mention the Moscow Synod’s guidelines of 22 October on receiving OCU members, including by baptism. Neither the OCU nor the UOC had issued a formal response to those guidelines in their official feeds by 31 October.

A former FSB officer ordained an OCU priest

On 26 October, at the Transfiguration Cathedral in Kyiv, Metropolitan Oleksandr (Drabynko) of Pereiaslav and Vyshneve (OCU) ordained to the priesthood Illia Bohdanov. According to 5 Kanal, cited by Religionpravda, Bohdanov is a former officer of the Russian FSB Border Service who defected in 2014 and fought with the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK). The RDK is a unit of Russian citizens fighting for Ukraine within the structure of Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR). Bohdanov was ordained deacon in the spring and now serves as the RDK’s chaplain. He says his days of armed combat are over. Drabynko confirmed the ordination on Facebook. (Religionpravda, 30 Oct — Ukrainian) The case is unusual: a Russian former security officer is serving as a priest of the Church that Moscow’s Synod, the same week, called a “schismatic structure” whose ordinations it does not recognise.

Cherkasy cathedral: the UOC alleges a “scheme” to transfer it

Metropolitan Feodosiy of Cherkasy (UOC) spoke to believers after a commercial-court hearing on the Archangel Michael Cathedral in Cherkasy, which was seized from the UOC on 17 October 2024. The hearing was postponed because neither the city nor the OCU attended. All of the more than 700 believers who applied to join as third parties were rejected. Feodosiy describes a three-step sequence:

1. In March 2024 the Ministry of Justice annulled the eparchy’s ownership registration of 10 December 2018.
2. The cathedral was then treated as ownerless.
3. It would be passed to the city or the OCU through the commercial court. City prosecutors have separately asked for the cathedral to be taken into communal ownership.

Feodosiy: «Даже если отменяется регистрация этого права, само право собственности никуда не исчезает» (“Even if the registration of this right is annulled, the right of ownership itself does not disappear”). (SPZh, 30 Oct — Russian; pro-UOC) This account comes from the pro-UOC SPZh alone and gives neither the hearing date nor the case number. The city, the prosecutors and the OCU had not commented in any source found.

Parish transfers in the Zhytomyr and Chernihiv regions

• Romanivka (Zviahel district, Zhytomyr region). A meeting on 24 October «одноголосно проголосували за перехід» (“voted unanimously for the transfer”) of St Michael’s parish to the OCU, with 41 residents signing, according to OCU Archbishop Volodymyr. The former rector stayed with the UOC, so the parish has in effect split. Residents cited the UOC clergy’s refusal to co-serve soldiers’ funerals. Vladyslav Peshkin, who heads religious affairs at the regional military administration, told Suspilne that seven communities in the region have moved to the OCU in 2026. (Religionpravda, 28 Oct, citing Suspilne — Ukrainian)
• Sediv (Chernihiv district). The regional military administration has registered the new statute of the Dormition parish, which voted in August, with DESS representatives present, to join the OCU (Religionpravda, 26 Oct — Ukrainian).

Clergy and mobilisation: a UOC archimandrite detained in Kharkiv

The pro-UOC SPZh reports that recruitment-centre (TCC) staff and police «жестоко избили и похитили» (“brutally beat and abducted”) Archimandrite Vladimir (Subbota) of the UOC near the church his community is building in Kharkiv. It says parishioners who tried to protect him were also beaten, and that an ambulance was called twice to the TCC building where he was held. The sources are the Telegram channel “Первый казацкий” and eyewitnesses it relays; a linked SPZh headline speaks of a pre-infarction condition. (SPZh, 29 Oct — Russian; pro-UOC) No account from the TCC, the police or the UOC’s official information department was found. The account rests on a single partisan source.

2.7 Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo — The Church and the change of government

Following the report of 24 October on the Church in the election campaign.

Election day. Serbia’s snap parliamentary elections on 25 October were won by the Studentska lista (Student List), which grew out of the protest movement. The NGO CRTA’s preliminary estimate gave it 51.47% against 40.42% for President Vučić’s “Ujedinjena Srbija”. Vučić conceded during the night (RFE/RL Serbian, live blog 25–26 Oct — Serbian; RTS, 25/26 Oct — Serbian, headline item). That morning, after the Liturgy at St Sava’s on Vračar, Patriarch Porfirije addressed the faithful: «Naravno da ja neću nikome reći kako da glasa» (“Of course I will not tell anyone how to vote”); «Svako neka glasa po svojoj savesti, po svome izboru, vodeći računa o opštem dobru» (“Let everyone vote by their conscience, by their own choice, mindful of the common good”). He asked that the peace received at the Liturgy remain, «da nema gneva, da ne pobedi nečastivi» (“that there be no anger, that the Evil One not win”). Whatever the outcome, accepting the result with humility is God’s will, even if it is not fully understandable at the time. (N1/Beta, 25 Oct — Serbian; Religija.rs/Republika, 25 Oct — Serbian; Republika is pro-government)

Read in two directions. Before the vote, the portal Srbin.info (standpoint not established here) headlined the message «Porfirije priprema teren?» (“Is Porfirije preparing the ground?”), reading the call to accept the result as anticipating defeat (headline item). The context is the Patriarch’s own record. In April 2025, in Moscow, he reportedly described the student protests to Putin as a “so-called colour revolution”, and analysts quoted by RFE/RL said this aligned him with Vučić (RFE/RL, Omer Karabeg, 18 May 2025 — Serbian; background).

After the vote: an attack from the nationalist right. On 29 October the portal Serbian Times (editor Antonije Kovačević) published a column against the Patriarch, as reported by NIS TV and Srpski Ugao: «Krasnaja revolucija pobedila – vreme Vam je za manastir!» (“The krasnaja [red/’beautiful’] revolution has won – it’s time for you to go to a monastery!”). The column calls his record “catastrophic” and claims he has driven more people from the Church in ten years than the Ottomans Islamised in five centuries. Kovačević had written in April 2025 that Porfirije was «nije moj patrijarh» (“not my patriarch”). The standpoint of Serbian Times could not be established from the sources reached; Srpski Ugao added an editorial note criticising attacks on the Church. No response from the Patriarchate was found. (NIS TV, 29 Oct — Serbian)

Montenegro — Joanikije: “Đukanović offered us separation from Belgrade”

On RTV Podgorica on the evening of 29 October, Metropolitan Joanikije of Montenegro and the Littoral said he had personally witnessed former president Milo Đukanović propose that the Metropolitanate break from the Serbian Patriarchate: «Odvojite se od Beograda i recite šta vam treba» (“Separate from Belgrade and tell us what you need”). The Church refused. He called “unfounded” claims that he or the late Metropolitan Amfilohije had favoured separation, described the ties with the Patriarchate as firm, and rejected the view that Vučić played a decisive role in the 2019–20 processions against the religious-freedom law. He also spoke about the Basic Agreement with Montenegro and the Cyrillic script. He did not say when Đukanović made the offer. No reply from Đukanović was found. (N1/Beta, 30 Oct — Serbian) The interview came five days after the Serbian vote, and his remark about Vučić distances the Montenegrin Church from the defeated president.

Kosovo — KFOR and NATO’s commander at Gračanica

On 29 October Metropolitan Teodosije of Raška and Prizren received, at Gračanica, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexus G. Grynkewich, and the KFOR commander, Major General Robert Verguerie, as transliterated in the Greek source. Abbot Sava (Janjić) of Dečani joined him. The diocese spoke of Kosovo Serbs’ concerns about security and their future, and said KFOR’s impartial presence is essential; it praised KFOR’s continuing protection of Dečani. The same day Teodosije met the head of EULEX, Antero Lopes, on peace, security and the rule of law. No incident at a church site was reported in the week. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 30 Oct and 30 Oct — Greek; relaying the diocese’s releases)

2.8 Romania and Moldova — A bishop for Bălți; Grosu and the two Metropolises

Romania — The Holy Synod’s autumn session

Following the report of 24 October on the nomination of two candidates for Bălți.

The election. On Thursday 29 October, at a working session in the Aula Magna “Teoctist Patriarhul” of the Patriarchal Palace in Bucharest, presided over by Patriarch Daniel, the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church elected Archimandrite Nicodim Petre Bishop of Bălți, in the Metropolis of Bessarabia (Republic of Moldova): «Sfântul Sinod l‑a ales prin vot secret pe preacuviosul părinte arhimandrit Nicodim Petre» (“the Holy Synod elected by secret ballot the Very Reverend Archimandrite Nicodim Petre”). The other candidate put forward by the Bessarabian Metropolitan Synod on 19 October was Archimandrite Dosoftei Dijmărescu of Putna. Neither source gives the vote count or the date of consecration and enthronement. (Ziarul Lumina, 29 Oct — Romanian)

Who he is. According to the Metropolis of Bessarabia, Nicodim (George Iulian) Petre was born on 12 July 1968, studied theology at Iași and Sibiu and did doctoral studies at the Saint-Serge Institute in Paris (2011–2013). He became a monk at Putna in 2000 and has been abbot of Bucium Monastery (Iași) since December 2018. He is best known as a youth minister of the Archdiocese of Iași: he coordinated the International Orthodox Youth Meeting at Iași in 2017 (6,250 participants from 32 countries), hosted the Doxologia portal’s “Întreabă preotul” and Radio Trinitas’s “Tineri către tineri”, and wrote a book, Fiul meu, tu încă nu ai ajuns acasă (2023). The Metropolis says the election «deschide o nouă etapă în viața Episcopiei de Bălți» (“opens a new stage in the life of the Diocese of Bălți”). (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 29 Oct — Romanian) Like his rival candidate, he is a monk of the Romanian side of the Prut. The Bălți diocese competes for the same territory with the Moscow-linked Metropolis of Moldova’s Diocese of Bălți and Fălești.

The other decisions. The Synod’s communiqué of 29 October lists:

• A “Pastoral code of responsible communication”. The Synod approved in draft the «Codul pastoral de comunicare responsabilă în Biserica Ortodoxă Română». It brings together existing statutory rules and synodal decisions on the responsibility and discipline of clergy in public communication. The text itself and any sanctions it lays down were not published in the sources reached.
• Groups “falsely” calling themselves Orthodox. The Synod expressed concern at groups it calls heretical or schismatic that use the name “Orthodox” and ask the faithful for donations, and instructed: «Centrele eparhiale vor lua măsuri pastorale, pe plan local» (“The diocesan centres will take pastoral measures locally”) to warn the faithful and stress full communion with the canonical Church. The communiqué, as reported, names no group. Whether it means the Old Calendarist synods, the “nepomenitori” (clergy who ceased commemorating their bishops after Crete 2016) or others is not stated.
• A commemorative year for 2028, devoted to the use of biblical texts in the liturgy and to the translators and printers of biblical and liturgical books.
• Pastoral care of foreign Orthodox and mission among immigrants in Romania, discussed without a recorded decision.
• Religion textbooks: the Synod welcomed the Education Ministry’s approval of seven new Orthodox Religion textbooks for grade IX.
• Liturgical texts approved in draft, including a service for the Holy Military Martyrs (26 October) and a paraclisis of the Priest-Martyr Liviu Galaction of Cluj.

(Ziarul Lumina, 29 Oct — Romanian)

The National Church Assembly. On 28 October the National Church Assembly, which the Church calls its “central deliberative body” (clergy and lay delegates from every diocese), was constituted for its 2026–2030 term. It validated mandates and elected the National Church Council. Patriarch Daniel told it: «Este foarte important ca în acest duh de comuniune în harul Preasfintei Treimi să facem orice lucrare în Biserică» (“It is very important that we do every work in the Church in this spirit of communion in the grace of the Holy Trinity”). (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 28 Oct — Romanian; Ziarul Lumina, 28 Oct — Romanian, headline item) That evening, at a solemn session of the Synod, Bishop Varlaam Ploieșteanul presented the report on the Church’s work in 2026, its “year of the pastoral care of the Christian family”. Daniel announced that next year’s theme will be cooperation between clergy and laity. (Ziarul Lumina, 28 Oct — Romanian)

All sources for this item are the Romanian Patriarchate’s own media (Ziarul Lumina, Basilica.ro) or its Bessarabian Metropolis. No secular-press reaction to the communication code was found.

Moldova — Grosu meets the Moscow-linked Metropolitan; Romania’s new Prime Minister visits the Bessarabian Metropolis

Following the report of 24 October on Metropolitan Antonie’s request for state mediation.

Grosu and Vladimir. On Monday 26 October the Speaker of Parliament, Igor Grosu, called on Metropolitan Vladimir of Chișinău and All Moldova, head of the Metropolis of Moldova (Moscow Patriarchate), at the Metropolitan Palace. The Metropolis’s account gives two topics: strengthening “dialogue and cooperation between the Church and state institutions”, and the Church’s mission of upholding “moral-spiritual values” and supporting social initiatives for people in need. It calls the meeting cordial, «într-o atmosferă cordială și respect reciproc» (“in a cordial atmosphere and mutual respect”) (Metropolis of Moldova, 26 Oct — Romanian). Grosu’s own post spoke of «искренняя дискуссия о диалоге между церковью и государственными институтами, а также о сохранении духовных ценностей» (“a sincere discussion of the dialogue between the church and state institutions, and of preserving spiritual values”), and of a wish for “a more cohesive society” (NewsMaker, Vera Balakhnova, 26 Oct — Russian; NewsMaker’s text dates the meeting “26 September”, evidently a slip).

What neither side says. The meeting came five days after Metropolitan Antonie of Bessarabia (Romanian Patriarchate) asked Grosu to mediate between the two Metropolises. Neither the Metropolis of Moldova’s account nor the reports of Grosu’s post mention mediation, the Metropolis of Bessarabia, property or the transfers of clergy between the two jurisdictions. Whether Grosu conveyed the request, and how Vladimir answered, is not known from the sources reached. The Metropolis of Moldova has still not publicly replied to Antonie’s charges of “abuse, intimidation and aggression” against his communities.

Bucharest’s support. On 27 October Romania’s new Prime Minister, Luca Niculescu, on what the Metropolis calls his first official trip abroad since taking office, visited the Metropolis of Bessarabia in Chișinău. Antonie thanked the Romanian government, through the State Secretariat for Cults and the departments for relations with Moldova and for Romanians abroad, for support that funds priests’ work, the upkeep of churches, community spaces and charity, and said «fiecare proiect realizat împreună întărește legăturile dintre românii de pe cele două maluri ale Prutului» (“every project achieved together strengthens the bonds between the Romanians on the two banks of the Prut”). Niculescu said he was open to “concrete joint projects”. No amounts were given. (Metropolis of Bessarabia, 27 Oct — Romanian) Romanian state funding of the Bessarabian Metropolis is a standing grievance of the Metropolis of Moldova’s supporters. The pro-Moscow Moldovan site Raskolamnet.info, for instance, headlines it as financing of “the schism” (a party label).

2.9 Bulgaria — Patriarch Daniil answers critics of the Bartholomew visit

Following the report of 24 October on Bartholomew’s visit and the commemoration of Epifaniy at Rila.

On Sunday 25 October, the day of the presidential election, Patriarch Daniil answered parishioners who had criticised the visit. He spoke after the Liturgy at the Sofia cathedral of St Nedelya. The only source found is the Union of Orthodox Journalists (SPZh), in its Bulgarian and Russian editions; SPZh is pro-UOC, pro-Moscow and hostile to the visit. No Synod communiqué or Bulgarian secular report was found, so the remarks are single-sourced, through a partisan outlet.

As SPZh Bulgaria reports him, Daniil’s arguments were:

• A synodal decision. The invitation was a decision of the Holy Synod («решението за поканата е взето от Светия синод»), and «Църквата не е нито българският патриарх еднолично, нито константинополският патриарх еднолично» (“The Church is neither the Bulgarian patriarch alone nor the Constantinopolitan patriarch alone”).
• Athos as precedent. He had raised the question on Athos, where he went on 21–22 October: «Навсякъде задавахме този въпрос и всички игумени и манастири подкрепиха това, че не са прекъснали общението» (“Everywhere we asked this question, and all the abbots and monasteries supported the view that they have not broken communion”). In the Russian edition: «Знаете ли вы, что и Иверский, и Ватопедский, и Хиландарский, и Зографский монастыри не допускают клириков ПЦУ? И при этом они не прервали общение со Вселенским Патриархом и служат с ним… Почему же вы требуете отчета от Болгарского Патриарха…?» (“Do you know that the Iviron, Vatopedi, Hilandar and Zographou monasteries do not admit OCU clergy? And yet they have not broken communion with the Ecumenical Patriarch and serve with him… Why then do you demand an accounting from the Bulgarian Patriarch…?”). He also cited Jerusalem, which does not receive OCU clergy but remains in communion with the Phanar.
• Conscience and conciliarity. «Дело не во мне! Совесть нужно сверять с соборным разумом Церкви» (“It’s not about me! Conscience must be checked against the conciliar mind of the Church”). He also asked that church gatherings not become a «говорильня» (“talking shop”).

He noted that a Serbian delegation and the abbot of Hilandar were expected for the cathedral’s second patronal feast (St Stefan Milutin, 30 October), and asked whether critics would condemn them too.

(SPZh Bulgaria, 25 Oct — Bulgarian; SPZh, 26 Oct and 26 Oct — Russian; pro-UOC)

What is and is not answered. Daniil’s case rests on a distinction: one can stay in communion with Constantinople without receiving OCU clergy. The Athonite claim is his, as relayed by SPZh, and is not independently verified here. In the reports, he does not address the specific act his critics objected to: at Rila, Bartholomew named Epifaniy in the diptychs during a Liturgy that Bulgarian hierarchs concelebrated. The Holy Synod itself has issued no statement on the commemoration that could be found, and the petitioners’ organisers have published no reply to Daniil that could be traced.

2.10 Georgia — The Patriarchate objects to a casino law rushed through Parliament

On 28 October the Georgian Parliament passed in third reading, on an accelerated procedure, amendments to the law “On Lotteries, Gambling and Winning Games”. They let casinos host international tournaments exempt from the table fee, provided at least 80% of players are foreigners and the prize fund exceeds GEL 3 million; the ban on advertising them in Georgia stays (Netgazeti, Giorgi Elizbarashvili, 29 Oct — Georgian; independent outlet). The same day Archpriest Andria Jaghmaidze, head of the Patriarchate’s public-relations service, said: «სამორინეებთან დაკავშირებით საკანონმდებლო ინიციატივა ჩვენთვის სრულიად მოულოდნელი აღმოჩნდა» (“the legislative initiative on casinos came as a complete surprise to us”). He said there had been no prior communication with the Patriarchate, and that «საპატრიარქო მსგავსი პროცესისგან განზე ვერ დარჩება» (“the Patriarchate cannot stand aside from such a process”). He said he personally “largely shares” the Public Defender’s objections, and hoped for dialogue with the bill’s initiators. He recalled that the Patriarchate, with the then locum tenens Shio (now Catholicos-Patriarch Shio III), had initiated the gambling regulations adopted from 2017. (GHN, 28 Oct — Georgian)

On 29 October five Orthodox theologians, including Shota Kintsurashvili and Mirian Gamrekelashvili, published an appeal, still gathering signatures: «მოვუწოდებთ ხელისუფლებას, გადახედოს უკვე მიღებულ საკანონმდებლო ცვლილებებს» (“we call on the authorities to review the legislative changes already adopted”). They cite the late Patriarch Ilia II’s 2015 warning about gambling (Netgazeti, 29 Oct — Georgian). Neither source names the bill’s sponsors or reports a reply from the ruling Georgian Dream party.

The episode is small but unusual. The Patriarchate, which the opposition and critical media accuse of closeness to the government (see the accreditation dispute reported on 24 October), here publicly complains of being bypassed by the majority and sides with the Public Defender.

2.11 Cyprus — A letter reportedly urging priests to leave the Church, and the Tychikos case

The scoop. On 27 October Phileleftheros (Dora Christodoulou) reported that priests had received a letter calling for a new church in Cyprus. According to the paper, the letter is signed by five persons, whom it does not name. It was sent to all priests of the Metropolis of Paphos and «σε μεγάλο αριθμό ιερέων των άλλων Επαρχιών» (“to a large number of priests of the other dioceses”). It urged them to «εγκαταλείψουν την Εκκλησία της Κύπρου και να ιδρύσουν νέα εκκλησία που να αντιστρατεύεται ουσιαστικά την Ιερά Σύνοδο» (“leave the Church of Cyprus and found a new church effectively opposed to the Holy Synod”). Citing “exclusive information”, the paper attributes the letter to supporters of apoteichismos (“walling off”, ceasing to commemorate a bishop held to teach heresy) who never accepted the removal of Metropolitan Tychikos of Paphos. It says the mailing began about three months ago and that the Synod had been watching without intervening. The same report says that a priest «από Σλαβική Χώρα» (“from a Slavic country”) celebrates the Liturgy on Sundays in a private house in Paphos. The house is said to belong to someone active on Tychikos’s side, and the stated motive is refusal to accept Metropolitan Grigorios. The paper presents this as information it has not confirmed, and it names neither the priest nor his jurisdiction. Cyprus Mail’s account (Elias Hazou) has the headline “Priests urged to break away from the Church of Cyprus”. (Phileleftheros, Dora Christodoulou, 27 Oct — Greek; Cyprus Mail, Elias Hazou, 27 Oct — English)

The paper trail starts earlier than this week. Politis had already reported letters to Paphos priests on 7 August 2026. Its source was Theodoros Kyriakou, speaking on Politis Radio; the article does not say who he is. That account differs from this week’s: the letter was sent by registered mail, was signed by «περίπου 10-15 πρόσωπα» (“about 10–15 persons”) from «κύκλους αποτειχισμένων στη Θεσσαλονίκη» (“circles of walled-off [clergy/faithful] in Thessaloniki”), and asked priests to take a position on the Council of Crete. The headline reads «Δεν μπορεί πλέον να κρύβεται ο Τυχικός» (“Tychikos can no longer hide”). According to Kyriakou, the new Metropolitan of Paphos asked the recipients to hand the letters in to the Metropolis. The timing matches philenews’s “about three months”, but the number of signatories does not (five against 10–15). (Politis, 7 Aug — Greek)

What the Synod said, and what it did not say. The Holy Synod met in extraordinary session on Tuesday 27 October under Archbishop Georgios. Its written communiqué has three points:

1. It finalised the programme for the 50th anniversary of the death of Archbishop Makarios III, which falls in 2027.
2. It studied Tychikos’s letter declining to appear. It accepted his request, conveyed «μέσῳ πρῴην συνεργατῶν του» (“through former associates”), to be received by the Archbishop. It expects him then to appear before the Synod and later to meet Metropolitan Grigorios privately.
3. It condemned the Karak attack in Jordan (§2.4).

The communiqué does not mention the priests’ letter. What has been reported as “confirmation” comes from the oral remarks of the Synod’s chief secretary, Archim. Georgios Christodoulou. He said the matter had not been discussed but would occupy the Church before it “πάρει διαστάσεις” (“takes on dimensions”). AlphaNews quotes him: «Υπάρχουν πληροφορίες βέβαια, κάποια στιγμή θα απασχολήσει το θέμα αυτό την εκκλησία» (“There is information, of course; at some point this matter will occupy the Church”). Politis quotes the secretary as saying that a document must be official and signed before it can be put to the Synod. Cyprus Mail’s “confirmed” overstates this. (Phileleftheros, 27 Oct, communiqué — Greek; AlphaNews, 27 Oct — Greek; Politis, 27 Oct — Greek)

Tychikos’s own letter. On 22 May 2025 the Synod declared Tychikos έκπτωτος (deposed). On 8 January 2026 it placed him under αργία (suspension) by 11 votes to 5. The Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate unanimously rejected both of his appeals, noting only procedural points. His three-page letter of 14 October, summarised by SigmaLive, makes these points:

• the session of 22 May 2025 «μετατράπηκε αιφνιδίως σε δικαστική διαδικασία» (“suddenly turned into a judicial process”);
• his treatment was «εξευτελιστική, ενίοτε δε και διακωμωδητική» (“humiliating, and at times even mocking”);
• he objects that a Synod letter of 23 September now calls him “former Bishop“, where earlier acts said “former Metropolitan“;
• he asks whether he is being summoned as an accused;
• he asks to serve in Paphos with the Synod’s blessing;
• he says he retains «κάθε κανονικό και νόμιμο δικαίωμα» (“every canonical and lawful right”).

AlphaNews also quotes him: «βίωσα αφόρητη πίεση» (“I experienced unbearable pressure”). His letter does not mention the new-church plan or the house liturgies. SigmaLive reports that the claims do not show he is involved. Church sources quoted by AlphaNews, and AlphaNews’s own reporting (Loukas Fesias), say that on current information he does not appear connected to the people behind the letter. His involvement is therefore not established. (SigmaLive, Marios Ignatiou, 27 Oct — Greek; AlphaNews, Loukas Fesias, 27 Oct — Greek)

The libellus: Crete as the test. On 28 October Phileleftheros (Vasos Vasileiou) reported, from its own information, that the Synod did examine the letter. The view that prevailed was «έχουν γνώσιν οι φύλακες» (“the guardians know”): neither priests nor faithful are being swayed, so for now the letter will be given no special weight and will be monitored discreetly.

The meeting with Tychikos was reportedly arranged through a businessman from his home village. The Archbishop will reportedly require Tychikos to:

• sign the libellus (statement of faith) «χωρίς προσθαφαιρέσεις» (“without additions or omissions”);
• withdraw his civil-court cases and any proceedings at the European Court of Human Rights;
• withdraw in writing certain claims about the Archbishop.

Otherwise deposition is not excluded. These are reported intentions, not decisions of the Synod.

The paper prints the libellus in full. Its crux is the requirement that Tychikos accept, besides the seven Ecumenical Councils and the local councils, the decisions «καθώς καί τῆς Ἁγίας καί Μεγάλης Συνόδου τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Ἐκκκλησίας (Κρήτη 2016)» (“as well as of the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete 2016)”). He must also respect the dialogues with the heterodox conducted under the Ecumenical Patriarchate, promise «ὑπακοήν» (“obedience”), and renounce «τόν ἀποτειχισμόν καί τούς ἀποτειχιστάς» (“walling-off and those who practise it”). He has reportedly drafted two versions that leave out the Crete reference. The same paper’s report of 27 October calls Crete an «Οικουμενική Σύνοδος» (“Ecumenical Council”); the libellus itself correctly names it the Holy and Great Council. (Phileleftheros, Vasos Vasileiou, 28 Oct — Greek)

New this week (29–30 October).

• The signatories’ reply. On 29 October SigmaLive published a statement by the letter’s five signatories, addressed to «κάθε αρμόδιο ενδιαφερόμενο» (“any competent interested party”). They remain unnamed, and the statement does not say whether they are clergy or laypeople. They deny founding anything: «Το μόνο που επιδιώκουμε είναι η διαφύλαξη της Ορθοδόξου πίστεως μέσω της αφύπνισης των κληρικών και όχι η δημιουργία “νέας εκκλησίας”» (“All we seek is the preservation of the Orthodox faith by awakening the clergy, not the creation of a ‘new church'”). They also say «ουδέποτε βγήκαμε εκτός Εκκλησίας» (“we never went outside the Church”). They describe themselves as «ελάχιστοι στον αριθμό» (“very few in number”) and reject what they call the «ψευδοσύνοδος του Κολυμπαρίου» (“pseudo-synod of Kolymbari”), meaning Crete 2016. They turn the charge of schism back on their opponents: those who consent to or cover up «την αίρεση του Οικουμενισμού» (“the heresy of Ecumenism”) «είναι εκείνοι που θέτουν τον εαυτό τους εκτός Εκκλησίας» (“are the ones who place themselves outside the Church”). They “categorically reject” reports of an attempt to «”προσηλυτίσουν” ιερείς» (“‘proselytise’ priests”) and reserve «όλα τα νόμιμα δικαιώματά τους» (“all their legal rights”) over what they call public slander. They dispute Kyriakou’s reading of Crete’s naming of other confessions. The statement does not mention Tychikos or the house liturgies. (SigmaLive, 29 Oct — Greek)
• The meeting has not yet taken place. On 30 October the Church’s spokesman, Christakis Efstathiou, spoke on SIGMA’s Protoselido. He said the meeting between the Archbishop and Tychikos, arranged through mediation, is expected soon but has no date. «Από αυτή τη συνάντηση θα εξαρτηθεί η περαιτέρω πορεία των πραγμάτων» (“The further course of things will depend on this meeting”). He was cautious, noting that earlier commitments, including some made before the Synod, had come to nothing. He said the key question is whether Tychikos accepts episcopal status and its obligations, including recognition of the Synod and of synodality. If agreement is reached, episcopal duties could be assigned to him. (SigmaLive, 30 Oct — Greek)

Where things stand on 31 October. No meeting has been reported and no signature. Tychikos and his supporters have made no public statement since his letter of 14 October. The “Slavic” priest has not been identified in any source opened. No body has been founded or registered. “Schism” and “new church” remain claims made by the parties: the Church’s side and the press use them, and the signatories reject them.

Explainer — “Walling off” (apoteichisis): a canon, a tradition and a fault line

The word. Apoteichisis (αποτείχιση; also apoteichismos) means “walling off”. Clergy or laity who practise it stop commemorating their bishop in the Liturgy. They also break communion with him, because they hold that he teaches heresy. Those who practise it insist that they are separating from error, not from the Church: in their view it is not schism. Their opponents call it disobedience, and in the end schism. The Cypriot dispute (above) is the latest case.

The canonical source. The term comes from a council held in Constantinople in 861 under Patriarch Photios, known as the “First-Second” Council. Canons 13 and 14 punish presbyters and bishops who break communion with their superior and stop commemorating him because of unproven charges. Canon 15 extends this rule to metropolitans and patriarchs. It then adds an exception, which is the whole basis of the practice. Clergy who separate from a bishop who publicly preaches “some heresy condemned by the holy Synods or Fathers” are not to be punished, even if they do so before any synodal judgment. In the canon’s words they act «τῆς πρός τόν καλούμενον Ἐπίσκοπον κοινωνίας ἑαυτούς ἀποτειχίζοντες» (“walling themselves off from communion with the so-called bishop”). They deserve the honour due to the Orthodox, «οὐ γάρ Ἐπισκόπων, ἀλλά ψευδεπισκόπων καί ψευδοδιδασκάλων κατέγνωσαν» (“for they have condemned not bishops but false bishops and false teachers”). (Greek as cited in Fr Theodoros Zisis’s book, below. The standard editions are the Rhalles–Potles Syntagma, vol. 2, and the Pedalion of St Nikodemos the Hagiorite. (Apoteichisis.com — English/Greek; an independent project favouring the practice; it names those editions.))

The point in dispute: “condemned”. Almost every argument about walling off turns on one participle, κατεγνωσμένην (“condemned”).

• The strict reading. The exception covers only a heresy that a council or the Fathers have already condemned. On that view, separating from a bishop over a new question, such as the documents of the 2016 Council of Crete, is the very conduct that Canons 13–15 punish.
• The broad reading. Any manifest heresy qualifies, and “ecumenism” is such a heresy. A text in the Old Calendarist “resistance” milieu makes this case. It rests on the 19th-century canon commentary of the Serbian bishop Nikodim Milaš, and it holds that “praiseworthy walling off” applies to heresies “newly manifest” as well as to those already condemned (imoph.org, text first published in Ὀρθόδοξος Ἔνστασις καὶ Μαρτυρία no. 3, Apr–Jun 1986 — English; author not named).

How the idea travelled. The canon lay mostly in the commentaries until the 20th-century calendar and ecumenism disputes gave it a new use.

• The “Synod in Resistance”. Among the Old Calendarist bodies that formed after the Church of Greece adopted the revised calendar in 1924, the Synod in Resistance was founded in 1985 by Metropolitan Cyprian of Oropos and Fili. It took “resistance” as its name and framework. It regarded the New Calendar Churches as ailing but not without grace, and it awaited a future conciliar judgment. In 2014 it merged into the Church of the Genuine Orthodox Christians of Greece (OrthodoxWiki — English; GOC announcement, 19 Mar 2014 — English).
• Mount Athos. The Holy Mountain offered precedents from the era of Patriarch Athenagoras. In those years, monasteries that ceased commemorating the Patriarch over his rapprochement with Rome were not sanctioned (Pravoslavie.ru, 17 Mar 2017 — English).

The 2017 wave. The practice became widespread within the canonical Churches only after the Holy and Great Council of Crete, held “during the week of Pentecost (18–26 June 2016)” (the Council’s Message — English). The Churches of Antioch, Bulgaria, Georgia and Russia did not attend (see the background briefing on Crete’s reception, §6.1). Its critics held that the Council’s document on relations with “the rest of the Christian world” gave ecclesial standing to the heterodox.

• Thessaloniki. On the Sunday of Orthodoxy, 5 March 2017, the patristics professor Fr Theodoros Zisis announced from the ambo that he was ceasing to commemorate Metropolitan Anthimos of Thessaloniki. Fr Nikolaos Manolis had done the same a few weeks earlier. Anthimos barred Zisis from serving within days (OrthoChristian, 15 Mar 2017; J. Sanidopoulos, 15–16 Mar 2017 — English).
• Crete. Four priests on Crete stopped commemorating their bishops. On 16 March 2017 the island’s Provincial Synod called their conduct “erroneous” (Pravoslavie.ru, 17 Mar 2017).
• Mount Athos. By the end of March, more than fifty Athonite cells and kalyves had reportedly stopped commemorating the Ecumenical Patriarch (OrthoChristian, 31 Mar 2017 — English, citing Vima Orthodoxias).
• Romania and Moldova. Similar movements arose in both countries, where those involved became known in Romanian as nepomenitori (“non-commemorators”).
• Zisis’s own account. He set out his case in Δέν εἶναι σχίσμα ἡ Ἀποτείχιση: Ὀφειλόμενες ἐξηγήσεις (“Walling off is not schism: explanations owed”), Thessaloniki: To Palimpsiston, series Kairos no. 24, 2017 (text online — Greek; ISBN not found).

Cyprus, 2025–26. The Cypriot case goes further than the Greek one, because it reached a ruling metropolitan. The Holy Synod deposed Metropolitan Tychikos of Paphos on 22 May 2025 and suspended him on 8 January 2026, by 11 votes to 5. According to Phileleftheros, the main charge was walling off, or association with those who practise it. The Synod has made a written confession of faith the condition of his return. It requires him to accept “the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete 2016)” by name, and to renounce «τόν ἀποτειχισμόν καί τούς ἀποτειχιστάς» (“walling off and those who practise it”). He has twice offered versions that leave out the Crete clause (philenews, 27 and 28 Oct — Greek). Acceptance of Crete has thus become a test of communion. That is the reverse of the position of the four Churches that stayed away from the Council.

The letter-writers of 2026 put the canon’s logic in their own words. In their statement of 29 October the five signatories wrote «ουδέποτε βγήκαμε εκτός Εκκλησίας» (“we never went outside the Church”), called Crete the «ψευδοσύνοδος του Κολυμπαρίου» (“pseudo-synod of Kolymbari”), and said that those who consent to “the heresy of Ecumenism” are «εκείνοι που θέτουν τον εαυτό τους εκτός Εκκλησίας» (“the ones who place themselves outside the Church”) (SigmaLive, 29 Oct — Greek). It is the “false bishop” clause of Canon 15, applied.

What the research shows, and does not. The practice has generated far more polemic than scholarship. A search of the main bibliographic databases found no monograph or peer-reviewed study devoted to walling off as such. The nearest works are these:

• The Iași dispute. Emilian-Iustinian Roman (Faculty of Orthodox Theology, Iași), “Debating the Documents of the Holy and Great Synod of Crete – A Canonical and Disciplinary Approach. Case Study: The Archbishopric of Iaşi”, Studia UBB Theologia Orthodoxa 62, no. 1 (2017): 159–170, DOI 10.24193/subbto.2017.1.10. It examines the Iași case in the light of Canons 13–15. It concludes that refusal to commemorate the hierarch is canonical disobedience that may amount to schism. The author writes from within the Romanian Church’s disciplinary framework.
• Anti-ecumenism generally. Brandon Gallaher, “Ecumenism as civilisational dialogue: Eastern Orthodox anti-ecumenism and Eastern Orthodox ecumenism. A creative or sterile antinomy?”, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 19, no. 4 (2019): 265–285, DOI 10.1080/1474225X.2019.1595827 (bibliographic data from Crossref; the publisher’s page could not be opened). It treats Orthodox anti-ecumenism as a whole, the wider current from which walling off draws.

Most of what exists in print is advocacy from one side or the other: Zisis’s book and the “resistance” texts for the practice, and canonists and diocesan authorities against it. An account that sets the canon, its commentators and the 20th–21st-century movements side by side has yet to be written.

Also this week. Before leaving Cyprus on 30 October, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas called at the Archbishopric for a 30-minute meeting with Archbishop Georgios. The Archbishop spoke of the shared pilgrimage sites and said Cypriots feel at home in Palestine: «νοιώθουμε πάντα σαν στη χώρα μας» (“we always feel as if in our own country”). Abbas said Palestinians have been friends of Cyprus «από τον καιρό του Μακαρίου» (“since the time of Makarios”) and drew a parallel: «καθώς και εμείς έχουμε κατοχή και εσείς έχετε κατοχή» (“as we have occupation, so you have occupation”). The two exchanged gifts. The report does not mention the Jerusalem Patriarchate or Gaza. (AlphaNews, 30 Oct — Greek)

2.12 Church of Crete — The clergy on violence

On 30 October the 8th Clergy Conference of the Archdiocese of Crete, at the Patriarchal Supreme Ecclesiastical Academy in Heraklion, took as its theme «Αντιμετώπιση της βίας, ποιμαντικές προτάσεις από την Εκκλησιαστική Γραμματεία» (“Addressing violence: pastoral proposals from ecclesiastical literature”). The theologian Georgios Samourakis gave the keynote. Archbishop Eugenios recalled that the Provincial Synod of Crete had recently addressed the issue in an encyclical, and called for the clergy’s attitude to social problems to be “redefined”. The reports do not specify the violence in question. (Fos Fanariou, 30 Oct — Greek)

2.13 Poland — The autumn Synod: no cremation, a youth day in Gdańsk

The Holy Synod of Bishops met in Warsaw on 27 October under Metropolitan Sawa. Among external matters, the communiqué lists the state of Orthodoxy after the division in Ukraine, and cooperation with the Patriarchates of Constantinople, Bulgaria and Georgia. On Ukraine it says only: «Tylko głęboka wiara i gorąca modlitwa pomogą zlikwidować przeżywane dzisiaj doświadczenie» (“Only deep faith and fervent prayer will help overcome the trial being experienced today”). It fixed the World Day of Orthodox Youth for Gdańsk, 10–14 February 2027. On internal matters it restated: «Cerkiew nasza nie dopuszcza kremacji ciał umarłych» (“Our Church does not permit the cremation of the dead”). Stillborn children are to be buried with a short prayer, without a Liturgy. It also called religion classes in schools a support for the young. (cerkiew.pl, 29 Oct — Polish)

2.14 North Macedonia — Ohrid congratulates the Phanar and sends a delegation to Moscow

The Synod (29 October). According to Orthodoxia News Agency, the Holy Synod of Bishops of the Archbishopric of Ohrid met on 29 October and dealt with church life, educational structures and «developments in the local Orthodox Churches». It sent Bartholomew congratulations on his 35 years on the throne, and sent Patriarch Theophilos of Jerusalem a telegram of condolence over the Karak attack. It also appointed a delegation to visit the Russian Orthodox Church: Metropolitan Georgios (Georgij) of Debar and Kičevo and the Synod’s secretary, Bishop Klimis (Kliment) of Herakleia, with names as transliterated by ONA. Neither ONA nor Orthodox Times gives the purpose or date of the visit. Kirill’s 80th birthday on 20 November is the obvious occasion, but no source states it. Orthodox Times’s own source is the Macedonian outlet vesti.alfa.mk; the Church’s site (mpc.org.mk) could not be reached. (Orthodoxia News Agency, 30 Oct — Greek; Orthodox Times, 30 Oct — Greek)

Bigorski. On 27 October the Bigorski Monastery of St John the Forerunner, under Bishop Partenij of Antania, published its own tribute for the anniversary. It recalls «историскиот 9 мај 2022 година» (“the historic 9 May 2022”), when the Phanar’s Synod received the Ohrid Church into communion, and condemns «неправедните напади, навреди и клевети што неретко се упатуваат кон свештената личност на Вселенскиот Патријарх» (“the unjust attacks, insults and slander often directed at the sacred person of the Ecumenical Patriarch”). It names no one. Fos Fanariou carried a Greek version on 28 October. On 30 October Ukraine’s ambassador, Larysa Dir, visited Bigorski for Partenij’s 56th birthday. He spoke of the Ukrainian people, who «натаму ги поднесува ужасите на војната со Русија» (“continue to endure the horrors of the war with Russia”). (Bigorski, 27 Oct and 30 Oct — Macedonian; Fos Fanariou, 28 Oct — Greek)

Reading it. In one week the Church whose communion Constantinople restored in 2022 sent thanks to the Phanar, while its best-known monastery received Ukraine’s ambassador, and appointed bishops to go to Moscow. Bulgaria did much the same in the same fortnight (§2.9): it received Bartholomew and defended its communion with the Phanar, while keeping its distance from the OCU. Neither Church is choosing between Constantinople and Moscow. Both are trying to stay on good terms with two Patriarchates that are now rivals, so as not to take sides in a quarrel that could harden into a lasting break. Their Synods’ acts, not their hierarchs’ gestures, will show whether that balance holds.

2.15 Baltic States — Lithuanian church bills judged unconstitutional; Pikk 64

Lithuania: the bills and the lawyers’ opinion. Following the report of 24 October. The two bills of Audronius Ažubalis and Arvydas Anušauskas (Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats) now have numbers:

• XVP-1977 would transfer named Orthodox properties of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Lithuanian Orthodox Church to the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s Lithuanian Exarchate, with parallel provisions for Sunni mosques.
• XVP-1979 would make it possible to strike the Lithuanian Orthodox Church from the list of traditional religious communities and to designate a single centre to represent Orthodox believers.

The diocese names the buildings as: the Holy Spirit Monastery, the Dormition (Prechistensky) Cathedral and the churches of St Paraskeva and St Nicholas in Vilnius, and the Dormition church at Vievis. Last week’s sources spoke of six buildings; only five are named here.

The diocese reports that the Seimas Chancellery’s Law Department found both bills contrary to the Constitution. It cites Arts 5, 23, 43, 94 and 109(1), the separation of powers and the rule of law: «Tradiciškumas nėra sukuriamas ir negali būti panaikinamas įstatymų leidėjo valios aktu» (“Traditional status is not created by, and cannot be abolished by, an act of the legislator’s will”), and «nuosavybės teisė negali atsirasti vien todėl, kad įstatymų leidėjas specialiu įstatymu ją paskelbia» (“a right of ownership cannot arise merely because the legislator declares it by a special law”). The department also notes that the bills provide no compensation. (Lithuanian Orthodox Church (MP), 28 Oct — Lithuanian; same, Russian version — Russian; relayed by SPZh, 29 Oct — Russian, pro-UOC)

Caveat: the opinion is known only through the diocese, a party to the dispute. Its date and number are not given, and the e-seimas register could not be opened. The opinion is advisory: the Seimas decides. No response from the sponsors or from the Exarchate was found.

The diocese’s response. Bishop Ambrose of Trakai held a press conference on 20 October, and Metropolitan Innokentiy wrote to the country’s leaders that the bills breach the Constitution. On 23 October the Holy Spirit Monastery and the St Paraskeva parish, followed by three more parishes, appealed to the Seimas: «We have no intention of changing our current Church (canonical) affiliation». (OrthoChristian, 23 Oct — English; pro-Moscow) In his Constitution Day address (dated 23 October, for 25 October), Innokentiy said that «вопросы церковной жизни не могут решаться путём произвольного вмешательства государства» (“questions of church life cannot be settled by arbitrary state interference”), warned against «принудительного перераспределения принадлежащего приходам имущества» (“forced redistribution of property belonging to parishes”), and affirmed: «Мы — патриоты Литовского государства» (“We are patriots of the Lithuanian State”) (Lithuanian Orthodox Church, 25 Oct — Russian). On 27 October, the International Day of Religious Freedom, a Seimas Human Rights Committee discussion on state recognition of religious communities heard the Vilnius University researcher Elena Masnevičiūtė argue that «существующую традиционность общины нельзя отозвать» (“a community’s existing traditional status cannot be revoked”). The Metropolitan’s secretary and an adviser attended. (Lithuanian Orthodox Church, 28 Oct — Russian)

Estonia: Pikk 64. Following the report of 24 October. No vacating date for the chancellery has been published. The Estonian Christian Orthodox Church’s (EKÕK’s) last notice remains that of 23 October on the temporary move to Alexander Nevsky Cathedral. On 29 October Archpriest Nikolai Balashov, adviser to Patriarch Kirill, called the eviction «постыдный шаг таллинской мэрии» (“a shameful step by the Tallinn mayor’s office”) and linked it to an attempt to rewrite Estonian history (RIA Novosti, 29 Oct — Russian; state agency). The pro-Moscow OrthoChristian (26 Oct) restated the building’s history without new facts. The 28 December deadline under the amended Churches and Congregations Act, set in the Interior Ministry’s letter of July, still stands (ERR, 7 Jul — Estonian; background).

2.16 Finland — Bishops bar clergy from taking part in Lutheran same-sex weddings; a statement on polarisation

The decision. On 25 October the Bishops’ Assembly of the Orthodox Church of Finland met in Kotka. Present were Archbishop Elia of Helsinki and All Finland (chair), Metropolitan Arseni of Kuopio and Karelia, and Bishop Sergei of Hamina, who is acting for the vacant see of Oulu. Under § 58, «Kirkon papiston osallistuminen samaa sukupuolta olevien vihkimiseen» (“Participation of the Church’s clergy in same-sex weddings”), the Assembly adopted guidance for clergy invited to the wedding or blessing of a same-sex couple in the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. It had first discussed the question at its session 3/2026 (§ 46). The proposal was adopted as presented:

1. «Papiston jäsen ei toimita eikä avusta samaa sukupuolta olevan parin vihkimisessä tai siunaamisessa toisissa kirkkokunnissa» (“A member of the clergy does not officiate or assist at the wedding or blessing of a same-sex couple in other churches”). He does not read prayers, pronounce a blessing, give an address or take any other liturgical part.
2. «Papiston jäsen ei ole läsnä toimituksessa liturgisissa vaatteissa eikä papin asussa» (“A member of the clergy is not present at the service in liturgical vestments or in clerical dress”). His name or title is not used in the order of service or in related communications.

The minutes do not forbid attendance as such. They regulate only how an ordained minister may be present: in no liturgical role and not in clerical dress.

The reasoning. The minutes are written pastorally as well as canonically.

• Family and friends. The Assembly notes that priests live in families and communities where same-sex couples are «lapsia, sisaruksia, ystäviä ja seurakuntalaisia» (“children, siblings, friends and parishioners”). An invitation is «luottamuksen osoitus» (“a mark of trust”), and answering it requires «sekä uskollisuutta kirkon opetukselle että lempeyttä ihmistä kohtaan» (“both faithfulness to the Church’s teaching and gentleness towards the person”).
• Scope. The guidance «ei arvioi toisen kirkon ratkaisuja eikä ota kantaa yhteiskunnan avioliittolainsäädäntöön» (“does not judge another church’s decisions and takes no position on society’s marriage legislation”).
• Ecclesiology. An ordained minister acting liturgically acts «kirkon nimissä» (“in the Church’s name”). His participation would therefore suggest that the Orthodox Church recognises the union as a marriage or blesses it, «Tätä kirkko ei voi tehdä» (“This the Church cannot do”).
• Oikonomia. The Assembly expressly rules out invoking oikonomia. Pastoral leniency, it says, always concerns a concrete person and situation, and cannot be used to create a new general practice or to blur the Church’s public liturgical witness.
• Closing. «Kieltäytyminen toimituksesta ei ole kieltäytymistä ihmisestä» (“Declining the service is not declining the person”). «Rehellinen pidättyminen on lopulta kunnioittavampaa kuin ele, joka lupaisi yhteyttä, jota ei ole» (“Honest restraint is in the end more respectful than a gesture that would promise a communion that does not exist”). The text ends with Ephesians 4:15, “speaking the truth in love”.

The background is that the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland, the country’s majority church, has been debating the marriage of same-sex couples. Some Orthodox clergy have Lutheran relatives and friends who marry in that Church, so the question arises in their own families.

Other business.

• The Joensuu seminary (§ 57). The ordained theology teacher and other clergy employed by the Orthodox Seminary in Joensuu will belong to the clergy of the Diocese of Helsinki for as long as they work there, because the seminary operates under the Archbishop’s ecclesiastical authority. The Assembly asks for the Church Order to be amended to match. It also recommends that theology students be ordained by the bishop of their home diocese. The decision does not change the role of the seminary’s current priest as the lead liaison chaplain of the Orthodox military clergy.
• A deacon’s status (§ 59). In an item whose background is partly confidential under data-protection law, the Assembly decided that a change in a deacon’s civil status does not affect his canonical status.
• Incense and health (§ 60). Metropolitan Arseni asked what liturgical adjustments are possible when parish employees suffer health symptoms from incense. His questions included fewer censings, charcoal alone, or omitting censing in parts of a service. They also covered what occupational-health evidence a parish should need first. The Assembly referred the matter to the Archbishop’s office for preparation.
• A letter from the university (§ 62). The Assembly recorded receipt of a letter of 24 September from four scholars of the University of Eastern Finland’s theology department. They are its head, Suvi-Maria Saarelainen, its deputy head, Joona Salminen, Professor Pekka Metso and Associate Professor Maria Takala-Roszczenko. The letter is titled «Selvityspyyntö koskien piispallisen kanonisen toimivallan käyttöä» (“Request for clarification concerning the use of episcopal canonical authority”). The minutes record it only as received; its contents are not given.

(Orthodox Church of Finland, Bishops’ Assembly minutes 5/2026, 25 Oct — Finnish; ort.fi news, 29 Oct — Finnish)

Polarisation. Separately, on 30 October Archbishop Elia joined the leaders of 16 churches in the Finnish Ecumenical Council in a statement on polarisation: «Lähimmäisen – ja jopa vihollisen – rakastaminen on tässä ajassa äärimmäisen vallankumouksellista ja vaikeaa» (“Loving one’s neighbour – and even one’s enemy – is in this age extremely revolutionary and difficult”). The statement cited a Taloustutkimus survey in which 70% of Finns called polarisation a serious problem (ort.fi, 30 Oct — Finnish).

3. Oriental Orthodox News

3.1 Ethiopia — A report of 42 churches destroyed in Wollega; the war in the north

Oromia (Wollega) — A report of 42 Orthodox churches destroyed

Borkena, citing “field reports from Ethio Focus”, reports that 42 EOTC churches were “burned, destroyed, and looted” “over recent months” in the Limu, Gida Ayana and Jimma Geneti woredas of the Horo Guduru Wollega and East Wollega zones. 28 parishes are documented by name and founding date (1979–2012), including Nigulo Gabriel, Hare Michael, Sosolo Michael and Chancho Maryam; 14 sites are still being verified. No perpetrator is named and no date range is given. Federal and regional officials had issued no statement. (Borkena, 29 Oct — English) Low confidence: this rests on a single report from a partisan diaspora outlet relaying an unidentified monitoring source. AAGE published an investigation into Wollega killings, 2018–2026, on 14 October, but the pages opened do not confirm the church count. Carry forward.

The war in the north this week (context)

Following the report of 24 October. AP describes the Pretoria agreement as “effectively shattered”. This week:

• Defection. The TPLF’s Central Command accused Major General Yohannes Woldegiorgis (“John Medid”) of defecting to the federal army. Pro-government channels speak of a “voluntary surrender” near the Eritrean border (Rama woreda) and say he was moved to Adwa. (Borkena, 27 Oct — English; EEPA 775, as above)
• Mekelle. Mekelle University began receiving students again (Fana, 30 Oct — Amharic, headline item, state-affiliated). The caretaker mayor, Dr Shishay Amare, appointed sub-city administrators (EEPA 775).
• Amhara. A drone strike on the Jari 2 shelter for displaced people near Hayk (Wollo) killed 15 according to The Reporter and 24 according to victims’ families. Borkena attributes the strike to the federal army, which did not comment. No church dimension was reported. (Borkena, 30 Oct — English)
• Moscow. Prime Minister Abiy and Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki both attended the Russia–Africa summit (28–29 October). Russia restated its readiness to host Ethiopia–Eritrea mediation, but neither leader confirmed he would accept it (EEPA 775). Ethiopia has received 12 Su-35 fighters and plans to acquire S-400 air defences (Al Jazeera, 29 Oct — English). On the Russian Church’s presence at the same summit, see §4.1.

3.2 Armenia — The Catholicos’s trial postponed; the Justice Ministry moves against a judge

Following the report of 24 October on the Armavir court’s civil rulings.

The hearing of 30 October did not take place. The trial of Catholicos Karekin II and six bishops of the Supreme Spiritual Council was due to resume on 30 October at 16:00. The defendants are Archbishops Nathan Hovhannisyan and Haykazun Najaryan and Bishops Mushegh Babayan, Hovnan Hakobyan, Makar Hakobyan and Vahan Hovhannisyan. They are charged under Article 507(2) of the Criminal Code with obstructing the enforcement of a judicial act: the Armavir court’s interim order of 16 January keeping Gevorg (Arman) Saroyan in office as primate of Masyatsotn. On the morning of 30 October the Church’s lawyer, Ara Zohrabyan, announced that the hearing had been postponed: «նիստը նշանակվել է նոյեմբերի 6–ին, ժամը 11:00-ին Էջմիածին քաղաքի նստավայրում» (“the hearing has been set for 6 November at 11:00 at the Etchmiadzin seat [of the court]”). No reason was given. (News.am, 30 Oct, 12:34 — Armenian)

Where the case stands. At the September hearing Zohrabyan announced four motions to terminate the proceedings for lack of evidence of an offence. He argued that the Church’s independence is guaranteed by the Constitution, so that the charge amounts to interference in its internal affairs, and asked for a reference to the Constitutional Court if the court had doubts. The Catholicos’s defence filed three similar motions; the prosecutor objected. No ruling on them has been reported. (News.am, 18 Sept — Armenian, background) Since then the civil case that produced the interim order has itself been closed in the Church’s favour (22 October). Zohrabyan’s argument is that the Catholicos is being tried for disobeying a measure the same court has now lifted. The prosecution’s case is that the order was binding while in force.

Disciplinary case against a judge. On 30 October it emerged, from the Supreme Judicial Council’s website, that the Ministry of Justice has started disciplinary proceedings against Judge Hakob Manukyan. Manukyan was the first judge assigned to the Catholicos’s case. He withdrew at the first hearing in August, on the ground that Zohrabyan had once issued him his lawyer’s licence. The motion is to be heard on 16 November. (News.am, 30 Oct, 11:41 — Armenian) The case then went on a detour. Judge Serzh Rushanyan sent it to the Yerevan Criminal Court; the Court of Cassation sent it back to Armavir, faulting the transfer for a «բացառապես սուբյեկտիվ և ձևական մոտեցում» (“an exclusively subjective and formal approach”). No comment from Manukyan, the Ministry or the Church was reported.

The parliamentary inquiry adopts its rules. On 26 October the National Assembly’s investigative commission adopted its rules of procedure. Its full name is «Եկեղեցու բացառիկ առաքելության չկատարման խնդիրներն ուսումնասիրող ԱԺ քննիչ հանձնաժողով» (“the National Assembly investigative commission studying the problems of the non-fulfilment of the Church’s exclusive mission”). It is chaired by Arman Yeghoyan (Civil Contract); opposition factions are boycotting it, as reported earlier. The rules entitle it «հրավիրել պետական պաշտոնյաների, մասնագետների և փորձագետների» (“to invite state officials, specialists and experts”). Information and conclusions from closed sittings are to be published only at the end of its work. Neither report says whether clergy may be summoned or when the commission must report. (Armenpress, 26 Oct — Armenian, state news agency; Aravot, 26 Oct — Armenian)

Three claims to keep apart.

• Did the alleged conduct occur? That the Catholicos defrocked Saroyan while the interim order stood is not disputed. Whether that amounts to the criminal offence of obstructing a judicial act is what the court must decide; no verdict exists.
• May the state reorganise church governance? This is the government’s stated aim. Pashinyan said on 1 October that a commission and legislative changes would follow. The Church and its lawyers say the Constitution forbids it, and the Armavir civil court has twice held church appointments and defrockings to be outside its jurisdiction.
• Is the case part of a campaign? This is the Church’s and the opposition’s reading. On 25 October the former MP Hovik Aghazaryan predicted, in an interview with the opposition-leaning 168.am, that Pashinyan «գնալու է Կաթողիկոսի կալանավորման» (“will go as far as arresting the Catholicos”), so that an acting head could be installed, and urged the Catholicos to convene bishops and elect a successor himself (168.am, 25 Oct — Armenian). It is an opinion offered without evidence. The government made no public statement on the Church in the window in the outlets reached.

Other court cases involving clergy

• A defamation suit by the Mother See’s chancellor. On 30 October Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan, chancellor of the Mother See, sued the defrocked priest Stepan Asatryan in the Armavir court. The suit is over statements about the archbishop’s private life that Asatryan made in a Public Television debate on 27 September, “How to reform the Church?”. Khachatryan demands a retraction on Public Television and a symbolic 999 drams in damages. The suit calls the statements «իրականությանը չհամապատասխանող և զրպարտություն հանդիսացող տվյալները» (“untrue data constituting defamation”). Judge Hovhannes Melkonyan is assigned. (Azatutyun, 30 Oct — Armenian; Aravot, 30 Oct — Armenian) The substance of the statements is not repeated here. In September Asatryan was ordered to retract statements and pay AMD 1 million to Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan (Hetq, 1 Sept — Armenian, headline item).
• Galstanyan trial. On 29 October the trial of Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and 17 co-defendants continued before Judge Karen Farkhoyan of the Yerevan criminal court of first instance. The court spent hours viewing a video of a 2025 search that found hunting rifles registered to the husband of the head of PARA TV. Neither she nor her husband is a defendant. Defence lawyers said the weapons had «կապ չունի իմ պաշտպանյալի ու մյուսների հետ» (“no connection with my client and the others”), and that an appeal court had ruled the search unlawful. Next hearing: 5 November. (Aravot, 29 Oct — Armenian) The report does not give Galstanyan’s current preventive measure.
• Belated pick-up: the Catholicos’s brother and nephew. On 22 October the Armavir court found Gevorg Nersisyan, the Catholicos’s brother, and his son Hambardzum guilty of obstructing a Hanrapetutyun party campaign in Voskehat before the local elections of November 2025. Sentencing was deferred to 12 November; the prosecution seeks 3.5 and 7.5 years respectively. Their lawyer calls the case “fabricated”. (Azatutyun, 22 Oct — Armenian) The case concerns relatives of the Catholicos, not the Church.

3.3 Coptic Orthodox Church — A social-services protocol with the Human Fraternity Foundation

On 29 October, at the Papal Residence in Cairo, Pope Tawadros II witnessed the signing of a cooperation protocol on social and medical services. The signatories were the Church’s spokesman, Hegumen Moussa Ibrahim, and Monsignor Yoannis Lahzi, chairman of the board of the Egyptian Human Fraternity Foundation. The Foundation runs children’s homes, maternal-health and outreach programmes, and says it treated 9,000 cases last year. Tawadros said the Church’s social work is “enveloped in a spirit of love that makes no distinction between one person and another”. (Coptic Orthodox Church, 29 Oct — English, official) The Foundation takes its name from the 2019 Document on Human Fraternity. The Church’s page does not describe its links to the Abu Dhabi-based Higher Committee of Human Fraternity, and none are asserted here.

4. Orthodox Churches in the Diaspora & Mission Fields

4.1 Africa — The Russian Exarchate at the Russia–Africa summit; Putin thanks Madagascar

Following the report of 24 October on the Russian Orthodox Church’s legal personality in DR Congo.

Putin and Madagascar. On 30 October, on the sidelines of the Third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow, President Vladimir Putin thanked Michael Randrianirina, styled “President of the Refoundation of the Republic of Madagascar”, for the Church’s registration there: «В апреле Русская Православная Церковь получила статус юридического лица на Мадагаскаре. Хочу Вас за это поблагодарить» (“In April the Russian Orthodox Church received the status of a legal entity in Madagascar. I want to thank you for this”). He called it important because the number of the Church’s parishioners on the island «превышает полторы тысячи человек» (“exceeds one and a half thousand people”). (Exarchate of Africa, 31 Oct — Russian) The Kremlin’s own transcript was not opened. The registration itself was reported in this review on 30 May; the Exarchate dates the certificate to 7 April 2026 (see the edition of 24 October). This is the first time in this series that the Russian head of state has publicly raised a Church registration with an African leader.

The Church at the summit. The Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarchate of Africa (an official source) brought 16 clergy from 11 African countries to Moscow on 27 October. Ten countries are named: South Africa, Mauritius, Zambia, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Cameroon, the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire. The group included heads of 13 social institutions such as schools and shelters. (Exarchate, 27 Oct — Russian) The week’s events:

• 27 October. Metropolitan Konstantin of Cairo and North Africa, the Patriarchal Exarch, read a greeting from Metropolitan Antony of Volokolamsk (DECR) at the “Spiritual Bridges: Russia and Africa” conference of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of the Russian Federation. The greeting said such bridges «невозможно возвести исключительно средствами политики или экономики» (“cannot be built by means of politics or economics alone”). Ethiopia’s Islamic Affairs Supreme Council chairman, Sheikh Haji Ibrahim Tukhfa, also took part. (Exarchate/DECR, 29 Oct — Russian)
• 28–29 October. The Exarchate’s conference «Просветительская деятельность Русской Церкви в Африке: проблемы и перспективы» (“The Russian Church’s educational work in Africa: problems and prospects”) heard reports from heads of Exarchate schools and children’s homes in Kenya (5), Uganda (2), the Central African Republic and Cameroon. Its stated aim was «создание единого образовательного пространства» (“the creation of a single educational space”). (Exarchate, 29 Oct; 30 Oct — Russian)
• 29 October. Konstantin spoke on the summit’s official programme, at a panel titled «Россия и Африка: духовный суверенитет, традиционные ценности и образовательное взаимодействие» (“Russia and Africa: spiritual sovereignty, traditional values and educational cooperation”). The other speakers came from the Presidential Administration (E. V. Eremin), the Foreign Ministry’s special representative on freedom of religion (M. M. Melekh) and the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia. The report gives no quotation and no figures. (Exarchate, 29 Oct — Russian)

Why it matters. The Church’s mission in Africa, which the Patriarchate of Alexandria regards as an intrusion into its canonical territory, ran this week inside the state’s flagship Africa summit. The same Presidential Administration and Foreign Ministry officials sat on its panels, and the President himself raised a registration act. No reaction from Alexandria was found on the pages opened.

5. Ecumenical and Inter-Orthodox Relations

5.1 WCC — A delegation in Kyiv to examine the OCU’s membership application

On 26 October a delegation of the World Council of Churches met the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organisations (VRCiRO) at the Kyiv Orthodox Theological Academy. It was then received by Metropolitan Epifaniy at St Michael’s Golden-Domed Monastery and met the State Service for Ethnopolitics (DESS). The delegation was:

• Rev. Dr Susan Durber, WCC President for Europe (United Reformed Church);
• Maria Mountraki, Orthodox Church of Finland;
• Metropolitan Thomas of Quosia and Mir, Coptic Orthodox Church, Executive Committee member;
• Bishop Ingeborg Midttømme, Church of Norway, Executive Committee member;
• Douglas Chial, director of the General Secretary’s office.

The OCU’s report states the purpose plainly: «Однією з цілей візиту делегації ВРЦ є ознайомлення з життям і діяльністю Православної Церкви України» (“One of the aims of the WCC delegation’s visit is to become acquainted with the life and activity of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine”), as part of the review of the OCU’s application for WCC membership. Epifaniy, who chairs VRCiRO this year, told the guests: «Ми з любов’ю відкриті до всіх, а любов об’єднує» (“We are open to all with love, and love unites”). (OCU, 26 Oct — Ukrainian; OCU, 26 Oct — Ukrainian; Religionpravda, 27 Oct — Ukrainian; DESS news list, 27 Oct, page itself not loadable — Ukrainian)

What the sources leave out. None of them says when the OCU applied or what stage the procedure has reached. None mentions a meeting with the UOC. The Russian Orthodox Church is a WCC member; the UOC has never been a member in its own right. As reported here on 18 July, VRCiRO has effectively excluded the UOC from its work while keeping it on its roll. The WCC’s own news feed for 20–31 October had not reported the visit. Admitting the OCU would put both Orthodox claimants to Kyiv inside the Council, with Moscow already there.

5.2 Assisi 2026 — “Basta con le guerre”

The closing ceremony on 27 October, in the lower square of the Basilica of St Francis, drew about 5,000 people. Christians, Muslims, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Shintoists, Taoists and Zoroastrians first prayed separately: the Christians in the lower basilica with Cardinal Matteo Zuppi and Bartholomew (§1.3). The final appeal, read by a young Sant’Egidio member and then by children, says «Basta con le guerre! Basta con la cultura della guerra» (“Enough wars! Enough of the culture of war”). It asks that military spending go to water, food, schools and jobs, and calls for de-escalation away from the nuclear threat. Pope Leo XIV’s video message carried the line «Solo la pace è santa». Testimonies came from Koko Kondo, a Hiroshima survivor, and the Cambodian monk Touch Sarith, who had been at Assisi in 1986. The next meeting is in Genoa, 26–28 September 2027. Vatican News’s report names no Orthodox participant other than Bartholomew; whether any Moscow Patriarchate representative attended could not be established. (Vatican News, 27 Oct — Italian)

5.3 WCC — Orthodox parliamentarians in Geneva; Faith and Order in Sweden

On 30 October the WCC received at Geneva a delegation of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (IAO). It was led by its secretary-general, Greek MP Maximos Charakopoulos (New Democracy), and the president of its General Assembly, Romanian deputy Ioan Vulpescu. They discussed a “growing crisis of values” in politics, a possible joint summit on “Churches, Values and Public Engagement”, and links between the WCC and the Inter-Parliamentary Union through Orthodox parliamentarians. Angeliki Ziaka was on the WCC side. No Russian members are named. The IAO, founded on Greek initiative in 1993, has long had Russian Duma members in its ranks; their status now was not checked. (WCC, 30 Oct — English)

Faith and Order in Sweden

The WCC Commission on Faith and Order met in Lund/Höör on 25–31 October, hosted by the Church of Sweden. It was its first meeting in Sweden since the 1952 Third World Conference on Faith and Order. Its director is the Serbian Orthodox theologian Andrej Jeftić. The opening session, as reported, presented the 2025 Nicaea anniversary as recent Faith and Order work; no Orthodox statement is reported. (WCC, 26 Oct — English)

6. Trends, Emergent Issues & Debates

6.1 Background briefing — Crete at ten: a council that took place, and is still being received

Why now. Two stories this autumn turn on the same question. In Cyprus, the Holy Synod requires former Metropolitan Tychikos of Paphos to sign a confession of faith accepting “the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete 2016)” by name (§2.11). In Bulgaria, opponents of Patriarch Bartholomew’s visit of 17–19 October accused him of “ecumenism” (edition of 24 October). Behind both lies one question: what authority does the 2016 Council have, and over which Churches? Ten years on, the Orthodox world has no single answer.

What happened in Crete. The Council met at the Orthodox Academy of Crete in Kolymvari “during the week of Pentecost (18–26 June 2016)”, in the words of its own Message (holycouncil.org — English). Its working sessions began on 20 June. Ten of the fourteen autocephalous Churches signed its Encyclical: Constantinople, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Serbia, Romania, Cyprus, Greece, Poland, Albania, and the Czech Lands and Slovakia (holycouncil.org, Encyclical — English). Besides the Encyclical and the Message, it adopted six documents (holycouncil.org — English):

• the mission of the Orthodox Church in today’s world;
• the Orthodox diaspora;
• autonomy and the means of proclaiming it;
• the sacrament of marriage and its impediments;
• fasting;
• “Relations of the Orthodox Church with the Rest of the Christian World”.

The last drew nearly all the controversy, for two of its provisions (holycouncil.org — English):

• Paragraph 6: the Church “accepts the historical name of other non-Orthodox Christian Churches and Confessions”.
• Paragraph 22: it condemns efforts to break the Church’s unity “under the pretext of supposedly preserving or defending true Orthodoxy”. That paragraph now stands behind the Cypriot Synod’s demands.

The four who stayed away. Their reasons, as each Church gave them in June 2016:

• Bulgaria (Synod decision of 1 June 2016): topics missing from the agenda, disagreements between Churches, rules that made the texts impossible to edit, the seating of primates, the place of observers, and the cost (Pravmir, 7 Jun 2016 — English).
• Antioch (6 June 2016): no council while communion between two Apostolic Churches was broken, a reference to its rupture with Jerusalem over Qatar (Pravmir, 7 Jun 2016 — English).
• Georgia (10 June 2016) declined to take part (OrthoChristian, Jun 2016 — English); in February 2016 its Synod had rejected the draft of the “Relations” text.
• Russia (13 June 2016): without all the Churches the Council would “lose its Pan-Orthodox status” (Metropolitan Hilarion, TASS, 13 Jun 2016 — English).

Who has said what since.

Church or body	Position	Date	Source
Council spokesman (Abp Job Getcha)	Decisions “representative and binding”	23 Jun 2016	NCR via Herald Malaysia
The Council’s Message	Proposes that the Council become “a regular Institution to be convened every seven or ten years”	26 Jun 2016	holycouncil.org
Antioch, Holy Synod	Crete was “a preliminary meeting towards the Pan-Orthodox Council”, “non-binding, by any means” for Antioch	27 Jun 2016	Orthodox Ethos, 30 Jun 2016 (a committed critical site)
Russia, Holy Synod	Cannot be regarded as pan-Orthodox, nor its documents as pan-Orthodox consensus; yet “an important event in the history of the… council process”	15 Jul 2016	OrthoChristian
Romania, Holy Synod	“Acknowledged the contents”; no new dogmas, canons or liturgical changes; the texts may be “explained, nuanced or developed” by a future council	29 Oct 2016	Basilica.ro; Pravoslavie.ru, 1 Nov 2016
Greece, Hierarchy	Report approved; the Archbishop’s closing address “unanimously adopted” (press release). Metropolitan Seraphim of Karystos said no vote was taken	23–24 Nov 2016	P. Anderson, News 2016
Bulgaria, Holy Synod	Formally rejected the Council as not pan-Orthodox; some texts conflict with Orthodox teaching	Nov 2016	Sofia Globe, 29 Nov 2016; OrthoChristian, 23 Nov 2016
Georgia, Holy Synod	“Not a Pan-Orthodox Council”; decisions “not obligatory”; calls for a future council	Dec 2016	OrthoChristian, 27 Dec 2016 (unofficial summary)
Serbia, Assembly of Bishops	“Accepted the report on the work” of the Council	May 2017	serborth.org, 26 May 2017
Russia, Bishops’ Council	Some documents contain “unclear and ambiguous formulations”	2 Dec 2017	P. Anderson, News 2017
Patriarch Bartholomew	The Council “took place and has already become a historical event”; invites the four absent Churches to examine and adopt the texts synodically	1 Jun 2026	Orthodoxia News Agency, 2 Jun 2026

All in English. No formal synodal act of reception was found for Cyprus, Poland, Albania, the Czech Lands and Slovakia, or Jerusalem.

Dissent inside the Churches that attended. Not every bishop present signed every text. Greek media reported that the following withheld their signatures from the “Relations” document:

• Metropolitan Hierotheos of Nafpaktos (Church of Greece);
• five Cypriot metropolitans: Athanasios of Limassol, Neophytos of Morphou, Nikolaos of Amathus, Epiphanios of Ledra and Porphyrios of Neapolis;
• Bishop Irinej of Bačka (Serbia).

(OrthoChristian, 29 Jun 2016 — English.) Irinej later wrote that an “overwhelming majority” of the Serbian bishops present had not signed it (OrthoChristian, Jul 2016 — English). In Greece, Metropolitan Seraphim of Piraeus argued that Crete was only part of the pre-conciliar process (Pravoslavie.ru, 22 Nov 2016 — English). In 2017 the opposition went further: some clergy stopped commemorating their bishops (see the explainer on “walling off”, §2.11).

Ukraine, and the council that has not met again. The seven-to-ten-year cycle the Council proposed has not begun. After the Ukrainian Tomos of January 2019 the argument largely moved: the deepest division in the Orthodox world now concerns communion and Ukraine, not the six texts. Archimandrite Ilia Jinjolava, a cleric of the Ecumenical Throne, wrote in June 2026 that the Council “did take place”. He added that its “partial absence of participation indicates that synodal consciousness” faces “a serious challenge” (Public Orthodoxy, 15 Jun 2026 — English). Bulgaria shows how the two issues now merge. The open letter of 22 September 2026 against Bartholomew’s visit cited the Ukrainian Tomos and his “ecumenist and syncretist views”, but not Crete (OrthoChristian, 22 Sep 2026 — English; a source sympathetic to the petitioners). On Bulgarian National Television Bartholomew called the petitioners a “small minority” of “zealots” and “extremists” who “create schisms” (OrthoChristian, 20 Oct 2026 — English).

The tenth anniversary, 2026.

• Phanar (1 June). Bartholomew recalled that four Churches withdrew “literally at the eleventh hour”.
• Romania (16 June). The Romanian Patriarchate’s agency called the Council “the only gathering of its kind held by the Orthodox Church in the 21st century”, while acknowledging that discussion of its texts had at times caused confusion among the faithful (Basilica.ro, 16 Jun 2026 — English).
• Rome (23 October). At the Angelicum’s study day “Crete – Ten Years Later”, where he received an honorary doctorate, Bartholomew said that the Council’s importance should not be measured by participation or immediate results, that many of its questions remain open, and that conciliarity is “constitutive and essential” (InfoVaticana, 24 Oct 2026; Greek City Times, 24 Oct 2026 — English).
• Finland. In the yearbook Ortodoksia 66, Krystallia Latsara warns of consequences “if the Orthodox Church does not address its internal conflicts soon” (DOI 10.61560/ortodoksia.178610; listed in the edition of 10 October).

This week’s stories. Cyprus’s demand treats Crete as settled and binding, the view the Phanar and the Council’s spokesman took in 2016. The libellus put to Tychikos names “the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church (Crete 2016)” alongside the Ecumenical Councils, and in effect invokes paragraph 22 against those who break unity “in defence of Orthodoxy”. The other side answered in kind: on 29 October the five anonymous signatories of the letter to Cypriot priests called Crete a “pseudo-synod” and said that it is the supporters of “the heresy of Ecumenism” who stand outside the Church (§2.11). As this edition closed, the meeting between Archbishop Georgios and Tychikos had still not been scheduled. Yet five of Cyprus’s own metropolitans declined to sign the “Relations” text in 2016. In Bulgaria the Church’s own Synod rejected the Council in November 2016, so the petitioners had no need to argue that point; their complaint had moved on to Ukraine and “ecumenism” at large. The same Council is a test of loyalty in one Church and a dead letter in another.

Further reading (existence verified):

• Alberto Melloni and Davide Dainese (eds), The Great Councils of the Orthodox Churches: Crete 2016 (Corpus Christianorum, Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Generaliumque Decreta IV/3), Turnhout: Brepols, 2017, ISBN 978-2-503-57504-9 (Brepols). A critical edition of the documents.
• Maxim Vasiljević and Atanasije Jeftić (eds), Synodality: A Forgotten and Misapprehended Vision. Reflections on the Holy and Great Council of 2016, Sebastian Press, 2017, ISBN 978-1-936773-35-0 (Sebastian Press). Supportive essays by Kallistos Ware, John Behr, Cyril Hovorun and others.
• Metropolitan Hierotheos (Vlachos) of Nafpaktos, The Orthodox Church and the Rest of the Christian World: The “Holy and Great Council” in Crete 2016, trans. P. Selfe, 2026, ISBN 978-618-5269-61-6 (Lemoni). The critics’ case, by a participant who did not sign the “Relations” text.

6.2 Heads of state as arbiters of jurisdiction: Africa this week

Following §6.2 of 24 October (“the state as registrar of jurisdictions”).

Last week’s edition noted that states increasingly decide, by registration, which Orthodox jurisdiction exists in law on their territory. This week the same logic moved from ministries to presidents, and in Africa it took place largely in public.

• Moscow. At the Russia–Africa summit, President Putin thanked Madagascar’s leader for the Russian Orthodox Church’s registration there (§4.1). The Moscow Patriarchate’s Exarch spoke on an official summit panel next to officials of the Presidential Administration and the Foreign Ministry. In this series, this is the first time the Russian head of state has publicly raised a church registration with an African leader.
• Luanda. In the same week Patriarch Theodoros II of Alexandria, whose Patriarchate regards the Exarchate as an intrusion into its canonical territory, met Angola’s president and conferred an order on him (§2.2). Alexandria also completed an episcopal residence in northern Madagascar.
• Earlier in October. The DR Congo granted the Russian Church legal personality on 16 October (edition of 24 October).

The two Patriarchates are thus competing for the same recognition from the same governments. A registration certificate does not settle a canonical question. Alexandria’s position that Africa is its canonical territory and Moscow’s position that it is serving faithful who asked to be received are both party claims. But a registration does decide who may own property, open schools and sign agreements. Neither side has said publicly what it expects from the heads of state it courts. Alexandria has issued no reaction to the Putin–Madagascar exchange that could be found.

Europe offers the mirror image, where legislatures and courts act against a Moscow-linked body rather than for it. In Lithuania, conservative MPs have tabled bills to transfer named buildings by statute, and the Seimas’s own lawyers are reported to have found them unconstitutional (§2.15). In Tallinn, the Estonian Christian Orthodox Church has lost its chancellery. In both places, as in Africa, the state is the arena in which inter-Orthodox rivalry is now fought.

6.3 When governments change: Belgrade, Podgorica, Tbilisi, Chișinău

Several Churches this week had to find their footing with new or shifting governments.

• Serbia. On election day Patriarch Porfirije refused to tell anyone how to vote and asked that the result be accepted “with humility”. After the Student List’s victory, a nationalist portal told him it was “time to go to a monastery” (§2.7). A patriarch whom critics had accused of closeness to President Vučić is now being attacked from the right for not having been close enough.
• Montenegro. Metropolitan Joanikije chose the same week to say that Milo Đukanović had once invited the Metropolitanate to break with Belgrade. He also played down Vučić’s role in the 2019–20 processions (§2.7). He was redrawing the Church’s political history as one patron left the scene.
• Georgia. The Patriarchate, often criticised by the opposition as aligned with the ruling party, said it had been “completely surprised” by a casino law passed without consulting it, and sided with the Public Defender (§2.10).
• Romania and Moldova. Romania’s new Prime Minister made the Metropolis of Bessarabia one of the stops on his first trip abroad. The Speaker of Moldova’s Parliament called on the Moscow-linked Metropolitan (§2.8).

What these episodes share is not a political direction but a posture. Each Church emphasised its distance from party politics while protecting its institutional interests. The tests will come when the new majorities touch church questions directly, as Serbia’s may on church finances and appointments.

7. New Academic Literature

Books and edited volumes

Mount Athos

Graham Speake (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Mount Athos. Routledge History Handbooks. London–New York: Routledge, 2026 (copyright dated 2027). 496 pp., 41 b/w illustrations. ISBN 978-1-032-00886-8 (hardback). (Routledge) The first comprehensive English-language reference work on the Holy Mountain, in 33 chapters. Part One covers its history from before 963 to 2020 (Rosemary Morris, Dirk Krausmüller, Kostis Smyrlis, Elias Kolovos, Evaggelos Bartzis) and its Greek, Georgian, Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian traditions (Marcus Plested, Tamara Grdzelidze, Nicholas Fennell, Aleksandar Fotić and Ognjen Krešić, Cyril Pavlikianov, Radu Păun), with Ioannis Konidaris on the avaton and the editor on “The Athonite Commonwealth”. Part Two treats eremitic, cenobitic and idiorrhythmic monasticism, hesychasm (Marius Dorobanțu), saints and elders (Archim. Maximos Constas), pilgrimage (René Gothóni) and the Philokalia (Andrew Louth). Part Three covers architecture, icons and wall paintings (Konstantinos Vapheiades), music, libraries and archives (Robert W. Allison), the Mountain’s “myth and lore” (Veronica della Dora), its legal status (Konidaris), its economy (Zachary Chitwood), ecology and the modern world; an appendix by Dimitri Conomos describes the twenty monasteries. The hardback is priced for libraries; an eBook is available, and a paperback has not yet been announced.

History and church–state relations

Scott M. Kenworthy, The People’s Patriarch: Tikhon Bellavin and the Orthodox Church in North America and Revolutionary Russia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2025 (online 28 October 2025; print 9 January 2026). ISBN 978-0-19-764475-1 (print); 978-0-19-764478-2 (e-book). DOI 10.1093/9780197644782.001.0001 The publisher presents it as the first comprehensive English-language biography of Patriarch Tikhon. It argues that his years as bishop in North America taught him to work inside a secular state and to build popular support, and that this experience later helped him resist the Soviet anti-religious campaign. The publisher also says the book uses primary sources that were previously unused or unavailable. It is a 2025/26 title, carried forward from the leads list. A review by DeBlasio has just appeared in Studies in East European Thought (DOI 10.1007/s11212-026-09923-1).

Marian Pătru (ed.), Churches in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the “Jewish Question” in the First Half of the 20th Century. Brill | Schöningh, 2026 (chapter DOIs deposited 10 September 2026; a trade listing gives 5 November 2026 for the hardback and 395 pp.; Crossref gives 2027 as the print date). ISBN 978-3-506-70541-9 (print); 978-3-657-70541-2 (e-book). DOI 10.30965/9783657705412 This edited volume grew out of a call for contributions funded by the German National Committee of the Lutheran World Federation. It examines how Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches in the region engaged with antisemitism up to the Holocaust. The Orthodox chapters are:

• Michael Hagemeister, “The Russian Orthodox Church and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (12–44)
• Pătru on the Romanian Orthodox Church and the antisemitic Zeitgeist, 1918–1944 (160–183)
• Nicolae Drăgușin on Romanian Orthodox clergy and the “New Nationalism” (184–236)
• George Enache on the priest-writer Gala Galaction (237–260)
• Martin Illert, “The Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the Holocaust” (285–294)
• Milan Koljanin, “The Serbian Orthodox Church and the ‘Jewish Question’ (1918–1941)” (322–339)
• Ionuț Daniel Băncilă on Orthodoxy and Freemasonry (340–358)

There are also chapters on Sheptytskyi, Prohászka, Stepinac and the Transylvanian Saxon church. Crossref lists Pătru as “author” of the book record, but a trade listing and the original call both name him as volume editor. The series (“Eastern Church Identities” 25) comes only from the trade listing.

Theology

Ioan Moga (ed.), Christologische Diskurse im Wandel: Ansätze aus der orthodoxen Theologie der Gegenwart. Brill | Schöningh, 2026 (OpenAlex gives 15 August 2026, chapter DOIs are dated 19 October 2026, Crossref gives 2027 as the print date). ISBN 978-3-506-70594-5 (print); 978-3-657-70594-8 (e-book). DOI 10.30965/9783657705948 — in German A German-language survey of contemporary Orthodox Christology (the title means “Christological discourses in transition: approaches from present-day Orthodox theology”). Its chapters are:

• Theodoros Alexopoulos, a critical review of the Orthodox–Oriental Orthodox dialogue (9–27)
• Rade Kisić on twentieth-century Serbian Christology (31–45)
• Vasilica Mugurel Pavaluca on Stăniloae’s cosmic Christ and its reception by Moltmann (46–63)
• Stefanos Athanasiou on a Nicene-inspired anthropology (67–81)
• Georgiana Huian on vulnerability as an anthropological and Christological concept (82–102)
• Marina Kiroudi on Christology in religious education (105–124)
• Moga on “liturgical Christology” (125–148)

The volume is closed access, and no publisher’s blurb was available.

Sociology and anthropology

Sarah Riccardi-Swartz and Candace Lukasik, Orthodox Christianity in America: An Introduction. London: Routledge, 2026 (online 30 September 2026). ISBN 978-1-032-71581-0 (as recorded by Crossref). DOI 10.4324/9781032715810 A co-authored anthropological introduction (not an edited volume). It treats American Orthodoxy as a contested transnational field shaped by migration, empire and racial formation, rather than as one linear history. Thematic chapters cover migration infrastructures, racialisation, jurisdictional tensions, conversion and digital publics. It is pitched at students and general readers. OpenAlex reports a freely downloadable PDF; this could not be confirmed on the publisher’s page.

Journal articles

Politics, security and law

Oxana Shevel (Tufts University), “‘Liberation from the devils of Moscow’: securitising the Ukrainian Orthodox Church after Russia’s full-scale invasion”, East European Politics (advance article, online 30 September 2026): 1–36. DOI 10.1080/21599165.2026.2731886 Shevel applies Copenhagen School securitisation theory to Ukrainian state measures against the UOC. She challenges the assumption that desecuritisation is always the normative goal, and proposes three criteria for judging whether a securitisation is justified. She finds that the Ukrainian case largely meets the first two, while the policies’ effects on security, democracy and social cohesion remain ambiguous. No volume or issue has been assigned yet, and the article is not open access.

Tornike Metreveli (Lund University), “Geopolitical symphonia: why the Moscow Patriarchate sanctified war in Ukraine but not Georgia”, Religion, State and Society 54, no. 5 (2026): 399–421. DOI 10.1080/09637494.2026.2683380 Metreveli compares Moscow Patriarchate statements from 2008 to 2024. He argues that the Patriarchate showed pastoral restraint over Georgia in 2008 but sacralised the war in Ukraine. The difference, he contends, lies in contested canonical territory: it activates civilisational narratives that make the church a “co-author” of territorial expansion. The case is that religious legitimation of violence is conditional, not automatic. The article was online on 26 June 2026 and is in the issue dated 20 October 2026; it is open access (CC BY 4.0). Its authors were unknown when the article was first flagged on 10 October.

Theology and ecclesiology

Denys Bakirov (V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University), “‘Power’ in Orthodox Political Theology”, Modern Theology (early view, online 25 August 2026), article moth.70142. DOI 10.1111/moth.70142 Bakirov uses the essence–energies distinction to model the democratic paradox that the people hold power but exercise it only indirectly. He argues that the imiaslavie (“name-glorifying”) tradition, where the divine essence is actualised through a discursive medium, suits deliberative democracy better than Neo-Palamism. In his reading, Neo-Palamism’s stress on mystical experience and will tends towards an immediate identification with government that can serve autocrats. It is a Ukrainian contribution to Orthodox political theology. Pagination is not yet assigned, and OpenAlex lists a free PDF.

Brandon Gallaher (University of Exeter), “Ecumenical White Nights: Primacy, Conciliarity and the Agony and Hope of Ecumenism: An Orthodox Perspective”, Ecclesiology 22, no. 3 (2026): 326–371. DOI 10.1163/17455316-bja10073 Gallaher links the impasse in Orthodox–Catholic dialogue to two things: the absence of a shared understanding of primacy and conciliarity, and the Moscow–Constantinople rupture. He argues that Orthodoxy needs a stronger theology of primacy, and tests this against the “hierarchy of truths” of Unitatis Redintegratio, the Eastern Catholic churches and intercommunion. It is open access (CC BY, per OpenAlex).

Early modern and modern church history

Liliya Berezhnaya, “Reforms in the Seventeenth-Century Kyivan Orthodox Metropolitanate and Its Aftermath: Revisiting Old Debates”, Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 78, no. 1–2 (2026): 1–50. DOI 10.1163/17831520-20260101 This is the long introduction to a special issue. It reads the Union of Brest, Mohyla’s reforms and the Zamość synod as linked processes, and tests four frameworks against them: Florovsky’s “pseudomorphosis”, “Kyivan Christianity”, confessionalisation and entangled history. Berezhnaya asks whether Orthodox–Uniate–Catholic exchange produced a distinct “Kyivan model”. It is open access (CC BY, per OpenAlex). The other articles in the special issue were not itemised.

Андрей А. Кострюков [Andrey Kostryukov], «О причинах ухудшения отношений между Русской Зарубежной Церковью и Московским Патриархатом в 1985–1990 гг.» [On the reasons for the deterioration of relations between the Russian Church Abroad and the Moscow Patriarchate, 1985–1990], Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия II: История. История Русской Православной Церкви, вып. 131 (2026): 101–118. DOI 10.15382/sturII2026131.101-118 — in Russian The article draws on émigré periodicals and archives. It explains why early Gorbachev-era goodwill gave way to estrangement: the slow easing of Soviet religious persecution, the Patriarchate’s continuing praise of the Soviet regime, and opposition to rapprochement among ROCOR bishops, including Metropolitan Vitaly. It ends with ROCOR’s 1990 decision to open parishes and dioceses on the Patriarchate’s canonical territory, which, the author argues, set dialogue back by more than a decade. Dated 31 August 2026. The publisher’s PDF is password-protected, so the data come from Crossref.

Liturgy, hymnography and manuscripts

Епифаний (Булаев) [Epifaniy (Bulaev)], «Самоназвания и названия сборников песнопений Октоиха в греческой рукописной традиции» [Self-designations and titles of Octoechos hymnographic codices in the Greek manuscript tradition], Вестник ПСТГУ. Серия I: Богословие. Философия. Религиоведение, вып. 126 (2026): 9–35. DOI 10.15382/sturI2026126.9-35 — in Russian The article surveys more than 100 witnesses from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries: charters, wills, hagiography and especially the codices themselves. Most use “Oktoechos” or “Oktaechos”, and the author argues that “Oktaechos” is the older form, dominant until the twelfth century. “Parakletike” is the next most common name. He traces continuity from the Tropologion and proposes “Sticherokathistarion” in place of the current scholarly term “Sticherokathismatarion”. Dated 31 August 2026. The author’s clerical rank is not given in the record.

Arsany Paul, “Variable Celebrant Prayers in the Medieval Coptic Eucharist: A Bohairic Manuscripts-Based Inventory and Introduction”, Eastern Theological Journal 12, no. 1 (2026): 113–162. DOI 10.59241/etj.12.1.113-162 Paul surveys about 375 Bohairic euchologia from the thirteenth to the twentieth centuries and inventories 24 alternative celebrant prayers across nine liturgical units. Fourteen of them are absent from the 1902 printed euchologion. He argues that print canonised a repertoire that was partly marginal in the manuscripts, and that regional diversity persisted. He also identifies manuscript families from three previously unstudied codices. It is open access (CC BY-NC-ND), published 26 June 2026 by the Greek Catholic college in Nyíregyháza (the journal’s publisher).

Balkans: medieval texts, popular devotion, literature

Павле Драгичевић [Pavle Dragičević], «Босна у дјелима српских средњовјековних аутора» [Bosnia in the works of Serbian medieval authors], Синеза / Synesis 7, no. 2 (2026): 75–91. DOI 10.63356/sin.2026.017 — in Serbian (Cyrillic) Dragičević examines how Bosnia and its rulers appear in three Serbian medieval genres: saints’ lives, chronicles and genealogies. He asks whether the motifs and names chosen reflect the political and ideological positions of their time. It is open access (CC BY-NC-ND), published by the University of Banja Luka on 26 August 2026.

Vihra Baeva (Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Studies with Ethnographic Museum, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), “Mary Three-Handed in Bulgaria: Orthodox Piety and Local devotion”, Balkanistic Forum 35, no. 2 (2026): 330–356. DOI 10.37708/bf.swu.v35i2.19 An ethnographic study, based on fieldwork from 2019 to 2025, of three cults of the Three-Handed Theotokos at the Troyan, Arbanasi and Sokolski monasteries. All three are dedicated to the Dormition and present themselves as copies of a prestigious prototype. Baeva compares the images, festivals, relics and miracle narratives, and argues that global Orthodox tradition and local communities are “mutually constitutive”. Published 8 October 2026. A different article from the same issue (Bozhinov) was cited on 24 October.

Bogdan G. Bucur (St Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary), “‘Scandalizing and Befuddling Pharisees and Church Zealots’: Nicolae Steinhardt’s Subversive Orthodoxy”, Journal of Romanian Studies 8, no. 2 (2026): 177–208. DOI 10.3828/jrns.2026.18 Bucur argues that Steinhardt’s pre-prison reading of Byzantine ascetic literature gave him the framework for describing his own encounter with Christ. On this reading, Steinhardt’s spirituality is tested by its ethical fruits: joy, courage, civility. His mid-1980s monastic “Orthodox Creed” set out deliberately to unsettle legalists and zealots. The article belongs to a thematic section on Steinhardt (ed. intro. Roland Clark, 107–118; also Constantin Jinga, 119–140; Adrian Mureșan and Paul-Mihai Paraschiv, 141–175). It is open access (CC BY-ND, per OpenAlex) and was published 13 October 2026.

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This review covers the period 25-31 October 2026.

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This text was generated by Claude (Anthropic), Claude Opus 5.5, on 31 October 2026. It has been edited by Orthodox.News. https://claude.ai